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ABSTRACT
DEVELOPING A CLIMATE OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN LARGE SYSTEMS
A CASE STUDY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY'S
EQUAL OPPORTUNITY RACE RELATIONS PROGRAM
September 1982
University of Massachusetts at Amherst
Directed by: Dr. Donald Carew
The author uses a framework developed by J. Victor Baldridge
(Power and Conflict in the University, John Wiley, New York, 1971)
to present a case study of equal opportunity programs in
the United
States Navy. The study is presented in the context of a
complex
systems change effort.
For organizations attempting to create a healthy EO
climate
the author suggests that the most important part
of any strategy for
long term effect is to identify the primary
means of power and control
in the organization and to address EO through
that channel, secondly
she suggests that EO is a political
phenomenon and must take into
account the political dynamics of the
organization. In addition
she recommends attention to the following:
organization culture and
environment; systems perspective; on going
assessment and strategic
planning; long term planning; historical
patterns of change in the
iv
organization; the need for strong leadership; and defining EO to
include selection and inclusion assimilation and integration into the
mainstream of the organization. Finally she concludes that an
organization has accomplished an EO climate when it has spanned the
"program" stage and EO efforts are replaced by efforts of good
management.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
... Organizations are tools for
shaping the world as one wishes it
to be shaped. They provide the means
for imposing one's definition of the
proper affairs of men upon men.
Charles Perrow (1972)
"Twenty four hour days and seven
day weeks do not seem enough as long
as our brothers, our sisters and our
children are dying and we can reach out
to try to stem the tide."
Statement from the
Corporate Brochure of
Curber Associates
The United States Navy was established in 1798. Like other
military organizations, in the early history of this country the
Navy was held in high regard by society. Boys became men by serving
in the Navy; it was an expression of loyalty and commitment to one's
country. Political leaders were most often men who had served with
honor, in the military.
In 1972 Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Chief of Naval Operations
described the mission of the Navy:
To maintain the sea-going capability
for strategic deterrence; to maintain
control of the seas in order to keep vital
1
2life lines open and, if necessary, for
overseas projection of our armed forces;
and to maintain our naval presence
whenever it is required overseas.
Theorists give the military three broad roles: an instrument
of foreign policy; a constabulary force; or it may perform general
administrative functions not necessarily of a combat nature
(Glover, 1974).
One of those non-combat functions has historically been
sociological. The Navy has been seen as an institution which provides
social and academic development. David Rapaport (1971) observed that
the most important function of the military occurs when it serves as
a school where the citizens can learn appropriate social and civic
virtues
.
People of color (minorities) have played a role in the history
of the Navy dating back before the Revolutionary War (1775-1778) when
the formal Navy had actually not been established. The military,
however, is as much as any institution a mirror of the social structure
in this country (Janowitz, 1960). The minority experience has been
significantly different from that of whites. The formative years
of
the Navy as an institution occured when slavery was
legal in the
United States so the practice of racial discrimination
in housing,
promotions, career development opportunities, and
fighting forces in
the active Navy was taken for granted.
The account of the military experience of
minority people
described in this study might be compiled from the
archives of any
American institution; industry, education, art,
even the church.
3Relative to mission and purpose the United States Navy has been
an effective organization in spite of the fact that it has embraced
racism for nearly two hundred years. In fact, racial discrimination
only became a "problem" for the Navy as it received attention in the
larger society in the 1960's.
In the late 1960's, then Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara
launched an intensive recruitment program. Project 100,000 which was
designed to increase the number of minorities, especially Blacks, in
the Navy. Many of the Young Blacks recruited through that program
were born in the early 1950 ' s and grew up learning racial pride; for
them civil rights activism was a way of life. So in the early 1970 '
s
the United States Navy was faced with large numbers of young Black
recruits who were not assimilating well into the military culture.
The presence of this "new breed" coupled with the ripple effects of
the Civil Rights movement in this country stimulated a period of
turbulence and change for the Navy. This study examines the manage-
ment of the issue of race relations in the Navy from 1775-1974 and
the programs and processes used to address the problems
associated
with this issue.
In the Fall of 1974, the United States Navy began
implement-
ation of the Equal Opportunity Race Relations (E0/RR)
- Phase II.
Phase I, 1972-1974, will be discussed in detail
elsewhere in this
study. The following are descriptive statements
of this program that
establish its relevance to systems change theory.
1 .
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The program was conceived as a system-wide effort,
designed to impact upon the organizational lifestyles
of a total Navy of more than 500,000 people.
2. Active planning and designing of Phase II over the past
year pooled the resources of some of the nation's top
social scientists, and has responded to the input of
Navy personnel at all levels.
3. The locus for change in this program is policy. The
Navy has developed equal opportunity policy, broad
in scope and supported by a well -planned program for
implementation.
4. Policies and directives focus on the reward system
of the Navy.
5. The program is based upon a conceptual organizational
change scheme involving structured inventions for all
fleet and shore commands.
6. Implementation strategies and related policies were
promulgated by the Chief of Naval Operations.
7. A two-year time line has been established for
implementation. Success of the program, however, has
been defined as that time when the nature of the
substance of E0 policies, educational goals, and role
requirements have become engrained into the system.
8. An independent consulting firm. The Systems
Development
Corporation, was contracted to manage evaluation of
of the program.
9 Approximately 150 Naval personnel were trained
to
deliver an educational component which prepares _
managers and significant others for their roles
in
the program.
This study addresses two subjects: our understanding
of
large systems change and the need for models
to address issues of
race/relations more effectively in organizations.
The behavior of large organizations
and race relations are
two subjects about which we find current
literature burgeoning by the
day. Most social scientists agree,
however, that in both areas
5research has only begun to make some promising inroads. This study
is designed to contribute to these research topics.
This research Is guided by four objectives:
1. To report the conditions leading to the establishment
of EO policies and directives In the Navy.
2. To report the development process of race relations
programs and policies in the United States Navy.
3. To describe present policies and directives for
EO in the Navy.
4. To present guidelines for creating a climate of
equal opportunity in organizations. These
guidelines will consist of Issues and structures
which may be used by any organization for
creating EO climates.
The format for this dissertation will be a case study modeled
after the work of J. Victor Baldridge (1971).
6Significance of the Study
This study examines the makings of a program that involves two
important themes of this century related to our attempts to live and
work with people in organizations.
The two major ideas which the Navy EO/RR Programs embrace
are: (1) institutional racism, the subordination of people of color
in American organizations and (2) systems change strategy, a tool for
improving the quality of life in American organizations. The
importance of racism for the author rests in the fact that it
imprisons us all, and functions as a barrier to personal, social,
economic and political advancements. The systems approach to social
change is substantive and all-inclusive enough to be highly applicable
to changing large-scale people problems in organizations.
The author
values this potential very highly in change technology.
The equal Opportunity/Race Relations Program applies systems
theory to the issue of racism. This study was
undertaken, therefore,
as a means of crystallizing the quality of our
understanding of this
application and to communicate it to others who might
find it useful.
Beckhard and Harris (1977) have described what
constitutes a
large systems change strategy:
We define a large systems change strategy
as a plan defining what interventions to
make where, by whom, and at what time
in
order to move the organization to a
state
where it can optimally transform needs
into
results in a social environment that
nurtures
people's worth and dignity. Managerial ly
this
7means defining the kinds of expertise
that need to be brought to bear to help
with the change, identifying people in
the organization who need to become
committed to the change; establishing a
timetable and specifying priorities in
procedures, rewards, policies, and
behaviors; establishing a system of
evaluating progress toward a new state;
and providing education in skills needed
to both operate in the new condition and
manage the change.
In 1969, Beckhard identified criteria for the effective process
of changing organizations: (1) it is a planned change effort;
(2) it involves the total system; (3) it is managed from the top;
(4) it is designed to increase organizational effectiveness and health;
and (5) it is implemented through planned interventions in the
organization's processes. Within the past ten years, the scope and
structures put forward by Beckhard have been corroborated by other
theoreticians and practitioners such as Katz and Kahn (1973); Dalton,
Lawrence, Greiner (1970); and Wilson (1973).
Knowles (1969) described institutional racism as: the
structures and practices in organizations that provide career
opportunities for some, while not providing the same for others.
The
selective distribution of goods, training, skills, medical
care, formal
education, political influence, moral support and
self-respect,
productive employment, law, decent housing, are all
manifestation of
institutional racism.
A lot of ambiguity surrounds the issue of equal
opportunity
in the large organizations of this country.
The flood of affirmative
8action programs and hiring practices which sprouted in the 70
' s has
probably produced as many variations and values as there are
organizations involved. The one thing these programs have not
produced is a change in the E0 climate. Most represent piecemeal
changes. It is important for researchers, legislators, and administra-
tors to become much more concrete as to what the targets and criteria
are for a healthy climate of race relations.
The significance of this study is that it addresses the
problem of piecemeal approaches to E0 by laying the groundwork of a
model for the institutionalization of E0 and improved race relations
in organizations. Knowledge of the processes involved in changing
the climate of the Navy has applicability for other branches of the
Department of Defense, as well as civilian organizations such as
public school systems where race relations have continued to be a
great source of disruption and haphazard change in the past two
decades.
9Limitations of the Study
The author has been intimately involved in the design and
initial implementation of the EO/RR Program. This fact will
probably function as both a strength and a limitation of the study.
As a civilian consultant to the Program during the formative
years of Phase II, her participation and observations have been an
invaluable contribution to this study. She had extensive exposure to
the Navy as an organization through key program element across all
levels, access to several shore and administrative establishments, as
well as the opportunity to visit aboard two major Navy vessels, the
USS KITTYHAWK and the USS CONSTELLATION both aircraft carriers. There
were many hours of informal discussion with Naval officers during
extensive work periods. She also had the opportunity of formally
interviewing several high level officers including Admiral Elmo R.
Zumwalt, Jr., the former Chief of Naval Operations ("the man who
changed the Navy") who spearheaded the major moves that led to the
changes in social priorities in the Navy.
The author therefore brings to this study some positive
perceptions and assumptions about the quality of the program strategy
and content which could be blinding to her view of things.
10
Research Methodology
Kurt Lewin, a famous social psychologist and pioneer in
organizational change theory once wrote: "a social organism becomes
understandable only after one attempts to change it." This study Is
designed to contribute to our understanding of large systems behavior.
The approach will be to study the change processes of the Naval
organization in the area of equal opportunity. The purpose is to
conceptualize these processes involved in reaching the existing stage
of E0 policy, and to identify the targets for change which the Navy
deemed critical to accomplishing its goals.
The research method for this study will be a case study using
an adaptation of J. Victor Baldridge's Political Model (1971) for
studying organizational change in the governance of New York
University in the 1960's.
The case study has five elements related to the policy forming
process (See Figure 2).
In his study of the governance system at New York University
(NYU) Baldridge "attempted to replace the classic beaucratic model
for
empirical organizational studies with one which more adequately
dealt
with the complexity of the organization." The format includes
five
areas of focus which in Baldridge's determination represent
an
analysis of political and sociological dynamics central
to the change
process in organizations:
Social Context Factors
Interest Articulation
Legislative Transformation
11
Policy Formulation
Policy Execution
The organization of the data under these topics sometimes
called for an element of judgment on the part of the author.
Categorization was not always clearly discernible by Baldridge's
criteria. Consequently the format was modified to best protect the
interest of the model and objectives of the study. All of the
original topic areas have been included but arranged differently.
A section titled Equal Opportunity Climate Factors has been
added to provide adequate historical context. Policy Formulation and
Policy Execution have been combined to accommodate the fact that in
this study the organization moved so freely and frequently between
formulation of policy and execution of policy they could not be
comprehensively differentiated for discussion.
The major period of policy execution occurred beyond the
period of study therefore data they may have completed in this area
was not available.
The following lists show the different presentations of topic
in the two studies:
Baldridge
Social Context Factors
Interest Articulation Groups
Legislative Transformation
Policy Formulation
Policy Execution
Baldwin
Social Context Factors
Equal Opportunity Climate
Factors
Interest Articulation
Legislative Transformation
Policy Formulation and
Execution
12
A Simple Political Model
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It is also the opinion of the author that the difference in
scope of the two studies accounted for this phenomenon. The Navy
study was very large in scope and generated a sea of information
partially because of the design or conceptualization and partially
that the topic and the size and history of the organization dictated
on inherently large amount of data. The model therefore provided an
efficient and comprehensive mechanism for sorting (criteria for what
was to be defined as relevant) and for organizing and presenting a
large amount of information.
The culture of the military system is probably not as well
known as the university system so the author has made a more thorough
attempt to build a social context for the reader.
Race relations and equal opportunity are topics often laden
with myths and poorly documented case materials which accounts for
the decision to provide a factual and thorough description of EO as
experienced in this organization specifically.
Data gathering activities for this study included the study
of documents, participant observations, and interviews.
1. Documents
Documents used included: official written
communications that transpired between policy
makers and personnel at all levels of the
organization, particularly the famous "Z-Gram,"
a communique introduced by Admiral Elmo Zumwalt
when he was Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), and
through which he pronounced guidelines feedback
and requisitions. Numerous research studies,
reports, newspaper articles, statistical analysis
showing the stratification of minorities in the
rank system, personal communications between
ranking officers, historical reviews,
Congressional reports, narratives of noteworthy
speeches, and the author's personal notes.
Participant Observations
As a civilian consultant to the Program the author
was exposed to materials and groups, formal and
informal observations provided context information
relative to the organization as well as the program.
During that four year period the author made visits
of one week to three months each to the following:
Navy Race Relations Training School
Naval Air Station
Key West, Florida
Bureau of Naval Personnel
Program Development
Washington, D. C.
Human Resource Management Center
Naval Station
Memphis, Tenn.
Naval Air Station
Phase II Training School
Cheltenham, Md.
Naval Air Station
Moffett Field
Mountain View, Ca.
Naval Training Center
Human Resource Management Center
San Diego, Ca.
Human Resource Management Center
Naval Air Station
Alameda, Ca.
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3. Interviews
The author conducted the following interviews:
Interviewee
Master Chief Willie Coleman
Former Minority Affairs Ofc.
Staff-Human Resource Mgt. Prog.
Petty Ofc. Othan Monday
Former Minority Affairs Ofc.
USS Kittyhawk
Staff-EO/RR Program
Capt. Loren Moore
Staff Member
Human Resources Mgt. Prog.
Lt. Bobby Randall
Staff Member
Human Resource Mgt. Prog.
EO/RR Program
Radm. Charles Rauch
Asst. CNO
Human Goals Program
Bureau of Naval Personnel
Capt. Byron Wiley
Program Manager
Equal Opportunity/RR
Bureau of Naval Personnel
Adm. Elmo Zumwalt, Jr.
Retired CNO
Time and Place
Navy Training Center
San Diego, Ca.
March 20, 1975
Navy Training Center
San Diego, Ca.
February 10, 1975
Amherst, Mass.
May 21, 1975
Navy Training Center
San Diego, Cal
.
January 26, 1975
Washington, D.C.
Bureau of Personnel
May 19, 1975
Bureau of Naval Personnel
Washington, D.C.
May 19, 1975
U. S. Navy Archives
Washington, D.C.
May 13, 1975
In each interview the following format was used:
1. Interviewee received a copy of the dissertation
proposal in advance, along with a description of
interview format and objectives.
2. An overview of the materials was presented.
16
3. Interviewee was asked to describe the following
from his experiences and perspective,
A. groups (internal and external that
influence equal opportunity activities
and decisions and their means of expressions
B. chronology or historical perspectives of
how EO policy was conceived and
formulated (and received) including
- time (year)
- diffentiation of Phase I and
Phase II activities
- issues, conflicts surrounding the
policy-making and implementation
process.
4. Interviewee was asked to recommend other data sources.
Each interview was recorded by cassette tape. Interviews
lasted 45 minutes to two hours. Several persons brought documents
to the interview.
17
Delineation of Chapters
Chapter I introduces the dissertation as a study of
a complex systems change effort. A context is created by an
introduction to the issue of institutional racism in the Navy's
history. This chapter also describes the research methodology,
the significance of the study and delineates the chapters.
Chapter II creates a perspective for the study by
tracing the development of complex systems change technology
for early experiements with personal growth training on the
1940
' s to the more advanced organizational change strategies
used in the early 1970' s. This history paralles the
developmental stages of the E0 Program conducted by the U. S.
Navy during the period of the study.
This chapter also presents a unique history of the
minority experience in the U. S. Navy drawn almost exclusively
from Navy archives; a candid view of the history upon which
the E0 Program was built.
Chapters IV, V and VI present the core of research
data collected for this study.
Chapter III, Social Context Factors, includes a
description of the Navy as an organization. It is a discussion
of the sociology of the military environment; open systems
chatacteri sties; tradition; patterns of change; and, the
reward system.
CHAPTER II
This dissertation captures the developmental process of two
concepts. It is a vivid reflection of the development of the field
of planned changes in organizations; starting with the personal
growth approach and moving to a more comprehensive approach of
permanent systems change. The study is also a "how to" in equal
opportunity. It sets an example for managers of large organizations
who wish to create a eliminate of equal opportunity. It illustrates
the need to build EO into the realities of life in each organizational
situation. Planned change and EO are brought together as process and
content.
The objective of this chapter is to create a context for the
case study by reviewing two areas of the literature; (1) the develop-
ment of the conceptual underpinnings of organizational change efforts
showing the origin and evolution of the technology used by the U. S.
Navy in its EO efforts and (2) a candid history of the experience of
minority people in the United States Navy highlighting racism not as
a societal problem but specifically as it was experienced within the
naval organization, and the slow progress that EO efforts have had in
this country especially Federally supported programs.
18
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There was a desire for redistribution of power and grass roots
participation in planning both in the public and private sectors. The
Vietnam War was a clear demonstration that power-oriented change
strategies would not work. Thus, environment was a major impetus for
a new concept of planned organizational change in the sixties.
The development of planned organization change parallels the
growth of the applied behavioral sciences (ABS) which include social
psychology, psychology, sociology, and anthropology and according to
some, political science and economics as well (Bennis, 1966). A
specific category within the social sciences, ABS seeks to study human
behavior and apply the results of those efforts toward the betterment
of humanity. One of the staunchest contemporary advocates of this
linkage between science and action has been Bennis.
In the sixties Bennis saw an emerging action role for the
behavioral scientist (Bennis, 1963). He and his colleagues Kenneth
Benne and Robert Chin sought to relate expert knowledge to action.
They believed that it was proper for men of knowledge to influence
action, but they also observed that when this influence was exercised
the results was not satisfactory. At the same time, they saw that men
of action were unsure, being afraid that their methods were becoming
obsolete under rapidly changing conditions. While Bennis et al.
acknowledged that there were incompatibilities between men of knowledge
and men of action, they believed that the gap could be bridged and
that the vehicle was the application of behavioral science findings
to planned change efforts. Bennis linked five major areas of
20
contribution of behavioral science to planned change: (1) personality
theory, (2) interpersonal dynamics, (3) group behavior, (4) intergroup
behavior, and (5) organizational behavior. (Bennis, 1963).
There has been some disagreement with Bennis' belief in the
potential contribution of the behavioral sciences. Robert Blake and
Jane Mouton four years earlier (in 1962), after studying an
organizational change effort, concluded that "the behavioral sciences
have accomplished little of systematic character in the direction
of achieving change in situations of organized human activity."
(Blake, Mouton, 1962). Nevertheless, the prevailing attitude today is
that the applied behavioral sciences and, specifically, the field of
planned organizational change can and will continue to be used to
manage change efforts.
Parentage of the Planned Change Field
Kurt Lewin: The Practical Theorist
The conceptual heritage of planned organizational change lies
primarily with Kurt Lewin, a social scientist in the thirties and
forties. While Lewin is best known for his field theory of
personality, he also made major contributions through his related
notions about social change, force field analysis, action
research,
and group dynamics. Douglas McGregor, Rensis Likert,
Chris Argyris,
and Bennis built on Lewin's concepts. (Marrow, 1969)
After Lewin s
untimely death in 1947, his colleagues. Lei and
Bradford, Ron Lippi tt,
Marian Radke, Benne, and others, carried on his
work in group dynamics,
21
action research, laboratory training, and social change.
Lewin devoted his life to building a conceptual bridge
between theory and practice. He once said there is nothing so practical
as a good theory and was called the "practical theorist" by his
biographer, Alfred Marrow. For Lewin the linkage between research and
action came through a process called action research (AR) in which
research on social behavior (individual, group, or organization) leads
to further social action through a continuing cycle of (a) planning,
(b) execution, (c) reconnaissance fact-finding, (d) re-planning,
(e) execution, etc. The process demands that the researcher and social
actor participate in full and equal roles.
The planning stage of AR starts with a general idea. Next, an
overall plan is developed and a decision is made on a first action
step. The plan is executed and is immediately followed by reconnaissance
much like an airplane observing after a bomber attack. In the re-
connaissance phase the action is evaluated and discrepancies between
the desired and actual are determined, forming the basis for plan
modification or replanning. Then the cycle of planning, action, and
reconnaissance fact-finding is repeated.
Lewin stressed that those involved in social action should be
responsible for the reconnaissance fact-finding and not leave it to
the researcher to insure that the data obtained will be researcher to
insure that the data obtained will be realistic and be used. This
involvement of researcher and social actor adds an additional dimension
to the process—commitment through participation. Lewin believed and
22
proved that those who participate in deciding a particular action will
likely have a commitment to consequent action (Lewin, 1951).
Another of Lewin's concepts, field theory, explains how
changes in individuals, groups, or organizations take place. One
aspect of the theory states that organizations tend to be in a state
of quasi -stationary equilibrium where an existing combination or field
of forces are counterpoised in dynamic tension. The implementation of
any change begins with an analysis of the nature and strength of the
forces which are producing equilibrium. There are two types of forces --
restraining and driving. When the strength of one or more of the
forces is changed, an imbalance is created and there is movement or
change with a new balance being attained. Thus, change strategies
include removing or reducing one or more restraining forces that held
back the desired movement and/or adding or increasing one or more
driving forces in the desired direction. Lewin noted that increasing
the driving forces alone will increase tension in the system producing
greater emotionality, aggression, and conflict. However, if the
restraining forces are decreased concurrently the system will reach a
new equilibrium point and the desired change with less tension.
Another aspect of Lewin's concept of change is that change
follows a specific process of unfreezing, change, and refreezing.
This notion was illustrated by Lewin in his study of food-serving habits
during World War II. One objective of the study was to get housewives
to change their food-serving habits. Three groups were given lectures
on new foods while three others engaged in a participative group
23
decision making process on the subject. In the group decision method
it was acknowledged at the outset that individuals had resistance to
change. This approach sought to remove counter forces within
individuals; that is, to unfreeze the custom. During this unfreezing
process people began to realize that change was desirable. Then, the
change or adjustment in habit could take place within the group
(finding a new balance in force field terms). The group's decision
to change food-serving habits was then refrozen at a new level and
permanency set in as a new force field was established (Lewin, 1947).
This process of unfreezing, changing, and refreezing is the cornerstone
for change efforts at individual, group, and organizational levels.
Lewin' s work also focused on creating change by using the
group as the basic building block. In the food habit study, for
example, Lewin found that it was easier to change individuals in a
group than to change them separately. The strategy, then, was to
change the group standard and individuals would follow suit. Results
of the food habit study showed that 32 percent of those involved in
the group decision making method changed their food-serving habits,
while 3 percent of those exposed only to lectures on new foods changed
their habits (Lewin, 1943).
Training, Lewin believed, was an important tool to bring about
change. While conducting a workshop for community leaders in 1946,
Lewin formed the first T-group (training group) almost by accident.
People were brought together to discuss problems and were observed
by the trainers who would review their observations privately after
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the session was over. However, in this case the community leaders
asked permission to sit in on the feedback meetings. Lewin and the
others agreed, producing the first situation where people reacted on
the spot to data about their own behavior. Lewin realized that this
type of feedback on group interaction was a rich learning experience
and offered a process of group building which could be transferred to
back-home situations.
Clearly, Lewin's contributions to planned organizational
change are substantial. He believed in a close linkage between
theory and practice and between participation and implementation,
developed a model of change which utilized the group as a change
vehicle, and pioneered T-group change technology.
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The Group Dynamics Movement
Originating in the thirties, modern group dynamics is
concerned generally with the interaction between and forces affecting
group members in a social situation. The term group dynamics has
several meanings. First, it may be used to identify something that is
happening in all groups at all times, describing complex forces with
dynamic aspects, the nature and direction of which are determined by
forces within the group. This view of group dynamics examines how
groups form and change, their structure and processes, and how they
affect individual members, other groups, and organizations. In this
sense group dynamics is a field of inquiry. (Cartwright, Zander, 1960).
A second view, normative in nature, deals with how a group should be
organized and conducted, stressing democratic leadership, member
participation, and cooperation. Group dynamics can also be looked at
as a set of techniques such as role playing, brainstorming, group therapy,
and T-groups which are examined and applied to form effective groups.
All three of these views of group dynamics are important to the study
of planned organizational change.
While Kurt Lewin is generally credited with being the father
of modern group dynamics, (Luft, 1970) there were several other
important early influences on its development.
As a field, group dynamics emerged from the thirties as a
subunit of the social sciences which placed heavy emphasis on
empirical
research. The field had interdisciplinary relevance as social
psychologists, cultural anthropologists, political scientists,
and
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others began to study groups, focusing on the dynamics and inter-
dependence of change, resistance to change, coercion, power, cohesion,
attraction, and rejection. There was excitment and hope that findings
would have applicability to social practice. (Cartwright, Zander, 1960).
By World War II the social sciences had enough assumptions about groups
and research techniques to permit empirical research on group function-
ing. A second influence by the end of the thirties came from the
growth of such professions as social group work, group psychotherapy,
education, and administration, each of which focused interest on groups.
The Hawthorne research undertaken by Elton Mayo at the Western Electric
Company during the late twenties and thirties was the third important
influence on the field. These studies showed that there were relation-
ships between individuals and groups that affected production. The
group dynamics movement of the late forties and fifties emerged from
this background.
Lewin's contributions to group dynamics began in the mid-
thirties while he was at the University of Iowa. Seeking to under-
stand groups better, he either conducted or sparked studies on leader-
ship, communication within groups, intergroup relations, morale within
groups, group productivity and its determinants, and problem solving.
He also contributed heavily to publication in the group dynamics
field. (Lewin, 1947).
It was Lewin's concept of field theory that helped greatly in
defining group dynamics. This concept put forth and defined the
intricate set of interactions and forces which comprise group
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behavior and which offset both group structure and individual behavior.
In addition, it holds that group behavior is a function of both the
individual and the social situation in keeping with Lewin's linkup of
the individual and his/her environment.
Lewin's grand design was to improve society by focusing on and
developing a general theory of group behavior. He believed that a
better understanding of collective behavior might show how groups could
be made to serve more socially desirable ends. In 1945 Lewin succeeded
in establishing a Group Dynamics Center at Massachusetts Institute of
Technology to continue the research begun at Iowa. In the Lewi ni an
tradition, the Center south to blend pure research and practical
application. Key staff members included Ron Lippitt, Leon Festinger,
Marian Radke, Dorwin Cartwright, and John R. P. French. MacGregor
was also at MIT and was heavily involved in the Center's activities.
Lewin's work in group dynamics was carried on by a number of
his colleagues after his death. Cartwright, prominent among them,
became director of the Research Center for Group Dynamics when it was
moved from MIT to Michigan and, with Alvin Zander, published the first
comprehensive book on group dynamics in 1953. (Cartwright, Zander,
1953).
The crescendo of activity in the group dynamics field during
the fifties emphasized the importance of work groups and laid the
groundwork for their role in planned organizational change. In 1957,
Cartwright and Ron Lippitt summarized the thinking about groups:
1. Groups are inevitable and are found in all
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parts of the world,
2. Group decisions often can produce greater
changes to individual behavior than can be
brought about in isolated individuals,
3. Groups mobilize and broker powerful forces
that affect individuals,
4. Group interaction, cohesiveness, membership,
and intergroup competition apply group
pressure to individuals influencing individual
behavior and choices,
5. Groups can produce both good and bad
consequences, and group pressure in cohesive
groups may result in higher or lower productivity,
and
6. Thorough understanding of group dynamics can
help us enhance desirable consequences and
inhibit undesirable ones -- knowledge is
power, the power to change behavior.
(Cartwright, Lippitt, 1961).
With youthful vigor the group dynamics movement channeled
much of its energy into laboratory training which was "an educational
strategy based primarily on experience generated in various social
encounters by learners themselves and which aims to influence
attitudes and develop competencies toward learning about human inter-
actions." (Schein, Bennis, 1965). The motivating force behind
laboratory training was the National Training Laboratory (NTL) and
its
first director. Lei and Bradford.
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By the sixties, laboratory training had become the most
prominent planned organizational change technique. With its usage
came a rash of effectiveness studies wherein laboratory training was
assessed for its ability to re-educate individuals and change
organizations. Results of the studies show individual change more
likely than organizational change. (Buchanan, 1972).
Team building, which focused on improving effectiveness of
work groups, grew out of the laboratory training techniques.
Gradually, by the seventies team building had replaced laboratory
training as the most prominent planned change technique. The group
dynamics movement provided the conceptual foundation for both of these
techniques.
Lippitt, Watson and Westley:
Planned Change Defined
Much of the post-1960 literature on planned organizational
change uses Lippitt, Watson, and Wesltey's book, The Dynamics of
Planned Change
, (1958), as a point of departure. The book represents
a formalization and elaboration of work that was started by Lewin in
the thirties. Ron Lippitt, one of his colleagues, working at the
University of Michigan Research Center for Group Dynamics with Jeanne
Watson, Bruce Westley, and others, focused on applying Lewin 's three-
phased change process (unfreezing, change, refreezing) to organizational
change. The major contributions of Lippitt, Watson, and Westley were
three-fold: (1) they gave the "discipline" of planned change its
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initial shape and direction, (2) expanded the Lewinian change concept
into a five-phase process, and (3) articulated a key role for the
behavioral scientist in organizational change processes.
Lippitt, Watson, and Westley provided an initial definition of
the field of planned change. The authors differentiate between change
and planned change. The former refers to changed states of affairs
toward good or away from bad. In organizations changes occur in many
ways. For example, a system may internally decide on and implement
change or it may occur through the normal processes of maturation and
development or the system may change to accommodate environmental
demands. Lippitt et al
.
point out that these kinds of change are
different from planned change which they say "originates in a
decision to make a deliberate effort to improve the system and to obtain
the help of an outside agent in making this improvement." (Lippitt,
Watson, 1958). The decision to begin planned change may come from
within the organization itself or from an outsider who observes the need
for change. They further define the field as dealing with problems
in psychological processes, intergroup and intergroup processes,
problem solving procedures, and process of social structure as opposed
to structural reorganization or technological change. They
specifically do not include change which takes place without the aid
of an outside change agent or where the change is involuntary or
coercive as being planned change. (Lippitt, Watson, 1958).
The second and probably most significant contribution of
Lippitt et al. is their development and articulation of a Lewin-based
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change process shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2
Lippitt, Watson, and Westley's
Change Process
1. Realize need for change
Unfreeze
2. Establish change relationship
3. Work toward change Change
4. Generalize and stabilize change
Refreeze
5. Achieve terminal relationship
This five-step process is explained in detail below:
Phase I -- Development of a need for change: The change
process begins with problem awareness; however, this awareness is not
necessarily translated into a desire for change. First, there needs
to be confidence within the organization that a better state of
affairs is possible; then a belief that external help both relevant
and available. The presence of these two factors will allow the move
from problem awareness to desire for change.
Phase II -- Establishment of the change relationship: In this
phase, the relationship with a change agent is initiated and solidified.
The organization seeks someone who will identify and emphathize with
its problems and needs as well as maintain his/her objectivity and
different perspective. A central part of this phase is the contract
between the parties as to expectations ground rules, time, and out-
comes. The quality of the relationship between the change agent and
organization is the key to the project's success.
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Phase III — Working toward change: This phase has three
subphases: (a) clarification or diagnosis of the problem, (b) establish-
ment of active goals, and (c) transofrmation of intentions into change
efforts
.
(a) Problem clarification or diagnosis: Data is
collected using a variety of strategies which
the change agent then actively sifts through
and arranges. While the whole process starts
with a felt need or problem, during this subphase
there is changing and broadening of the problem
based on the data collected.
(b) Establishment of active goals: The change agent's
diagnostic insights are translated into possible
actions and then definite intentions to change.
The client often experiences motivation problems at
this point when it realizes traditional patterns
will have to be discontinued to allow change.
There is also anxiety about failure because of
attempting new behaviors or procedures.
(c) Transformation of intentions into change efforts:
Lippitt et al. note that the active work of
changing is the keystone of the whole change
process. In this subphase the client continues
to need substantial support from the change
agent. Care must be taken not only in
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implementation but also in gaining supportive
acceptance of the changes from subparts of the
system. Feedback which may be difficult to
obtain must be sought from the client system
regarding the change consequences.
Phase IV -- Generalization and stabilization of change:
This phase is crucial because the change often disappears after the
specific effort ceases, allowing the client system to lapse back into
old ways. Generalization of the change to other parts of the system,
support of procedural changes by structural modification, positive
evaluation, and/or rewards help the system "lock in" the change.
Phase V -- Achieving a terminal relationship: Often at this
point the client system is dependent on the change agent. However,
in most cases the client has learned sufficient problem solving skills
to proceed alone. If additional changes are desired, the change
agent may continue. Sometimes, internal consulting positions are
created. In summary, Lippitt, Watson, and Westley took the conceptual
work in Lewin and packaged it for popular consumption. They
articulated a planned change agents, creating a powerful tool for
client systems.
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Bennis, Benne, and Chin: Ordering the Field
Seeking to build on the work of Lippitt, Watson, and Westley
and to define further and unify the field of planned change, Bennis,
Benne, and Chin edited The Planning of Change in 1961. This 765-page
volume included eighty-four articles and was grouped into four parts:
(1) The Roots of Planned Change; (2) Conceptual Tools for the Change-
Agent, Social Systems, and Change Models; (3) Dynamics of the Influence
Process; and (4) Programs and Technologies of Planned Change. The
compilation contains contributions from a variety of disciplines and
perspectives and places them under the common rubric of planned change.
The term planned change was defined by the authors as "a
deliberate and collaborative process involving change-agent and client
systems . These systems were brought together to solve a problem or,
more generally, to plan and attain an improved state of functioning
in the client system by utilizing and applying valid knowledge."
A deliberate, collaborative process, one of the three key
ingredients of planned change, refers to the relationship established
between the giver and receiver of help. Bennis et al . list six
features which distinguish this relationship: "(a) a joint effort
that involves mutual determination of goals; (b) a 'spirit of inguiry'
--a reliance on determination based on data publicly shared; (c) an
existential relationship growing out of the 'here-and-now' situation;
(d) a voluntary relationship between change-agent and client with
either party free to terminate the relationship after joint consultation;
(e) a power distribution in which the client and change-agent have
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equal or almost equal opportunities to influence the other; and
(f) an emphasis on methodological rather than content learnings."
Collaboration has an important value to the authors for two
reasons. Change is best accomplished by facilitating the client's
use of his/her own data which usually surfaces only after a trusting,
collaborative relationship is developed. Secondly, collaboration
helps overcome fear of and resistance to change in the client system.
Second, Bennis et al . include the change agent and client
system in the definition. The change agent is any person used by a
client system to assist it in improving performance, while the client
system, an individual, group, or organization, is the party asking for
help and desiring change. Bennis et al . believe that the Lippitt
et al . definition of change agent, a person brought in from outside
the client system, is too narrow, citing three reasons: (1) client
systems have potential resources for instituting their own planned
change programs, (2) client systems need to continually adapt and
change so as to have internal capability, and (3) outside change agents
have ties to their own social and moral system which may limit their
effectiveness.
Valid knowledge is the third important element in the author's
definition of planned change. The requirements of valid knowledge are
that it must be comprehensive, looking at individual and group
behavior within institutional environments and their interrelationships
It must also be selective, using only values, ethics, and moralities
appropriate for local situations. Finally, valid knowledge must be
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usable, containing data the client can understand, manipulate, and
evaluate.
Beyond its expanded definition of planned change, the book had
several thrusts significant to the field's development. First, it
traces the roots of planned change by drawing from such scholars as
Karl Mannheim, Robert Merton, Alvin Gouldner, Max Lerner, and Ron
Lippitt. Concerned with conceptual tools for the change agent, the
authors build upon the work of Talcott Parsons, Lewin, Harry Stack
Sullivan, Carl Rogers, and McGregor, as well as their own resources.
Of the thirty-five concept-related articles, over half are written by
people influenced by Lewin, indicating both the orientation of the
book and the significance of Lewin's heritage.
The book emphasizes the author's concern for the influence
process. They assume that if planned change is to take place a
relationship must exist between persons or groups where one of the
other party (or both) utilize some form of interpersonal operation to
induce the other to do, feel, or think that which the influencer
believes is desirable. They rely on Lewin's theory of the important
effect of groups on individuals in the change process in their
discussion of influence.
Only 20 percent of the book is devoted to techniques and much
of that deals with small groups. Few articles relate to organizations.
This indicates the relatively uni-dimensional nature of change
technology in the early sixties.
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The authors of The Planning of Change wrote for a specific
audience, the change agent. Also. In the tradition of Lewin and
Lippi tt et al. the book provides conceptual material and techniques
for behavioral scientist change agents to go Into the practical world
and ply their trade. The book speaks to practicing managers only to a
limited extent.
To sum up, Bennls et al . followed the direction of Lippi tt
et al. and drew together the disparate elements of a field In Its
infancy. They provided a more specific, concise view of planned
change, setting the stage for growth.
Mann and Neff: Combining Theory and Practice
While Bennls, Benne, and Chin were working In the Boston area,
Floyd Mann and Franklin Neff were working with the Lewinian change
theory at the University of Michigan's Foundation for Research on Human
Behavior. In spring 1959 the Foundation held a conference attended by
practitioners and university researchers to review current knowledge
about change In organizational settings and to draw attention to the
need for research on planned change.
At the conference Mann and Neff's change concepts were applied
to four case studies. In seminar settings practitioners and social
scientists commented, analyzed, and drew generalizations from the
cases using the Lewin-Lippl tt change process.
In addition to further articulating Lewin's theories, the
seminars served to bring social scientists and practitioners together
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hopefully to forge a stronger bond between theory and action and to
operationalize the force field concept to individuals exposed to
change.
The seminars also sought to apply theories of change to
large-scale social systems, a relatively unexplored effort until then.
An outgrowth of the conference was Mann and Neff's book, Managing
Major Change in Organizations (Mann and Neff, 1961), which addressed
the following problem: How can change be managed efficiently and with
reasonable concern for the personal feelings and rights of all?
Despite these contributions to the planned change field, the
Mann and Neff project appears to have had limited direct impact at
the time. In retrospect, however, its key thrusts have been picked up
by others and are now important elements of the field.
Warren Bennis: Birth of a Salesman
During the sixties Warren Bennis emerged as perhaps the most
prominent, prolific, and outspoken social scientist active in the
field of planned change. His contributions fall into four categories:
reporting and advocating, consulting, theorizing, and questioning.
Based at Massachusetts Institute of Technology during much of
the sixties, Bennis was a prolific writer on planned change and its
technology, organization development. His books had a significant
impact on the field both because little had been written before 1960
and because the publications were timely, providing both academicians
and practitioners with material when the field was growing rapidly.
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Bennis was also active as a consultant to organizations involved
in change programs and worked with many people important in the field
including Argyris, Bradford, Kenneth Beckhard, Schein, and McGregor.
His consulting showed him the theoretical and practical problems
associated with planned change, leading him to advocate further
conceptualization of the field and to re-examine its development.
In his role as theoretician, Bennis 's main contribution to the
definition of the field has been elaborated earlier. Another
contribution is his argument for the necessity of planned change. Also,
a student of society and organization, he predicted the demise of
bureaucracy due to the rapidly changing world, as discussed in Chapter
I. Its replacement would be by "organic-adaptive" systems which operate
according to basic democratic principles such as full and free
communication, reliance on consensus, influence based on technical
knowledge not power, encouragement of emotional expression, and
mediation of the conflict between the organization and the individual.
In his book Changing Organizations , Bennis enumerates the problems these
principles are presenting in contemporary organizations such as:
sources and distribution of power and authority, integration of
individual needs and management goals, management and resolution of
conflicts, appropriate responses to changes induced by the environment,
and growth, decay, and revitalization. (Bennis, 1966).
By comparing organizational effectiveness to mental health,
Bennis, sought to expand the dimensions used to identify and measure
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it. Heretofore, he argued, organizations were measured only on
performance (profit, cost, productivity, and output) and satisfaction
(morale, motivation, mental health, and cohesiveness). Three additional
qualities were needed: (1) identity—clear definition of mission,
(2) reality- testing—ability to perceive the world and organization
correctly, and (3) adaptability— learning how to learn and change.
Planned organizational change was intended to move organizations
toward fulfilling all of these conditions.
As a critic, Bennis saw, while viewing the field of planned
organizational change, a number of key deficiencies. They included
lack of theoretical content in change models, overemphasis of inter-
personal and group factors as opposed to the cognitive processes of
problem-solving, paucity of good measures of change, lack of methods
to trace change dynamics in organizations, ineffectiveness of T-groups'
transference of learnings back to organizational settings, uncertainty
that new organizational values such as participation, openness, and
collaboration would lead to improved performance, indecision over the
boundaries of the change effort, total organization vs. top management
group, and inadequate preparation of change agents for this important
calling. These concerns, raised by one of its most active and
stauch supporters, helped to shape and improve the field.
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Summary
The planned change field moved from birth in the forties to a
robust youth in the sixties. Its conceptual heritage is traced from
Kurt Lewin who contributed field theory, a change process, and notions
about change in individuals and groups to the field. The group
dynamics movement combined with and extended Lewin 's theories by
developing laboratory training techniques. After twenty years of
incubation, the field of planned change was given direction by Lippitt
et al. in 1958. From that point the field quickly took shape, meeting
the needs of a rapidly growing, changing society. The Planning of
Change
,
published in 1961, drew together disparate parts of the field
and defined planned change as a conscious, deliberate process employing
behavioral science technology to solve societal problems through
collaboration between a change agent and client system. Mann and Neff
reemphasized Lewin's belief in the need for close collaboration between
the social scientist and practitioners and began to apply theories of
change to large-scale social systems. Warren Bennis, more than any
other behavioral scientist, provided leadership, energy, and self-
criticism for the growing field during the sixties.
42
Development of the Planned Change FieiH
.
Definition and Conception
Both Lippi tt et al . and Bennis et al. use the term planned
change restricti vely describing change processes as those which meet
criteria such as valid knowledge and collaborative relationships
between change agent and client system. Some writers were even more
restrictive. For example, Dalton defines planned change as "any
significant alteration of the behavior patterns of a large number of
the individuals who constitute that organization." (Dalton, 1970).
It is not planned change if other than behavior or attitudes are the
change target.
There were moves in the opposite direction as well. Some
writers use planned change generically to designate any deliberate
effort at changing. Garth Jones defines planned change as a projection
of a course of action which moves organizational affairs from one
state to another. He suggests that while the power relationships of
principal actors (change agent and client) need to be fairly equal,
other constraints of the Lippitt-Bennis definition are not required.
(Jones, 1969). Leavitt's model of planned change is also broader
than Lippitt-Bennis, who he believes are only concerned with change in
the people category. While Leavitt does not specifically define
planned change, he includes four approaches in his discussion:
technology, structure, task, and people. (Leavitt, 1965). His view
of planned change, developed in 1964, expanded the academic view of
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what comprised planned organizational change.
It is clear, however, that all of the writers cited differ-
entiate planned change from changes which are natural, haphazard, or
accidental
.
In the twenty years since its inception planned organizational
change has moved through youth and adolescence to maturity. While
the basic definition has remained the same, some profound, salutary
changes have occurred in the past five years.
1. Organizations are no longer considered a single
class but are differentiated as to service
industries, public bureaucracies, and volunteer
organizations
.
2. There is now major concern for social ecology of
interinstitutional relationships and boundary
transactions of the organization.
3. Emphasis has shifted from reduction or
elimination of conflict to understanding and
managing it to obtain its positive effects.
4. More direct confrontation of the power exists
rather than underplaying it and stressing the
facilitative role of the leader.
5. There is a realization that new, more effective,
hard-nosed strategies will be necessary to
elicit change as opposed to stressing that
organizations will get it together through
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trust and collaboration. (Bennis, 1976).
The preceding and other emerging perspectives result in part
from a rapidly changing environment: the agony and frustration of
Viet Nam, the pursuit of equal rights by minorities, women, handicapped
and aged, Watergate, the rise of Third World nations, and the OPEC oil
squeeze. The world has become more complicated and more interdependent.
In turn, organizations are buffeted by new forces, making planned
organizational change even more challenging than it was in the past.
Planned organizational change does not have critics at both
conceptual and operational levels. Crowfoot and Chesler place Bennis,
Benne, and Chin in the professional technical school of thought which
"stressed the intellectual expertise of selected classes of people
and their ability as well as their right to make decisions and plans
for others in order to be helpful." (Crowfoot, Chesler, 1976). They
argue that this type of planned change has contributed to the
established goals of econcomic and organizational growth as opposed
to stimulated qualitative organizational change. Crowfoot and
Chesler define two other perspectives: political, which stressed
organization of mass power, legitimate office, and mobilization of
elites and is derived from the works of A1 insky, Lewin, and
Machiavelli; and countercultural, which is redemptive in character,
emphasizing the unfolding nature of man and commual organization as
the building blocks of a new unalienated society and comes from the
works of Fromm, Slater, Buber, and Schutz.
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Bennis et al . respond that "our paradigms of planned change
(or organizational development) desperately need to be broadened to
account for the needs, aspirations, anger, and concern of outside
interests groups and internal pressure groups and caucuses and to
incorporate models of change which are more innovative." They seek to
operationalize this desire by including broader, more diverse articles
in the third edition of The Planning of Change
.
Another recent criticism has been leveled at planned organi-
zational change by Edgar Huse, author of a comprehensive organization
development text (Huse, 1975). In this text, Huse distinguishes
between managed and planned change. Managed change involves the
active participation of the organization, group, or individual in
making things happen that are in the best interests of both the
individual and the organization. They are directed at bringing about
planned, organized change in order to increase organizational
competence. He sees planned change as only one of three approaches to
managed change, the other two being intervention theory and method
and action research.
Huse equates planned change to the Lippitt, Watson, and
Westley model but does not use either the Lippitt or the Bennis
definitions. He believes that: (1) planned change places a greater
emphasis on immediate, specific changes and problem solving than
internalization of changes into the organization, 12) it does not
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stress research about results or about validating the model, (3) the
Lippitt typology is seldom followed in practice, and (4) planned
change tends to rely on one intervention, particularly packaged
programs, resulting in emphasis on content rather than process. His
definition is more general and is couched in more popular terms.
Though one includes Huse's three approaches within managed change, the
end product differs little from the Bennis definition. Nevertheless,
Huse's criticisms of the planned change approach appear valid.
French, Bell, and Zawacki (1978), provide a contemporary view
of the field that uses the term organization development rather than
planned change. French et al
. see OD as normative, prescribing, how
planned change in organizations should be approached and implemented.
They define OD as planned, sustained, and overall strategy, involving
deliberate entry, using a collaborative relationship between the
consultant and client, and targeting changes in people. Clearly, this
definition is very similar to the Bennis et al . definition of planned
change. It appears that planned change is being replaced by
organization development as the more common term describing the field.
In this dissertation the terms are used interchangeably.
In summary, the definition of planned change over the years
has received strong leadership from Bennis, Benne, and Chin. They
defined the field in 1961 and elaborated on that definition in 1969
and 1976. Yet, there is no unanimity. Leavitt and others
conceptualize planned change more broadly. In order to develop a
better understanding of planned change, attention must be directed in
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future sections to theories, strategies, approaches, processes, and
techniques.
Bennis proposed that the need for a theory of changing includes
the following:
1. Mani pul able variables — accessible levers for
influencing the direction, tempo, and quality
of change and improvement,
2. Variables which do not violate the client
system's values,
3. A reasonable cost factor,
4. A reliable basis for diagnosing conditions
facing the client system,
5. Clear intervention phases that the change agent
can use to estimate termination of the relationship,
6. Communicability to the client system, and
7. Conditions which allow assessment of the
appropriateness of the theory for different
client systems.
The discussion of whether a theory of planned change/OD exists
accelerated in the seventies. Harry Levinson argues that there is no
systematic body of professional knowledge about OD, but two other
writers differ with him. Sashkin points out that there is a
theoretical basis of OD, citing the work of Lewin, Coach and French,
Cartwright, Lippitt, Watson, and Westley, and Kolb and Frohman.
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French et al . argue for the works of Lewin, Cartwright, Schein, and
Katz and Kahn as conceptualizations of the field of planned change. At
best, there appears to be agreement that there are a number of theories
of planned change and organization development, but no definitive
theory exists.
Perhaps the most significant contribution to the theoretical
field in recent years has been made by Dunn and Swierczek, who suggest
using practice to develop theories of planned change, because it is
generated directly from experience acquired from social research.
They examined planned change theory and developed eleven hypotheses
which they then used retrospectively to analyze a sample of sixty-seven
cases of planned change efforts. Of the eleven hypotheses, results
show that low to moderate empirical support exists for three, those
involving collaboration and participation in change efforts.
While some authors caution that the results of the Dunn study
are based on a limited case sample, the findings suggest discrepancies
between leading planned change theories and available records of
experience. Hopefully, as the sample is broadened and this method of
theory building is further utilized, a more definitive theory of
planned change will emerge.
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Strategy
The strategy of planned change ranges from the general plan
for the change effort based on one's conception of man to what
approach, what process, and what series of techniques to employ.
Its development in the literature can be traced first from
the meta- theoretical level which deals with assumptions about man and
human behavior. Chin and Benne's article, which is the most significant
of the few written on this issue, discusses three general change
strategies based on meta-theoretical assumptions: rati onal-empiri cal
,
normati ve-reeducative, and power-coercive.
Rational -empirical change assumes that man is rational and will
follow his self-interest once it is revealed to him. Change proposed
by an administrator or consultant will be adopted if it can be
rationally justified and if it will offer benefits to those affected.
This general strategy is well suited to the expert consultant or
engineering model of change.
Normati ve-reeducative change strategies assume man is rational
and intelligent, but patterns of action and practice result from
sociocultural norms and commitments on the part of individuals to
these norms. Thus, change in man comes not exclusively from the
cognitive level but often from a more personal level of habits,
attitudes, and values. Employing this strategy entails changing
people's normative orientation.
Power-coercive strategies are based on a compliant view of
man which holds that those with less power accede to the will of
those
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with more. These strategies seek to use political and economic power
to achieve the change goals proponents have decided are desirable. This
application of power, both legitimate and nonlegitimate, comes in a
number of ways: (1) such means as economic boycott, strikes and
negotiations, and moral persuasion, (2) political institutions
(passage of a law), and (3) recomposition and manipulation of power
elites; e.g., C. Wright Mills' power elite).
Chin and Benne's contribution to planned organizational change
is a clear articulation of the relationship between meta- theoretical
assumptions and general change strategies. In other words, if you
believe "A" about human behavior, then general strategy "B" can be
employed. Until their article the choices were either unclear or
couched in terms of individual managerial style (e.g., McGregor's
Theory X - Theory Y, Likert's four-system model, and Blake and Mouton's
managerial grid).
More specific development of strategy came from the
theoretical work of Lewin, Coch and French, and the group dynamics
movement. Their work emphasizes reducing resistance to change
through groups using laboratory training which in turn changes
organizations. The work of these early contributors focused on
strategy as well as theory, perhaps to the deteriment of the development
of theoretical foundation of the field.
In further elaborating general strategy, there was a need to
determine specifically what to change and how to go about it. This
led to development of various change approaches and processes.
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In the sixties development of strategy became still more
specific. Larry Greiner, representative of this trend, was concerned
about what works in the organization. He developed a list of
conditions which differentiate successful changes from less success-
ful ones. In 1969 Richard Beckhard wrote a book on strategies of
planned change, using both theoretical and case study materials, that
outlined conditions necessary for a successful change effort.
The pioneering organizational change work at TRW Systems done
by Sheldon Davis has been a model and inspiration to other practitioners.
David added to the growing literature on strategy in 1967 when he
authored a popularized case study on his experiences with organizational
change efforts at TRW. His emphasis also was to talk about what
worked in the organization.
Over the past decade much attention in the planned change
field has been directed to the development of change techniques.
Consistent with this trend has been the definition of conditions under
which certain techniques should be used.
The strategy of planned organizational change has moved from
a focus on its meta- theoretical and theoretical basis where strategy
is conceived of in the broadest sense to a concern (perhaps even
preoccupation) with technique. This has occurred largely as a
response to the practical need to deliver a successful end product--
organizational change.
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Approaches/Targets
Much attention has been directed to "approaches" to planned
organizational change. The term approach refers to what and/or who is
being changed; that is, the target of change. Harold Leavitt
visualized organizational change in terms of four interrelated
approaches: task, structure, technology, and people. Task refers to
the organization's reason for being and all of the subtasks that exist
in complex organizations. Structure includes systems of communication,
systems of authority, other roles, or work flow. Technology is
comprised of problem-solving inventions like work measurement techniques,
computers, or other machines. People refers to the members of the
system and their behavior. Leavitt suggests that while approaches to
organizational change may begin with one variable, change usually
results in compensatory or reactive change in others. For example,
the introduction of a new technology such as a computer may cause
structural change (e.g., in the communication system or work flow),
changes in people (numbers, skills, attitudes, performance, and
activities) or even changes in task definition. Ideally, these
secondary changes are intended and foreseen, but sometimes they are
not. Figure 3 is a diagrammatic presentation of the Leavitt variables
and their interrelationships:
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Figure 3
Leavitt's Change Typology
Structure
Task Technology
People
Approaches to change, Leavitt observed, differ in the amount
of emphasis and the ordering of these four variables. The approaches
also differ in the causal chains by which they intend to bring about
change. For example, structure is often altered to change people
in order to improve performance. Some human relations approaches
seek to change people in order to change structure or technology to
improve performance. Also, Leavitt argues that all three approaches
(excluding task which is assumed to be constant in more cases)
conceivably could be used to solve the same problem. One might see
a modification of structure such as decentralization, or a change in
technology (e.g., computerization), for a change in the way people
relate to one another such as a sensitivity training program proposed
as the solution to one problem.
Leavitt's work offers several contributions to the field of
organizational change. First, as indicated earlier, he presents a
broader view of organizational change than many of his contemporaries
who were emphasizing the people approach only.
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Second, he constructed a four-variable typology which
provides a framework that he and others could use to discuss, analyze,
and evaluate individual approaches. Finally, Leavitt, in essence,
presented a systems view of organizational change efforts.
Though each of the three major change approaches (again
excluding task) have undergone a lengthy developmental process which is
described in detail by Leavitt, only summaries of these along with the
systems approach which has been developing more recently will be
provided here.
Structure as an Approach/Tarqet
This approach is derived from classical organization theory
which held as its objective the clear definition of functions and
authority to accomplish tasks efficiently. It is grounded in the
early writings of Henri Fayol
,
Luther Gulick, Lyndall Urwick, James
Mooney and Alan Reilly, and, more recently, the works of Harold Koontz
and Cyril O'Donnell, Ernest Dale, and Peter Drucker. The greatest
impact on organizational change, however, has come from management
consultants who used these concepts as a foundation for change efforts.
Another branch of the structural approach is social
engineering advocated by the so-called interaction! st school which
emphasizes changes in interactional structures to improve attitudes,
morale, behavior, and output. A third type of structural approach is
sociological, and is addressed by Charles Perrow (1970), Jerald Hage,
and Michael Aiken (1970). According to them, organizational change
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takes place by altering role definitions, role relationships, and
behavior.
Technology as an Approach/Target
The genesis of the technological approach was Frederick W.
Taylor's scientific management in 1911 which relied on empirical work
measurement to change procedures and equipment to increase efficiency.
Other early contributors were Harrington Emerson, Lillian and Frank
Gilbreth, and Henry Gantt. In organizations scientific management
first became industrial engineering with its time and motion studies.
After World War II operations research, which utilized sophisticated
mathematical techniques, became the watchword of scientific management.
Behavior (People) as an Approach/Target
The objective of the people approach is to attain increased
organizational effectiveness through improved managerial resources.
The approach developed from the human relations school of management
with the Hawthorne studies of the thirties and has gone through
several phases. The first was manipulative, addressing the question.
How can we get people to do what we want them to do? and was generated
by the work of Lewin, Dale Carnegie, Lester Coch, and John R. P.
French. (1948). A second phase was the power equalization approach
whose early influences were Carl Rogers' client-centered therapy and
the group dynamics movement. Later, power equalization models were
developed by Lippitt et al .
,
McGregor (participative management), (1960).
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Likert (leadership styles), (1961), Argyris (interpersonal comptence)
(1962), and Blake and Mouton (managerial grid). (1964).
This change approach seeks increased organizational
effectiveness by simultaneously relating the social system to changes
in technological and/or structural system changes. A second objective
is to assure organizational systems (particularly structure and
technology) to the environment. The change foci are varied: work
groups, methods and procedures, work flow, and linkages between people
and technological subsystems.
A branch of the systems approach to change called socio-
technical systems originated at the Tavistock Institute in England in
the fifties with writers such as Elliot Jacques, Cyril Sofer, Fred
Emergy, Eric Trist, Joan Woodward, Tom Burns, G. M. Stalker, and
A. K. Rice. In the United States Robert Blauner, Paul Lawrence, and
J. W. Lorsch follow this perspective.
Organizations are viewed as integrated wholes composed of
elements and parts. The elements can be classified as human, structural,
goal, and technological. Organizational parts include departments,
agencies, bureaus, goal -attainment, adaptation, production, and
support. As an open system an organization also carries out a dynamic
interaction with the environment in order to survive and grow,
receiving inputs from it and providing outputs to it. Since the
environment is subject to continuous change, organizations establish
feedback mechanisms to deal with these changes. (Ulku, 1969).
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Katz and Kahns' work, The Social Psychology of Organizations
(1966), which relates systems theory to organizations, emphasizes the
systemic nature of organizations, and, consequently, the advisability
of dealing directly with organizational variables rather than
individual or group properties in isolation. In other words change
in organizations must be approached on a total social system basis
where subsystems are interdependent and must deal with the environment
which it affects and is affected by.
Michael Tushman (1975), is a key spokesperson for the con 1-
tingency approach to change, another branch of the systems approach.
He begins with Leavitt's four-variable typology which he divides into
two areas: people and structure (combining Leavitt's structure and
technology). Tushman's thesis is that each of the two approaches alone
is deficient. The people approach (psychological in nature) ignores
or assumes constant such factors as organizational size, technology, and
environment. Further, he finds a bias toward individual change,
minimal results based on empirical studies, lack of transferability
back home, and doubts that training alone can bring about change.
Similarly, the structural approach used alone is deficient.
The Tavistock studies have illustrated the need to consider both
technical and social systems in order to implement change effectively.
There is a sociological bias to the structural approach which defines
individual interaction in terms of roles and minimizes psychological
aspects of a social situation.
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In summary, approaches to planned organizational change
during the past twenty years have undergone three major alterations.
The first came in 1964 when Leavitt suggested his four-variable
typology. This broadened the horizon from what defined by Lippitt
et al. and Bennis et al., serving to open up the field to include
structural, technological, and task change, in addition to behavioral
change. The Leavitt contribution also set in motion the second
alteration — a systems approach to change which is now a well-
accepted alternative in the literature. Finally, there is growing
interest in a contingency approach to change as exemplified by Tushman.
Processes
Another important element in planned change is the process or
series of actions or operations that lead to change itself. Most
change processes are based on Lewin's action research concept and
this three-step process (unfreezing changing, refreezing)articulated
by Lippitt, Watson, and Westley. Three trends in the development of
processes have been evident: (1) elaboration of the Lewi ni an process
to explain and encourage change in individuals, (2) application of it
to organization-wide change, and (3) development of a linkage between
processes and strategies of change.
Development of the first trend which utilizes the people
approach to planned change has depended on the necessity for change
in individuals' beliefs, attitudes, and values as its cornerstone.
Using Lewin as a point of departure, Schein developed a three-stage
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individual change process. (Schein in The Planning of Change
. 1969).
Schein's conceptual scheme addresses individual changes of a basic
nature; that is, changes which involve a person's self or identity
and occur during socialization or therapy, for example. He emphasizes
the problem of having individuals unlearn something before new things
can be learned, since most changes involve giving up attitudes or
behaviors integrated with the self and highly valued. Resistance
arises because changing implies that the previous behavior or attitude
was deficient. In this first step, called unfreezing, these defenses
aroused in the individual "must be made less operative, circumvented,
or used directly as change levers."
When the equilibrium has been upset and the resistance reduced,
the individual will seek information which will be utilized to re-
establish equilibrium. This is the process of seeking, processing,
and utilizing new information to form new behaviors and perceptions
which is the second stage, changing.
Finally, the individual must fit the new behavior or attitude
with other existing attitudes and integrate the changes into
significant on-going relationships. This refreezing is essential for
the change to endure. If the change doesn't fit, the cycle of un-
freezing should be initiated again.
The main contribution of Schein's scheme is that it provides
a model for individual change which identifies change
mechanisms step-
by-step. It elaborates a process for the people
approach school which
sees organizational change as the result of
individual change.
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Working with the second trend, Louis B. Barnes approached the
problem of changes in organizations first by focusing on who would be
changed, believing that individuals' response to change was critical
to the success of organizational change. He then developed an
organizational change framework with this perspective.
Larry Greiner (1967), followed the strong emphasis in the
sixties of making practical use of concepts. Part of the research
focus was to evaluate organizational change efforts and to generalize
from them. Greiner surveyed eighteen studies of organizational
change, looking for "successful" and "less successful" change patterns
and reported ten conditions which differentiated successful changes
from the less successful. He found that successful changes follow
sequence which has a Lewinian base. Operationalizing his findings,
Greiner developed a six-phase change process as depicted in Figure 4.
Writing from a people-oriented, power equalization approach,
Greiner also argues that successful change depends on a redictribution
of power within the organizational structure. By this, he means a
significant alteration in decision-making practice toward greater
use of shared power which occurs through a developmental process of
change, involving a number of phases.
The third trend in development of process leading to change
has been aimed toward managers and the change strategy that they
ought to employ. Representative of this is the work of Kenneth Benne
and Max Birnbaum. (The Planning of Change, 1969). They exhort
managers saying "those who have managerial functions in organizations
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must analyze and predict impending changes and take deliberate action
to shape change according to some criteria.
. .The planning of change has
become part of the responsibility of management in all contemporary
institutions....' The authors also rely on Lewin to explain change
dynamics, using force field analysis and the three-step model, and
offer strategic principles to managers.
Techniques
It is not within the scope of this dissertation to treat
planned change/OD techniques in a detailed fashion. However, some
knowledge of them is important for an understanding of the field and
its development and how that development influenced the navy social
changes efforts. This portion focuses on the developmental activities
of the sixties, while a succeeding section identifies major current
techniques. Specific descriptions are included in Appendix A.
Bennis, Benne, and Chin suggest that the technology or
instrumentation section of the planned change field falls into three
categories: (1) training, (2) consultation, and (3) research (data
collection) and feedback.
Training is viewed as an action-enabling step that is the
teaching of skills and knowledge necessary to carry out an action.
An organization which feels some deficiency in the conduct of its
business may decide to go to school to learn better ways of doing
things. Education or training is an attempt by behavioral scientists
to meet this kind of organizational need.
Greiner's
Clunge
Process
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Consulting is viewed as "an interpersonal relationship
between a client-system and change agent (consultant), in which the
latter tries to help the former solve a problem." Various forms of
advice-giving" are the life-blood of the consultant. Sometimes, the
advice takes the form of recommendations drawn from the expert
knowledge of the consultant developed from studying other systems.
This type of consulting has been termed the engineering model by Alvin
Gouldner (1956), and fits with the structural change approaches of
the classical management school.
Another method is for the consultant to stimulate, assist,
and support the client in developing, applying and evaluating his own
advice. This model is termed clinical by Gouldner and is the generally
accepted change agent role of the planned change literature.
Applied research, the third category of technology, is a
tool for evaluating results through feedback about the validity of
consulting and/or educational efforts. Research is also used to obtain
information about what is going on in the system. In this case the
consultant enters the system, collects data, and reports it to the
client.
In ideal form "consulting leads to adequate diagnosis, training
to internalization of prerequisite skills, and research to evaluation
of the two prior steps." Clearly, these three technology sectors are
related and often blend together. Training, for example, frequently
involves problem solving as well as internalization; research may
involve training and consulting.
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Current State of the Planned Change Field
This look at the planned organizational change field has shown
rapid growth, terminological confusion, and greater emphasis on
technique than theory.
The field has enjoyed rapid growth during its thirty years of
existence. Its Lewinian conceptual framework has stimulated a variety
of theories and strategies of participation, commitment, group
development, and resistance to change, and a growing number of change
processes. But even greater growth has occurred in the number and
variety of techniques.
Growth of the field has been accompanied by terminological
confusion. It is difficult to determine the difference, if any,
between planned change, organization development, organizational
improvement, and managed change. "Techniques" are called "approaches"
and "approaches" are called "strategies" or "processes." This
confusion makes it difficult to communicate particularly to managers
who are considering a planned change effort and compounds the
inescapable problem of how to communicate about feelings, trust,
collaboration, openness, and values in an organizational world which
is cognitively oriented. The vocabulary of planned change confuses
and scares people.
There is no unifying theory of planned organizational change.
This is neither surprising nor damaging to the field at this time. A
unified theory during such a growth period could restrict creativity.
The disadvantage is that the field lacks theoretical direction and
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general parameters. The recent work by Dunn is applying grounded
theory to planned change is a positive remedial step.
Development of theory has been slow because of the rush
toward development of techniques. Consequently, we may be moving
toward a triumph of method over purpose. This is not to say that the
prol iteration of techniques and the recent emphasis on elaboration
of the Lewi ni an change process have not been positive. To the
contrary. They indicate industry, creativity, health, and
aggressiveness which will help the field to measure up to its task of
improving organizational effectiveness. The recent renaissance and
adaptation of the action research process in the public sector has
been a particularly exciting development.
The field's theoretical development has also been retarded by
its conceptual and methodological heritage. Spawned from the applied
behavioral sciences, planned organizational change emphasizes behavioral
as opposed to structural or technological change. The idea is to
change peoples' behavior. The people will then make structural,
technological, and other changes. The founders (Bennis, Benne, and
Chin; Lippitt, Watson, and Westley) and their successors (French, Bell,
and Zawacki ) have made limited movement toward accommodating other
points of view. Their stance has been largely responsible for the
behavior vs. structure dichotomy that has plaqued the field for
fifteen years. The movement toward systemic and contingency approaches
to change appear to be rectifying this problem and are likely to be the
wave of the future.
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Further, it is important to note that the planned
organizational change field has been partially coopted in the seventies.
This has come about through organizations' unrelenting search for
greater profits. The temptation has been to try a few techniques,
to get a quick fix. This practice, though causing growth in planned
change technology, cannot be called planned change.
The Minority Experience in the
United States Navy 1775-1973
67
This overview of the experience of minority people in the
United States Navy is presented to establish a context for this study,
and to introduce the Issue. The materials found in this section draw,
almost exclusively, upon military documents, the depth and scope of
which could not be found in the cursory treatment of minority people
in the literary history of this country.
In 1973 the population of the United States Navy was nearly
600,000 people. Of this number, 65,000 were minorities (people of
racial groups other than Caucasian); more than half of the minority
group were Black. The second largest minority population was Filipino.
Minorities have played a significant role in the history of
the United States Navy dating back before the Revolutionary War (1775-
1778), when the formal Navy had actually not been established.
(Sessions, 1974). They have fought in every major American conflict
and have come away with a substantial share of its citations and
decorations even when subjected to discriminatory treatment.
The late 60' s and early 70' s were marked by a series of racial
disturbances in the Navy when Black sailors attracted national
attention by openly resisting discrimination. Racism in the Navy
appears to have spanned two centuries. The history of those years needs
to be known and understood for purposes of this study.
There are five minority groups in the United States Navy today:
Blacks, American Indians, Malayans, Mongolians and Hispanic Americans.
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The titles designated ethnic groups are constantly changing. For
purposes of this study, the author will use the following names:
U.ac ^ s ~ referred to as Negroes in dated materials
American Indians
Fi 11 P 1
n
os - sometimes designated Malayans as that is the
reference used by the Navy
Japanese - sometimes referred to as Mongolians
*
Hispanics - all Spanish-speaking Americans
Until very recently Hispanics were not designated as a cultural
group in the Navy. Their military history is basically unrecorded,
as an identified group. The author acknowledges the presence of this
group; however, references will not be made to their contributions due
to this lack of information.
Filipinos
The history of Filipinos in the United States Navy is obscure
even though their participation dates back to the early 1900' s. During
World War I (1914-1918) 25,000 Filipinos enlisted and served this
country. (Griggs, 1973). This was the largest such population during
the period covered in this study. In subsequent years their entry into
this country was restricted; there were no formal integration policies
and the military was an entry vehicle for future citizenship.
In the early years of World War II (1934-1945), approximately
5,000 Filipinos were still enlisted. Those who were not already a
part of the military were ineligible for the draft and were in fact
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considered aliens. Approximately 7,000 additional Filipinos were
made eligible as a result of a 1940 protest for their right to serve.
They wewe placed in an all
-Filipino regiment in California.
In the early post-war period this country signed the first
United States/Filipino agreement. Filipinos were drafted in large
numbers and channeled into the stewards rates where they replaced
Blacks who had filled those jobs from 1932-1942 when it was the only
rate open to them (Blacks).
In 1952 the Navy Advocate General signed T1AS2931, a military
agreement which stated that the United States would recruit 1,000
male Filipinos between the ages of 18 and 30 annually. They would be
eligible for assignment to duty both ashore and at sea with eligibility
to re-enlist and retire as United States citizens. (The Rudder
October, 1974). This agreement was amended twice before 1973. The
first amendment increased the number recruited annually to 2,000; the
second amendment expanded recruitment to other branches of the
military.
As with all military career people, the Filipinos were immersed
into a total military culture that affects not only the service man or
woman but the entire family. Blaszkowski (1973), summarized the
following as problem areas experienced by Filipinos in the Navy.
(1) culturally biased entry and promotional examinations.
(2) discrimination based on accent. Filipinos were
often disqualified for leadership positions because
of their accents.
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(3) disproportionate numbers of cooks and stewards,
which did not allow development of their
potential and limited their preparation for good
jobs when they returned to civilian life.
(4) limited number of promotions. In 1972 there were
only 80 officers among a Filipino population of
20,446.
Filipinos and their families were subjected to humiliating and
demeaning situations especially in housing and legal matters. The
language barrier was frequently used as a means for exploitation.
Japanese (Mongolians)
In 1973 there were 1,000 Mongolians in the Navy. The most
prominent features of their history that I reviewed were the conditions
under which they initially volunteered their services. Their naval
experience began with the Spanish-American War, 1898-1902 (Griggs).
History records the death of seven Japanese sailors in 1898 who were
aboard the Battleship Maine destroyed in Havana Harbor. Others were
listed aboard United States warships in the Battle of Manila Bay 1898.
When the United States went to war with Japan, Japanese-
Americans were put in the precarious situation of fighting for a
country that was hostile against people of their race and simultaneously
fighting against their families in the Japanese forces. The generation
of Japanese of age to serve at that time were the Nisei (second
generation Japanese). To begin with, the Navy and Marines had changed
the classification of all Nisei to 4c (aliens not eligible to serve)
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thus imposing blanket exemption from the draft. The Nisei resented
this act deeply. (Finklestein, Sandifer and Wright, 1971). Many of
those who were eventually allowed to serve came directly from
concentration camps in the United States where many Japanese Americans
were detained until after the war.
American Indians
Many Indian tribes allied themselves with the British in the
Revolutionary War and the War of 1812. (Griggs, 1973). Others
sustained a cautious neutrality waiting to see what would come; a few
tribes declared themselves on the side of the Americans. American
Indians have participated in every major war since the Revolutionary
War and received recognition for valor. Like other minorities, the
Navy became, for the American Indian, a channel into the larger
American society. Many did not return to their tribes after military
stays. Figures obtained from reservation drafters and enlistees show
that the larger number of Indians participating in the United States
Armed Forces have been in the U. S. Navy. Few records are available
to describe in any detail what their Navy experience had been.
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Black Enlisted Mph
Military records include more extensive accounts of the Black
Navy experience. Consequently the author will present a more detailed
overview of the history of Blacks in the Navy which embraces a
substantial history of the development of the U. S. Navy itself, and
probably simulates in many ways the experiences of all minority groups.
Logan (1974), described records of Blacks dating as far as
1775 when many slaves and bondsmen served their country in the
military. At the outbreak of the Revolutionary War in 1775, the
United States was not yet in existence and the colonies had no navy.
Vessels previously used for transportation and trade were outfitted
with equipment for war at sea. Many of these ships, some of which
were captured and destroyed by the British, were manned by men of color.
(Hailey, 1973). In the Navy's first sea fights of the Revolutionary
War, 1500 Black Americans served their country manning boats, working
sails, loading guns and piloting coastal vessels. The Navy needed
warpower desperately, and in keeping with the times, often resorted
to increased numbers of Blacks, even though they were the least
preferred human resource. Hailey (1973), relates: "commanders were
often forced to rely on Blacks because of shortages or desertions
among the crew." Blacks were enslaved at this time and were not
considered men. Most of the thirteen states promised freedom money
and land to Black slaves who fought, therefore, many volunteered.
Although some had patriotic motives, freedom took precedence,
according to Hailey. Whatever the motives, Blacks, entered in the
73
ships books without distinction of race, distinguished themselves in
the Revolutionary War, some of whom, subsequently reclaimed by their
masters, died in slavery.
In 1798, the permanent Navy of the U. S. was formalized with
the building of the first official ships, the Constitution
, the United
—
ates and the Constellation. At the time, there was a ban against
the development of Black sailors aboard ships, issued by the first
Secretary of Navy, Benjamin Stoddert. (Logan, 1974), (Wiley, 1968)
and (Session, 1970). A few Blacks were known to have served on ships;
however, because of the Navy's loose compliance with Congressional
orders. Blacks enlisted. This inclination toward non-compliance
affected minorities, sometimes positively and sometimes negatively.
It was during the Revolutionary War that the involvement of
Blacks as a desperate move to supplement white male fighting forces
began a mentality that prevailed through the War of 1812. The
conditions of their involvement was situational; they were consistently
referred to by (and in) derogatory terms and given the less desirable
jobs whenever it was possible to make such a distinction. Sometimes
limited facilities did not allow for separate living and working
facilities. Generally, however, they lived in separate, substandard
facilities. In the War of 1812, Black men comprised about one-sixth
of the Navy population and made up nearly 20% of the crews of some
ships. Under extraneous conditions, they often distinguished themselves
in heroic plays for this country.
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Slavery, both as a moral issue and as the focal point of the
Southern economic system and cultural pattern, was an important causal
factor to the Civil War (1861-1865). Military necessity, as in
previous wars, gave Blacks the "opportunity to fight." It was not
until the Civil War that Blacks were made a permanent part of the
military establishment. (Session, 1970).
Nearly one quarter of the Union fleet was Black, and of the
3,220 casualties, 800 were Black (Wiley). While the conditions of
their service were unusual, numerous Blacks were decorated for heroic
performance, among them:
Robert Blake received the Medal of Honor, the nation's
highest military award, for bravery for his performance
aboard the Union gunboat, Marblehead
, December 25, 1863.
Blake was the first of four Blacks to receive this
honor during the Civil War.
Robert Snualls, a slave pilot, became commander of the
Confederate ship. Planter
,
for his heroic actions in
delivering the ship to the Union Army. Many years
later, a camp at Great Lakes Training Center, Illinois
designated for the training of Black recruits, was to
be named in his honor.
With the advent of the Spanish-American War, the first hint of
segregation in formal Naval policy made its appearance. (Wiley, 1968).
Although Blacks served extensively throughout the fleet, it was
decided that in the future they were to be strictly limited to the
lower ranks. By the time of World War I, this small seed had grown
full bloom and the 10,000 Black men who volunteered for Naval Service
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during this period were relegated to duty as messmen. Segregation
policies curtailed the opportunity for Blacks to distinguish themselves
by valorous service as they had done for nearly one and a half
centuries.
At the end of World War I, a period of general disarmament, all
Black enlistments were stopped. In 1932, the Navy began accepting
Blacks again for messmen duties only. The position was defended by a
declaration that "the enlistment of Negroes other than as mess
attendants leads to disruptive and undermining conditions." (Wiley,
1968). This position came under strong attack by civilian and military
groups alike. The Navy defended, "The policy of not enlisting men of
the Colored Race for any branch of the Naval service but the messmen'
s
branch was adopted to meet the best interest of general ship's
efficiency.... This policy not only serves the best interests of the
Navy and the country, but serves as well, the best interest of Negroes
themselves."
In 1941, in the face of the bombing of Pearl Harbor, the
United States went to war with Japan. Messman Second Class Dorie
Miller distinguished himself as a hero when he manned one of the
ship's anti-aircraft guns (with no gunnery training, he shot down two
of the attacking aircraft). Miller received the Navy Cross, which is
the Navy's highest award for gallantry. Another mess attendant,
Leonard Harmon, also received this award posthumously. In keeping
with Naval tradition that destroyer class ships are named for Naval
heroes, the USS HARMON was later named to honor his memory.
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After the beginning of the war. Blacks began their first protest
against the discrimination the Navy had shown toward them. They were
still assigned, for the most part, to the messman branch. To meet the
requirements of combat conditions, every man aboard ship was trained
to be utilized at battle stations in emergencies. Blacks were there-
fore trained at many jobs other than their ratings allowed, which
afforded them the opportunity to join their shipmates in actual combat,
but did not change their official status. (Logan, 1974).
The early 1940's seemed to mark a pivotal point in formal
segregation policy of the armed forces. The Selective Service Act of
1940 included the provision that "in selection and training of men
under this act and in the interpretation and execution of the provisions
of this act, there shall be no discrimination against any person on
account of race or color." The effects were not immediate. Many
government and military officials did not regard this legislation as
an order to desegregate the military. Secretary of the Navy Frank
Knox announced that Blacks could still serve only as mess attendants.
Because of this stance, a large number of Negroes were rejected from
the Navy, even though the monthly quota of draftees was on the incline.
In 1942, the War Manpower Commission, backed by President
Franklin D. Roosevelt, ordered an end to the policy of designating
Blacks as messmen; the Navy was forced to accept a percentage of the
Black draftees in all general service ratings.
Desegregation policy on entry procedures did not mean an
integrated Navy in the 1940's. Secretary Knox subsequently stipulated
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that Blacks would be trained in segregated schools, housed in segregated
quarters, utilized in segregated units and would not be permitted to
serve on sea-going vessels. All of those guidelines were, in fact,
implemented for several years. In 1943 the Navy was receiving 12,000
Black draftees a month and there simply was not ample room for so many
men in shore establishments. During this period, Christopher Smith
Sargent, a young lawyer who had left Dean Acheson's law firm to work
with the Navy's manpower division, became the prime architect of a
series of innovations designed to destroy racial segregation in the
naval service. As lender of the "Special Programs Unit," Sargent ran
into opposition. By skillfully managing his resources and relying on
connections with several open-minded people in influential positions
within the department, Sargent's unit demonstrated that segregation
was the source of a massive waste of manpower, and soon affected a
complete about-face in the Navy's racial policy. This would not be the
last time a bright, young, liberal-minded man, relying on connections
with open-minded people in influential positions, would "affect a
complete about-face in the Navy's racial policies."
When Secretary Knoz died in Office in April, 1944, James V.
Forrestal
,
a man of far more liberal outlook and attitude, was named
in his place. Under Forrestal 's leadership many sweeping changes
occurred in fairly quick succession.
Segregated advanced training schools were entirely abandoned
in 1944. The following year the Navy took the next logical step and
abolished segregated basic training. In August 1944, the crews of
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twenty-five auxiliary ships were desegregated. Blacks were, however,
still restricted from combat ships, and no auxiliary vessel was
supposed to exceed a ten percent ratio of Black to White personnel.
Finally on February 27, 1946, general service assignments
without restrictions were opened to Blacks.
Black Officers
The first Black officers were commissioned in 1944. Hand
picked by several people in high places, the original sixteen
candidates, from Black training camps such as Hampton Institute,
Virginia, commenced an intensive ten-week indoctrination program. In
the middle of the training period, despite the fact that posted records
indicated that all of the candidates were making satisfactory progress
and maintaining good scholastic averages, it was announced that only
twelve of the sixteen would be commissioned.
On March 17, 1944, with no fanfare, twelve young men became
the first Blacks in history to hold formal commissions in the United
States Navy. Wiley (1968), relates: "The historic ceremony consisted
of a handshake from the officer who conducted the swearing-in in his
office." This was apparently quite minor in an organization of
rituals and ceremonies such as the Navy.
Progress was certainly not without pain. Black officers were
studiously kept out of responsible positions and consistently
subjected to personal affront. They were denied access to the local
officers' club, one of the main avenues of social contact with fellow
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officers. These restrictions had been imposed by Commander Daniel W.
Armstrong, who had also been instrumental in setting up inadequate
curriculum guidelines for Black training camps. When Armstrong was
transferred to new duty, his practice of segregation of officers was
immediately dismissed.
It seems important to note that throughout the accounts of
policy implementation relating to desegregation, it mattered
tremendously who the officer in charge of execution of the policy was
and what attitude he held toward Blacks. Non-supporters could distort
the intent of any policy by the manner in which they chose to implement
it.
By the end of World War II, there were sixty Black officers
(including two women (Waves) on active duty). The original intent
had been to use these officers in training Black recruits and to command
all Black units. Shortly after the first group had been commissioned,
however, James Forrestal became Secretary of the Navy and began
reshaping racial policies. As the number of Black officers increased,
the number of billets (positions available) originally intended for
them decreased. Most were assigned to small vessels, such as patrol
craft and tugs, or to duty overseas, usually serving with forward area
support units primarily engaged in stevedore work (the loading and
unloading of ships). When the war ended, the future for the Black
officer looked rather bleak. All but four of this group of twelve
left the Navy and returned to civilian life.
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There were only four Black officers in the entire Navy at the
end of World War II; the time when we might expect to see Black flag
officers in the United States Navy was extended into the future.
Although they had attended the Naval Academy at Annapolis as
early as 1872, it was not until 1949 that the first Black, Wesley A.
Braun, successfully completed the requirements for graduation. Braun
had entered the Academy in 1945 following nomination by Congressman
Adam Clayton Powell. The number of Black academy graduates has
increased slowly, consistent with the slow pace of successful integra-
tion of all facets of Navy life. In 1950, the number of Black
Annapolis graduates and officers had not increased significantly,
(Wiley, 1968), and continued through 1968 to be a slow process.
On January 31, 1962, Lieutenant Commander Samuel L. Gravely,
Jr. assumed command of the USS FLAGOUT, a destroyer escort. Gravely
later became the first Black line officer to attain the rank of
Captain, was the first Black admiral, and is presently Commander of
the Third Fleet in the Pacific. Command at sea is, and has always
been, the most coveted of assignments in the Navy. It places a man
in a position of such absolute authority that the assignment really
has no comparable counterpart in either civilian life or in any other
area of the military service.
The increase in the number of Black officers in the Navy was
eventually facilitated through the NROTC (Naval Reserve Officers
Training Corps) Program. Testing under segregated conditions was not
allowed (as had been the accusation in some Southern states), and NROTC
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units were established in predominantly Black colleges.
Another source of Black officers was the program MORE
(Minority Officer Recruitment Effort) established in September, 1967.
MORE was designed to heighten interest in various officer programs
among all minority groups, especially Blacks. The program directed
commanding officers of all NROTC units to conduct minority recruiting,
not only on their own campuses, but at all schools in the vicinity.
Major entry points to commissioned service were the Naval Academy and
the Officer Candidate School. The latter was designed primarily for
students who did not have access to NROTC units. In 1965, the Bureau
of Naval Personnel began introducing academy prospects from minority
groups to the Department of Defense for screening and nomination for
sponsorship. Remedial preparations were also made available to
potential candidates through the Naval Academy Preparatory School.
In 1968 Blacks began obtaining commissions through the Navy Enlisted
Scientific Education Program. Under this plan, selected enlisted
personnel attended a civilian university under Navy sponsorship and
were commissioned upon graduation. Prior to 1966 there had never been
more than seven Black midshipmen in an academy class. There were
twelve (12) in the class of '66 and fifteen (15) in the class of '72.
In 1966, Midshipman Anthony Watson became President of the Naval Class
of 1970. Blacks were increasing their numbers and roles in the United
States Naval Academy. In 1968 there were 300 Black Officers on duty.
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Legislation
The 1940
* s marked the beginning of legislation to bring an end
to a segregated Navy. In December, 1945, Secretary Forrestal ordered
an immediate end to discrimination in the administration of personnel.
In February, 1946, general service assignments without restrictions
were made available to Blacks. In July, 1948, Hubert H. Humphrey, a
then little-known politician, helped force through one of the
strongest civil rights planks in history. One of the actions for which
it called was "equal treatment in the service and defense of our
nation." On July 26, 1948, President Harry S. Truman issued Executive
Order 9981. The opening remarks state, "It is essential that there
be maintained in the armed services of the United States the highest
standards of democracy, with equality of treatment and opportunity for
those who serve in our country's defense." The order was to be put
into effect "as rapidly as possible, having due regard to the time
required to effectuate any necessary changes without impairing
efficiency or morale."
The order also created the President's Committee on Equality
of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services. Known as the
Fahy Committee, after its chairman Charles Fahy, this group was to
check on the practices of all branches of the military to determine,
"in what respect such rules, procedures and practices may be altered
or imporved, with a view to carry out the policy of this order."
The committee, although concerned with the low number of
Blacks in the Navy, particularly officers, made note that the Navy had
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progressed from a policy of exclusion of Blacks from general service
to one of complete integration in general service, in only five years.
It made several recommendations, one of which was that the Navy, in
its relations with the public and the press, should put greater emphasis
on its policy to use Blacks on the same basis as Whites (Logan, 1973).
The Navy was receiving increasingly more criticism from various
external sources about its racial policies.
Growing pressure from forces such as Thurgood Marshall of the
NAACP and A. Phillip Randolph and his labor union, forced the U. S.
Navy, as well as other branches of the armed forces, to seriously
consider total desegregation. The Fahy Committee and the Naval
personnel collaboratively drafted and adopted a six-point plan for
working on the problem of segregation in 1944:
1. Issue a policy statement on minorities.
2. Try to attract Blacks through publicity.
3. Encourage Black participation in the NROTC.
4. Permit transfers out of the Steward Branch.
5. Change Chief of Stewards to CPO (Chief Petty Officer,
the title assigned others of comparable rank).
6. Eliminate segregated Marine boot camps.
The Navy, we should note, was meanwhile the only branch of
the military in which desegregation was an established, official
policy. The Air Force was in the process of preparing such a policy;
the Army was still strictly opposed to a non-segregation policy,
using as its position, "the Army is not an instrument for social
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evolution." (Wiley, 1968).
In the late 1940's and early 1950's, the Navy accelerated efforts
to improve its image by increasing its complement of Black officers and
enlisted men. Teams of officers visited Black high schools and
colleges in southern states. The results of this effort were minimal.
A study by the Urban League (1968) indicated that presentations made
to approximately 11,000 studetns resulted in 303 applicants, and only
a small portion of these successfully completed the admission examina-
tion. The Navy was unable to overcome the deep-rooted suspicions
generated by its early policies of racism. Lack of response and the
expense involved forced suspension of these visits after the Korean
War began in 1950.
The Korean War (1950-1953), marked a period of successes and
failures in the story of military desegregation. Blacks were an
essential part of the naval forces; Black forces were seen in ships of
every class, engaged in ratings of every type, and continued to claim
commendations and honors for heroism.
Housing
As late as 1952, minorities in the Navy have historically lived
in segregated housing. Navy Under Secretary Francis P. Whitehair
officially sanctioned the use of segregated facilities for civilian
workers at Southern naval bases. Whitehair proposed that segregation
was the custom, and in some cases the law, in Southern communities.
It was Representative Adam Clayton Powell who voiced strong protest
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to this act. He publicly issued a direct challenge to President
Dwight D. Eisenhower to live up to his campaign promises on
desegregation of armed forces. Eisenhower employed Secretary of the
Navy Robert B. Anderson to solve the problem.
In 1962, President John F. Kennedy established a Committee on
Equal Opportunity in the Armed Forces. A year later the report of
that committee led to the issuance of a Defense Directive which for
the first time squarely enunciated a policy against off-base as well
as on-base discriminatory treatment of servicemen. (Clifford, 1968).
The Defense Department stopped accepting rental listings from
civilian landlords who refused to treat all men and women in uniform
on an equal basis in 1963. In 1967, commanders were told to seek out
landlords and to urge them to rent to all servicemen without regard
to color, pointing out that if they refused, servicemen and women
would not be authorized to deal with them at all. In 1967, only 30%
of landlords nationwide were on the Department of Defense non-discrimina-
tory housing list. (Clifford, 1968). By July, 1968, 84% of the
nation's landlords had been added to the list, presumably the result
of strict enforcement by the Department of Defense on housing for
minorities.
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Summary
Each minority group studied faced the contradiction of
fighting for a country that embraced racial norms of which they were
the victims. Generally, they have utilized the military as a vehicle
for socio-economic mobility. Bowerman and Campbell ( 1965 ), found
that the military offered a career for Black men which compared most
favorably with available alternatives. The improved nature of their
participation has, I suspect, been intended to demonstrate their
manhood and general self-worth.
Between the Revolutionary War and the 1948 Desegregation
Order, minority people played a significant role in the history of
the United States Navy. Many were decorated for bravery with medals
and awards, and today several vessels carry the name of minority
heroes, which in the Navy culture is a great medium of recognition.
The minority contribution has not gone unnoticed, at least within
the military institution. It was my perception, in fact, in studying
this history, that the Navy establishment found it easier to
recognize minorities as heroes than to recognize them as worthwhile
human beings in those earlier days, judging from the detailed accounts
of their participation and bravery.
The involvement of minorities was generally centered around
crisis and wars, so that milestones of their military history are
recalled around the major wars in this country's history.
The Civil War period represents a time during which Blacks
were exploited as Navy Men. Beyond the period of
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their freedom and for the next seventy years. Blacks were used as
reverse manpower to supplement inadequate numbers of Whites. They
were channeled into the less desirable jobs and restricted from the
type of visibility that may have served as avenues for attaining rank.
Like other minority groups. Blacks were programed to view participation
in the military as a privilege. Less of the history of Filipinos,
American Indians and Orientals was documented. These groups have all
shared the socio-economic motivation for involvement in the military.
For some it was even more basic; they often sought citizenship in a
country with a promising future.
The turning point in discriminatory practices came in the
1940's in the form of congressional legislation and the establishment
of short term programs by Congress, the Department of Defense and the
Navy. Laws were aimed at desegregation in military policy which
basically affected the professional elements of Navy life. The
programmatic efforts were initially designed to increase the minority
population, especially in terms of Blacks males. Subsequent programs
focused on career advancement and social norms.
A decade of legislation resulted in a desegregated Navy, at
least in principle. Social changes were difficult to legislate;
therefore, for years to follow, the prevalence of institutional racism
was quite evident in the Navy. Black men served 169 years before the
first officer among them was commissioned. Blacks and Filipinos were
generally seen in jobs such as stewards, cooks and deck hands until
very recently. Even though laws prohibited segregation in the Naval
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Academy, Blacks were in attendance there 67 years before the first
successful Black graduate was seen. The area of promotion seemed to have
been one of the more rigid barriers to break down. Between 1966 and
1972, the number of Black graduates from the Naval Academy increased
from seven (7) to fifteen (15), and in 1968, Navy records showed only
300 Black officers in the total population. In 1973 minorities accounted
for only 1.66% of officer's positions above Warrant Officer I, and
131,890 of the enlisted ranks. All of these statistics have been
drawn from the Bureau of Naval Personnel official records.
It is important to note the parallel between rank and rate in
the Navy structure. Rate assigns the vocational area of specific
job title. In terms of professional growth, it has been equally
significant for minorities to gain access to the more professional
jobs (rates) such as engineering, aviation and medicine. Literally
thousands of professionals in civilian life received their training
in Navy schools.
In 1948, 95% of the Blacks in the Navy were stewards; 20 years
later, 95% of Blacks were in ratings other than steward. In 1972,
only half of the Filipino population served in the steward rate,
whereas almost 100% of them served historically.
The author shares the view of those contemporary social
scientists who view institutional behavior as critical to the under-
standing and elimination of racism. It is therefore important to
point out that the minority experience in the Navy, in terms of their
inclusion (and exclusion) into the hierarchy and reward system, was
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even more important perhaps than the persona, discomfiture.
In 1972, minorities could be found in practically all facets
of Navy life, but in a rather limited way. Subsequent parts of this
study will show that racism was still prevalent, though more subtle
interpersonal ly, stronger institutionally, than in earlier years.
Most minorities who remained in the Navy for long periods of
time were able to realize the economic security they sought, but
experienced varying degrees of success in career goals and social
acceptance. The Navy has been a difficult place for them to demonstrate
courage and self-worth. The antagonistic life styles described here
were certainly not limited to the Navy; this institution was simply
a microcosm of the greater American society.
This overview has been presented to appraise the reader of the
foundations upon which the current climate for equal opportunity was
built. Those military personnel who are professional Navy men brought
some rather oppressive experiences to the EEO program in 1974.
CHAPTER III
SOCIAL CONTEXT FACTORS
This chapter answers the question posed by Baldridge: "what
are the social conditions which promote the formation of divergent
values and interest groups?" The author selected the following as
factors relevant to the social context of the United States Navy:
Mission, Authority and Structure; Individualism and the Organization;
Isolation; Personal Responsibility and Cohesion; The Profession of
Arms; Prestige and Symbolism, The Workplace and Patterns of Change.
These characteristics of military sociology define the nature of the
milieu and subculture which influence all associations with the
military. It is important that the civilian have at least superficial
comprehension of the culture which frames the focus of this study;
the social setting into which the concept of equal opportunity was
interjected.
The introduction of equal opportunity programs occurred in
an environment strongly influenced by the larger society, but with
some very distinct differences. The differences encountered in the
service environment are fostered by military tradition, maintained
by organizational process and strengthened by those who seek, and
are successful in, a military career. The forces at work within the
military environment result from tradition, process and people involved
and the dynamics created as these forces interact (Glover, 1974).
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Ihe Formal Bureaucratic SystPm
The Bureau of Naval Personnel 1973 statistics show a Navy
population of 548,879 people. This figure does not include the thousands
of civilian employees who at least peripherally must be considered a
part of the immediate environment as defined for this study.
The Navy has a rank, hierarchical structure with the central
leadership and power based located in Washington, D. C., the nation's
capital; reporting to the Department of Defense, the U. S. Congress,
and of course to the President of the United States who is Commander
in Chief of the Military.
All major policy, budgetary, and operational decisions are
made in Washington, where divisions and departments are represented
by a team of high-ranking officers.
Navy operations have a geographical differentiation: the
Atlantic Fleet, the Pacific Fleet, and European Fleet which administers
all shore and fleet commands with the United States as well as foreign
territories. This division represents one element of the complexity
of the organization (others include mere size and mission). The
Atlantic command, operating out of the Eastern United States, and the
Pacific, operating out of the West, are major subsystems and each has
very distinct characteristics.
The author has had frequent discussions with Navy officers
who experience these subsystems as two different organizations. The
consequence is that operations, programs, and policies are interpreted
and implemented differently. Over a period of time "the Navy" becomes
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a rather naive phrase. A superficial way that this difference gets
characterized is: the Pacific command tends to be formal, thorough
and academic in its "modus operandi" while the Atlantic command is
more expedient and efficient.
The foregoing represents the author's interpretation of
discussion and behavioral description made with Navy members as well
as her personal observations while working in the organization.
The United States Navy, established in 1798 and modeled after
the British Navy, has historically maintained a primarily white male
leadership. The Navy has been successful in its responsibility to
defend this country. When one thinks of the relationship between the
mission of the organization and the goals of the equal opportunity/
race relations program, it is well to remember that, in essence, the
Navy has filled its role for nearly 200 years in a racist environment.
This reasoning could obviate the connection between racisms and command
readiness, a premise upon which the program was built.
The values of the organization are couched in phrases such as
"command readiness," "command efficiency," "discipline," "respect and
obedience of authority," "internal order," "loyalty," "military
appearance," and "Navy tradition." If the author was more familiar
with the language of military purpose the above could be networked
into a value statement which shows the interconnection of the fore-
going phrases, each of which implies behavioral prescriptions. An
example might be: "maintaining military rank distinction between
officers and enlisted men is necessary for discipline; and discipline
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is necessary or pertinent to command readiness."
For the purposes of this study, the author will treat the
Navy as a bureaucracy; that is presumably not subject to extensive
argument, however, a description and definition of bureaucracy is
included to support this contention. Etzioni (1964), quoted a
statement by Max Weber which clearly depicts the tensions experienced
between the Equal Opportunity Program staff and the organization
especially during the formative stages:
The high rationality of the bureaucratic
structure is fragile; it needs to be
constantly protected against external
pressures to safeguard the autonomy
required if it is to be kept closely
geared to its goals, not others.
There was the constant threat of conflict of interest between
the goals and values of the organization, and the pressures of the
larger society mirrored by minority members of the organization;
consequently the organization was constantly protecting itself.
The description by Weber of the features of a bureauratic
structure as presented by Etzioni provides a framework for discussion
of organizational behavior in the Navy and helps to build the context
for this study:
Weber spelled out in considerable detail
the features of the bureaucratic structure.
They all specify what makes a highly rational
structure.
1. "A continuous organization of official
functions bound by rules . 11 Rational organization
is the antithesis of ad hoc, temporary, unstable
relations; hence the stress on continuity. Rules
save effort by obviating the need for deriving a
new solution for every problem and case; they
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facilitate standardization and equality in
the treatment of many cases. These advantages
are impossible if each client is treated as a
unique case, as an individual.
?* ^ specific sphere of competence.
This involves (a) a sphere of obligations
to perform functions which have been marked
off as a Dart of a systematic division of
labor; (b) the provision of the incumbent
with the necessary authority to carry out
these functions; and (c) that the necessary
means of compulsion are clearly defined and
their use is subject to definite conditions."
Thus a systematic division of labor, rights,
and power is essential for rational organization.
Not only must each participant know his job
and have the means to carry it out, which
includes first of all the ability to command
others, but he also must know the limits of his
job, rights, and power so as not to overstep
the boundaries between his role and those of
others and thus undermine the whole structure.
3. "The organization of officers follows
the principle of hierarchy; that is, each lower
office is under the control and supervision of
a higher one." In this way no office is left
uncontrolled. Compliance cannot be left to
chance; it has to be systematically checked
and reinforced.
4. "The rules which regulate the conduct
of an office may be technical rules or norms.
In both cases, if their application is to be
fully rational, specialized training is necessary.
It is thus normally true that only a person who
had demonstrated an adequate technical training
is qualified to be a member of the administrative
staff ..." We examine below the full import
of this statement by Weber. It suffices to say
here that he thought that the root of the
authority of the bureaucrat is his knowledge and
his training. Not that these replace legitimation,
but his command of technical skill and knowledge is
the basis on which legitimation is granted to him.
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5.
'It is a matter of princiDle that tho
members of the administrative staff should be
completely separated from ownership of the
means of production or administration
There exists, furthermore, in principle,
complete separation of the property belonginq
to the organization, which is controlled within
the spheres of the office, and the personal
This segregation,p:°pr,vf the officiai -y , cy ,which Weber applied to other elements of the
status, such as the segregation of the
bureaucrat's personal residence from the
organization, keeps the official's bureaucratic
status from being infringed by the demands of
his non-organizational statuses.
6.
In order to enhance this organizational
freedom, the resources of the organization have
to be free of any outside control and the positions
cannot be monopolized by any incumbent. They have to
be allocated and reallocated according to the needs
of the organization. "A complete absence of
appropriation of his official positions by the
incumbent" is required.
7.
"Administrative acts, decisions, and rules
are formulated and recorded in writing ..."
Most observers might view this requirement as less
essential or basic to rational organization than
the preceding ones, and many will point to the
irrationality of keeping excessive records, files,
and the like, often referred to as "red tape."
Weber, however, stressed the need to maintain a
systematic interpretation of norms and enforcement
of rules, which cannot be maintained through
oral communication.
Mission
The mission statement of the Navy is quoted from Z-Gram #104
issued by Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, January, 1972:
To maintain the sea-going capability for
strategic deterrence; to maintain control
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of the seas in order to keep vital life
lines open and, if necessary, for ove-seas
projection of our armed forces; and to
maintain our naval presence wherever it is
required overseas.
Military theorists and sociologists give the military three
broad roles: an instrument of foreign policy; a constabulary force;
or, it may perform general administrative functions not necessarily of
a combat nature (Glover, 1974).
To the civilian, the layperson, the United States Navy represents
a career choice and military protection both in times of war and in
times of peace.
Authority and Structure
At the very heart of military existence is structure, rigid
organizational process and authoritarianism. In his summary of the
military ethic, Huntington (1957) included, "it stresses the supremacy
of society over the individual and the importance of order, hierarchy,
and division of function. The importance of centralized authority and
structure has been a natural growth within the military as in most
large organizations, although the form is particularly severe within
the military." This importance has been brought on primarily by
rotation and turnover. In an organization which experiences frequent
rotation of its personnel and attrition of its forces by demands of
war and society, structure and order become important pillars. And
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this type of organization in turn is maintained not
interpersonal relations but by an emphasis on rank,
is not important; rank and position are elevated for
maintaining the hierarchy intact.
by individuals or
The individual
purposes of
This emphasis on authority has its impact on interpersonal
communications. Abrahamson (1972) stated that “stress on authority as
in interpersonal relations as well as political conservatism and
emphasis on religious values are the three primary elitist perspectives
of the military. And like the elitist qualities of the military
'
ethic the stress on authority is reinforced by recruitment and selection.
Those already favoring a military environment are those likely to
be recruited and selected. Therefore the 'military mind' is reinforced
by those who are attracted because they already generally favor the
military ethic."
As in many institutions the ethic suffers because through the
organization process, it has been carried to an extreme. It is not
the necessary order, structure and authority which speaks poorly of
the military but the extreme of these qualities. Ackley (1972)
describes the extreme rather clearly when he explains the "crushing
weight of technology" and the "fascination for the concrete."
Order, structure and authority reach their lowest point when they
result in "endless paper forms which seem in league to swamp the time
and the very inclination to think." The habitual process of the
institution too often reduces order and structure to unnecessary
discipline, rules and routines, issued not for any necessity but to
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fill the void created by previous rules and routines.
Janowitz however offered some hope. In his 1960 writings he
created the military with a "shift from authoritarian domination to
greater reliance on manipulation, persuasion and group concensus."
Twelve years later Abrahamson supported this finding and emphasized
the increasing trend toward manipulative command. He credites this
trend to the emerging military emphasis on managerial skills.
Individualism and the Organization
One of the strong factors of the military environment is its
tendency to elevate the organization at the expense of individualism.
A strong emphasis in military training is placed on group success.
The Naval officer is under significant influence from this training
to subordinate individualism. Kurt Lang (1972) points to "limits in
the ability of officers and noncommissioned officers to look after
the welfare of their men." He sees the military supervisor caught in
the middle between consideration for their subordinates and the
demands on them to produce results in a military environment.
Another difficult hurdle is that of displaying or utilizing unique
styles of leadership and recognition of the individual.
Another factor of significance is the military drive to seek
internal order by elevating the organization at the expense of its
people. When society is torn by military crisis the military reaction
in many cases has been to ignore that crisis and concentrate on
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immediate military goals not liking to the objects of civilian unrest.
This is not happening in the Navy in the 1970's, a fact which for
many is hard to accept; and which makes the EO/RR Program somewhat
more acceptable and palatable than it would have been some years ago.
William Simons (1965) deals with two additional facets of
military life which tend to play down individualism and elevate the
organization. Simons recognizes a liberal trend in military officers
and their education, but indicates that this trend is overcome by the
nature of military training and the highly visible value of individual
loyalty to the group. The constant training by group tends to elevate
the group above concern for the individual. Simons also cites
organization loyalty as perhaps the highest military virtue.
Military theorists have identified a generally pessimistic
view of man held by military organizations. Huntington (1957) says:
The existence of the military profession pre-
supposes conflicting human interests, and the
use of violence to further those interests.
Consequently the military ethic views conflict
as a universal pattern throughout nature and
sees violence rooted in the permanent biological
and psychological nature of men. As between
the good and the evil in man, the military
ethic emphasizes the evil.
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Abrahamson (1972) supported Huntington In his evaluation
of the military images of human nature. Abrahamson says that the
military officer generally thinks that man cannot learn to avoid war
and that the proportion of people holding this pessimistic view
increases as we move from samples of civilians to reserve officers.
Ackley (1972) treats the military image of human nature with even less
optimism than either Huntington or Abrahamson. Ackley sees this
Hobbesian view on the part of the armed forces as having deleterious
effects on man's future efforts to improve himself.
Isolation
Another relative characteristic of the military as an institution
IS its tendency to recruit from its own social classes and thus
strengthen its social base. This form of social inbreeding has a
tendency to reinforce the organization at the expense of the individual.
Janowitz (1959, 1960) treats this repeatedly in his work in the late
fifties and early sixties, as one of his central themes. He also
indicated at that time a decline in this tendency which he associated
with increased social mobility.
Of all the factors involved in this acceleration of social
change probably that most affecting the military is isolation.
(Glover, 1974). It is simply no longer possible to isolate any
military unit for extended periods of time. Even the longest Navy
deployments now include the artifacts of the parent society at least
on a part-time basis. Military demands are still made of our sailors,
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but the chances are slim of any but the raw recruits spending their
off-duty hours at military pursuits.
To say that isolation has been drastically reduced is not to
say that the military is free from isolation. This periodic Isolation
is a phenomenon which enables the military to remain trained to
develop the cult which can ask great sacrifices and even attempt to
incorporate social reforms as a part of its own ethic. In looking at
increased social awareness in the military we should also be aware of
the isolation involved in the all volunteer concept. Some critics of
this concept fear a gradual return to the separation of the military
and society. Ackley (1972) credits the military leadership when he
says "the military faces renewed isolation, but under the deliberately
appealing guise of greater professionalism and higher pay, i.e., the
volunteer concept. It seems significant also that the military leaders
and thinkers, in Ackley's view, are not nearly so enamored of this
prospect as are their civilian leaders.
Education and Leadership
In the pursuit of a climate of equal opportunity the Navy
turned instinctively to education, even though the organization
embodies many forces which are inherently contrary to education when
the objective is social (Lang, 1972). The environment of the parent
society demands the attempt of education toward equality, yet the
military environment imposes organizational restrictions and mores
which argue not only against the success of social education but even
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the attempt itself.
In Phase I of the program especially, naval officers faced the
experience of race relations education with the contradictory stamp of
the profession.
The navy's reliance on education, predominant in the attempt
to solve its problems of inequality is fully supported by tradition.
Education is stressed by the military and is a matter of professional
pride as well as leadership in the society. (Glick, 1971). To educate
the Navy's leaders to foresee and solve their own problems and to lead
society by the pen as well as by the sword is a long standing and
strengthening position with the military. (Masland, 1957). With
the original emphasis on technical education and the increasing atten-
tion given to organization and management sciences it has been accepted
that these areas are not only of interest to the military but in fact
are educationally pursued by military men.
The social sciences are, on the other hand, just gaining
acceptance. David Rapoport ( ) observed that the most important
function of the military occurs when it serves as a school where the
citizens can learn appropriate social and civic virtues. Huntington
(1962 stated: "In the early 70 ' s we saw the Navy placing great
emphasis on this role. This internal emphasis is supplemented by the
Department of Defense support of social research." Glick (1971) points
out that, of the approximately $1,679 million total federal funds for
psychological and social science research during the period 1961-1968,
approximately $215 million went to the Department of Defense.
1U3
While the military hierarchy recognizes and supports a social
role, middle and lower level managers of the Navy prefer to support
social research while not actually becoming involved. (Glover, 1974 ).
To educate and train former civilians to acceptable service standards
in military skills has long been a necessity but managers balk when
placed in a position as a "healer of society's ills." The lesser
task of curing society's ills is left to civilians. Janowitz (1960)
attributes to the Navy "the highest concentration of officers who
believed that the military were superior to civilians." Reflective
of this attitude of superiority is preference of the naval officer to
engage in technical education, an area in which the military is
recognized as a leading institution.
One resistance, then, to social awareness may be that of the
military subconsciously trying to hang on to a military tradition and
not bend to social pressures to become what it regards as a "social
healer. But the reality is that while the Havy need be neither a
constabulary force nor a social healer, it must inevitably accept a
role in the social movement of a society that is at least theoretically
moving toward more homogenity. The military is as much as any other
institution a mirror of the social structure in this country.
(Janowitz, 1960).
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Personal Responsibility and Cohension
Professional and organizational solidarity has been a
continued theme of Janowitz's view of military sociology. In his 1964
writings he assesses the capacity of the military to adopt or resist
change as largely due to group solidarity. This solidarity occurs
because of professional and personal identity with organizational
goals and actions and is subsequently reinforced by peer pressure. And,
as explained in previous sections of this chapter, many of the
organizational dynamics support this solidarity and resistance to
change.
The naval officer feels personally responsible for goals and
actions in an organization which has continually reminded him of his
position as a commander and a manager. His professional anxiety is
aroused by his feelings of closeness with the fellow members of his
unit or organization. One form of this professional anxiety is peer
pressure levied across unit boundaries to ignore or disclaim any
challenges to organization goals and actions. Another form is the
tendency by members of a particular unit to disclaim these injustices
because they fear the loss of the hard won solidarity and cohesion.
The Profession of Arms
This section has dealt with the characteristics of the military
environment (or institution) and their impact on the naval officer
(target population of the EO/RR Program). Those characteristics
form the outline of the organization, but what of the subculture that
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is developed by the interaction of men with the institution? What
characterizes the milieu in which officers perform their duties?
Many of the characteristics described so far are found in all large
organizations. This section will discuss those characteristics
particularly formed within the profession of arms, a profession whose
reason for existence is the management of the potential for violence.
Popularism has been a strong force in military tradition. The
relationship of the solider and his training to his civilian counter-
part has long been an issue. The attitude of acceptance of civilians
toward the military in the 1950's and early sixties was slowed and
soured by the Viet Nam War. The targets of criticism were not only
the military but those civilian leaders who were closely related with
military policy and even the execution of military operations. Since
My Lai, the violent reactions have subsided but some authors say an
even more dangerous separation of the society and its military has
occurred. These people view the all volunteer concept during this
period of a powerful military with great alarm. It may not deserve
this emphasis but Ackley says, "At the very least such a radical
change could have the effect of making permanent the chasm once again
opening between the military and its parent society."
At the heart of professionalism, the third strand of tradition,
stands four tenets which constitute the military ethic. (Lang, 1972).
This ethic is reflected in the professional view of war, man,
politics and power. The naval officer is infused with these views
as his career progresses. His reactions to all situations reflect
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these professional ethics:
War is a science and the exclusive province of the military.
Civilians are left the less herioc tasks of administration.
Man is smaller and less worthy than the societies and causes
he serves. Individualism is scorned.
Politics are renounced. It is not the place of the military
to involve itself in politics. Once national policy is made the
military will ensure its execution.
Power is superior to commercialism. The virtue of the military
is the guiding light for a society which has lost its way among the
myriad causes.
These are the extreme or "pure" military views but they make
their point. An institution whose tradition is based on these values
and whose tradition is strong is not immediately transformed into a
role of social reponsiveness and involvement.
Of course, all officers do not assimilate military ethics to
the same degree. Assimilation depends on background and training,
particularly the latter. Officer candidates undergoing more lengthy
and intense training prior to commission demonstrate a higher degree
of Navy culture assimilation than do those whose route to commission
is of shorter duration or less intense. There is also strong cor-
relation between this assimilation and opportunities for long and
successful careers. For all but the most senior ranks this cor-
relation holds. The very senior officers of the services tend to be
less authoritarian and dogmatic in their outlooks and to have greater
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perspective and a reputation for innovation. (Lang. 1972).
The military profession directed by politicians, led by
innovators and heroes and managed by those infused with tradition and
the military ethic, tends toward a distinct managerial style.
Janowitz (1960) saw a marked change in military managers. He described
the change as moving from
"traditionalism" to "initiative and
continuous innovation." Kurt Lang further modified and refined
Janowitz's description of the military mind as one committed to "trend-
thinking" and "a tendency for innovation to occur at the margins."
These characteristics give the military its strength — and many of
its weaknesses. The effort of equal opportunity/race relations
education was undertaken in a time when these forces were not only
strong but were under close scrutiny by the parent society.
Prestige and Symbolism
Prestige and status symbolism is overtly utilized in the
military to differentiate rank and authority reinforcing the value
placed on the latter. The consequence is an internal class system
which gets expressed in designation of uniforms, housing, educational
opportunities, entertainment facilities, career, mess facilities, as
well as ritualist ceremony (salute, standing, etc).
This section has been included to highlight the impact
of these traditions on the military environment.
A critical operational unit in the Navy is a command, which
may be a ship and its crew or it may be a stationary support operation
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such as a hospital and staff, school, engineering unit or construction
unit. The command is an interdependent subsystem which is heavily
influenced by the larger system, but maintains its distinct norms,
mission and standards of operation.
The author has selected to describe the social structure aboard
a Navy ship as an illustration of symbolism as a climate factor.
In addition to the obvious differences between ranks in pay
and uniforms, status is most often expressed in three areas: the
amount and east of obtainable liberty time; the elaborateness of
sleeping accommodations and the eleborateness of eating accommodations.
(Downs, 1972).
Without detailing the gradations between ranks, the situation
is best illustrated by comparing the facilities of the captain and an
apprentice seaman. The cabin near the bridge. A special detail of mess
attendants and cooks prepare and serve his meals and bring his snacks
on the bridge if he requests them. He eats alone at a time when he
decides, although he may, by tradition, invite a junior officer to
dine with him. In port the captain can leave the ship at will and
remain ashore until the vessel sails.
The apprentice seaman lives in a bunkroom. He must maintain
his own possessions in a small locker. His food is provided at
regular meal times during which he must stand in line, be served on a
tray, eat at large tables and wash his own mess gear. His snacks are
limited to night rations issued to night watches by the galley, candy
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and other snacks may be purchased after a long stand in line. His
liberty is rigidly controlled by a rotation system and except in
emergency he has little chance of getting more free time. Between
these extremes are a number of gradations in cabin size, number of
cabin mates, type of bunk and locker, and messing facilities.
A communication system of old-fashioned voice tubes and
pneumatic tubes is designed to carry orders from senior to junior
officers and reports from junior to senior. There is, however, no
real provision for senior officer's to discover actual conditions on
lower levels except through the reports of juniors. These reports
become formalized and are of very little value in determining actual
reactions and attitudes. Juniors, furthermore, are extremely reluctant
to bring problems to a senior because it reflects on their ability to
handle the situation. There is little direct contact between officers
and enlisted men in working or informal situations. Officers seldom
enter enlisted men's quarters except during inspection, and enlisted
men are permitted in officers country only on duty. In addition,
senior officers are isolated from juniors by the fact that they live
separately and by the formality of wardroom dining. The captain of
course does not dine in the wardroom and is even more isolated from
upward communications.
In problem situations the junior officer who receives a
complaint from his men is often reluctant to bring the problem to the
department head. The department head is reluctant to bother the
executive officer. Only when a problem becomes major does it receive
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senous attention on levels of higher ship-wide authority.
This problem of adequate feedback is endemic in naval service
and a great deal of enlisted lore is concerned with attempts on the
part of the captain to find out what's going on. Official channels
seem to block upward coimiuni cation of the attitudes and reactions of
enlisted men from reaching officers on the highest levels.
Aboard the U.S.S. Constellation —
A Feel for the Workplace
The information in this section has drawn from formal studies
of the military organization related to; values, philosophy, structure
and people; their characteristics, orientation and training. The
later section on symbolism gives some feel, though narrowly, for the
workplace.
The most unique or unfamiliar military work setting from a
civilian perspective is probably aboard a Navy vessel, or on site at
a military base, especially in a foreign country or combat area.
Most of the investigator's experiences with the Navy occurred
in Washington, D. C., in the stereotypical civil service grey/green
buildings in the District or in rather comfortable office buildings
in Arlington, Virginia; and sometimes at military bases (Florida,
Maryland, Tennessee and California). This provided some perspective,
though limited, on the living and working environment. Consulting
visitations in the equal opportunity program were generally extended
periods of three weeks to three months. Frequently, the consultant
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lived in base facilities among military activities. One military
co-worker, in view of my work on this study, felt that it was important
to round out this experience with a visit aboard a ship. Such a visit
was arranged aboard the U.S.S. CONSTELLATION, which was docked at
Coronado Island outside of San Diego, California, on January 25, 1975.
The CONSTELLATION, an aircraft carrier, was the site of a major racial
incident in October, 1972, a description of which appears in the
section on Interst Articulation. The details of that visit are best
shared exactly as they were journalized immediately following the
Sunday morning experience. The following is from that journal:
The U.S.S. KITTY HAWK and the U.S.S.
CONSTELLATION stand side by side at the
docks at Coronado like two grey metal
expansive hotels. When you board of course
it is more like entering a military city with
all experiences (eating, sleeping, working)
connected by narrow circular steep stairways.
"Aboard ship" seems like a world of its own.
The CONSTELLATION is a carrier, transport-
ing airplanes, vessels and weapons. So I'm
surrounded by hangors, airstrips, and I see
firing equipment perched on the decks. My
escorts are a young seaman attached to the
CONSTELLATION and Lieutenant Bobby Randall
who was assigned to the CONNIE two years, but
completed his assignment at the onset
of the race riots. He was the minority
affairs officer on the CONSTELLATION
at that time.
The green metal monster softens when you
visit the gal lies with colorful round tables
and the wardrooms with dark panelling, table
cloths, individual table settings. One wall
of the wardroom (officers' eating quarters)
is donned with an expensive silver serving
outfit donated by the State of Washington.
This, I am told, is used on special occasions.
When these heavy pieces are removed from the
ship they are moved only by a specially
assigned Marine group. The rationale was not
given, I called it ritual /tradition. A
gigantic punchbowl which forms a large boat
represents the elegance of the multi -piece
collection.
The purpose of my visit is to enter the
real world of the fleet where the Phase II
Equal Opportunity Race Relations Program will be
delivered, and to acquire some appreciation of
that atmosphere. So we do not discuss the
incidents of the early 70' s, instead
Lieutenant Randall explains functions and
climate. For instance, the two upper levels
are narrowed and enclosed with tinted green
glass windows. He describes what it is like
to be called from a lower deck by the com-
manding officer. You rush up flights of
narrow grey steps which are located in
different places on each level. You stand
by the side of the CO and discuss the racial
climate as planes can be viewed through the
tinted glass.
Getting caught up in an intriguing
atmosphere of courtesies, discipline and just
the metal mass itself, left me in awe. As we
left the ship, Lt. Randall pointed out plaques
paying tribute to approximately 30 men who
burned to death in a fire off the docks of
Manhattan during construction of the
CONSTELLATION. I think, "bugles, pomp, and
circumstance.
"
It was Sunday and the men wore civilian
clothing. There were young Blacks dressed in
stylish clothing, wearing large afro hair styles.
Some of the men wore uniforms, but they were all
obviously off duty. The wardrooms were the most
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heavily populated areas which I visited
(some areas were off-limits) officers sat
around in uniforms watching television sets
encased in the dark panelled walls (neatly).
Uniformed men manned the entrance and
were extremely courteous to us as we left; to
Lieutenant Randall as an officer, to me as a
lady. As I left the ship I looked back at
the CONSTELLATION and the KITTY HAWK and thought,
So this is where it all happend, this is the
world of Navy men in action. Very impressive."
The ships looked noble, strong, massive.
Patterns of Change
In a study of innovation in the Navy, Davis (1967) identified
three critical time periods in the change patterns of that organi-
zation: (1) that period which begins when for the first time within
the organization, some individual proposes that the Navy attempt to
develop a new technology; (2) the appropriate decision makers decide
to go ahead and commit the Navy to the research and development stage;
and (3) conceptualization or invention of the proposed innovation.
Davis notes that stages one and two take place primarily within
the organization; stage three takes place between the Navy and some
external group or organization.
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Randall (1975) cited five steps in the change process when the
change is sociological: exploration of the issue; educational or
training phase; program development which includes pilot testing a
model; operationalizing and finetuning to Navy specificity; and finally,
institutionalization. These sociological stages, from the
investigator's observations, were experienced and easily detectable
in the Equal Opportunity Program.
Davis concluded that technological innovations are generally
spearheaded by some one person who is strongly comnitted to the idea;
he characterized this person as the "innovation advocate."
The innovation advocate in the Navy is
usually a man in the broad middle ranks
(lieutenant, commander or captain); age 30-40.
He identifies strongly with the nation's interest.
He is in full vigor of his professional years;
energetic; hard-driving and confident of success.
The advocate is seldom the inventor of the
innovation that he is promoting but he usually
possesses a uniquely advanced technological
knowledge pertinent to the innovation that is
not generally shared within the Navy. The
innovation advocate is a zealot.
He seldom pays any attention whatsoever
to the way in which his crusading efforts may
influence his personal career in the Navy
or elsewhere. He has already enjoyed a
prominent career; is accustomed to winning
(some have suffered).
The advocate's first step is usually to
try to enlist supporters from among friends
and colleagues at his own rank level
(horizontal political alliance).
The second step whether or not he achieves
success in step one, is to recruit supporters
in key positions of authority and power at
higher levels (vertical political alliance).
Davis notes that a strong vertical element
appears to be absolutely essential. In an
organization such as the Navy with a strong,
tight, hierarchical structure and authoritarian
patterns, things simply are not achieved by
means of grass-roots movements alone, no matter
how strong.
The innovation alliance seldom seeks or
even admits extra-organization supporters or
allies unless this appears necessary as a last
resort. Davis' research reveals patterns
against involvement of outsiders. Extra
organizational allies can be counter-productive.
Advocates have suffered later in their
careers for "premature" involvement or
tolerance of unsolicited extra organizational
allies.
The advocate usually sells his idea as
a better way to perform some well established
Navy task or mission. Davis notes that
innovation usually means change -- it is
easier to sell the idea if the scope and
magnitude of changes are minimized during
the selling period.
Counter alliance emerges within senior
rank level and builds strength by acquiring
members at gradually lower rank levels.
Counter alliances usually argue that it
will cost too much (not to appear to be against
progress)
.
Counter alliances argue (like the innovator)
in terms of established task and mission - not
in terms of new conceptions of international
policies, grand military strategy, tactics, etc.
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Davis concludes that the internal setting which provides
stimuli for innovation and shape the innovation process within the
Navy is built on: "naval officers subculture; traditional patterns
of doing things supported by a traditional set of values and beliefs
which are in part derived from broader American patterns of action and
values; but in part distinctive to the Navy."
Summary
Social Context Factors described the military culture creating
the setting for the non-military reader. This section ties together
those distinct characteristics of the United States Navy which form
the backdrop for racism and for the efforts in equal opportunity to
eliminate racism. The Navy is described as a rather rigid bureacracy
dedicated to tradition and comprised of a set of structures, philosophies
and values which have over a period of time proven effective in the
accomplishment of its mission. The mission is put forth as the
criteria for all decisions; organizational demands receive priority
over individual needs and a hierarchical authority structure is
strongly maintained. Change in the Navy is basically an educational
process.
CHAPTER IV
EQUAL OPPORTUNITY CLIMATE FACTORS
This section is an overview of the racial climate in the Navy
in the early 70 s. Four sets of data have been included to delineate
the scope and nature of the problem.
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tudy of institutional racismin the Navy which reports the perceptions ofa samp! e population on organizational practicesand available opportunities.
2. A report from the Black Retention Study Group
convened by the CNO October 1972 which lays out
problere
nS1Ve y the "atUre and extent of racial
3. A summary of interviews and observations
developed by the investigator.
4. A review of Navy statistics which compares
population to promotion and discharge patternsby race, and the percentages of minorities in
different occupations.
Predicto rs of Race Discrimination in the Navy
(Pecorella, 1975)
The details of the Pecorella study are reviewed here, including
rationale, for the design, methodology and findings; all of which
illustrate some dimensions of the concept of institutional racism as
it was manifest in the U. S. Navy in the 1970' s.
The two major factors examined in the Percorella study were:
(l) organizational practices and (2) available opportunities. The
rationale:
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The operating policies and practices of an
organization determine to some extent the economic,
psychological, and social opportunities available
to its members. It is the members 1 perceptions of
organizational practices, and their perceptions of the
opportunities these practices do or do not make
available to them which most directly affect their
choices as to how to behave in the organization.
Organizational practices and available
opportunities can be combined to provide an
indicator of institutional racism by examining the
relationship between the two factors for various
racial groups. More specifically, if for whites
present organizational practices make available
many, and deny few, opportunities while the
opposite is the case for Blacks, such practices are
discriminating against Blacks.
The total size of the study was 2,552 officers and enlisted
Navy personnel from 38 different Navy sites, ships and shore stations,
from both coasts, including southern and northern locations.
An exclusive population of all volunteer Navy (AVN) enlisted
men was used in the report because the racial composition of this
group has been found to be strikingly similar to the racial composition
of the total U. S. Navy. To compile a representative sample Pecorella
excluded females and warrant officers because they were such a small
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percentage of the total sample. Regular officers were excluded
because 14.2% of the whites were officers while 1.4% of the Blacks and
1.8% of the other minority races were officers. The final sample
included 2,039 enlisted personnel, of which 84.3% were white, 6.9%
were Black and 7.9% were of other races.
The racial groups were substantially different in several
respects:
Age: Blacks tended to be younger than whites
and "Others." Secondly, more personnel
in the other category were over the age
of 37 than were Blacks and whites.
Education: Blacks tended to be less educated than
whites and others.
Community: Fewer blacks than whites and others came
from rural areas and suburbs, while more
Blacks than whites and others came from
large cities.
Region: A much larger proportion of others than
whites and Blacks came from regions out-
side the U. S. mainland. In addition,
over half of the Blacks came from the
south, while most whites came, in about
equal numbers, from the east, south,
midwest, and west of the U. S.
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Present Rank Rate: More whites tended to have
intermediate rank ratings while more
Blacks than whites and others have the
lowest rank ratings.
Four major sets of variables were subjected to study:
organizational climate, available opportunities, demographic character
istics, and behavior intentions relevant to organizational outcomes.
Three issues pertaining to institutional racism in the Navy
were covered: (1) relationship between organizational practices and
available opportunities, (2) relationships between available opportuni-
ties and intention to remain in the Navy, and (3) moderating effects
of demographic characteristics on these relationships.
The following findings were reported:
1.
Blacks and others experienced on-the-job discrimination
that whites did not.
2. All three racial groups indicated that Blacks as a
collective experienced discrimination in the Navy.
3. Minority groups received fewer status rewards and
advancement opportunities than whites as evidenced
by objective data. These 1972 statistics were cited:
14. 2% of whites
1 . 4% of Blacks
1 . 8% of others
26. 9% of whites
47. 5% of Blacks
38. 3% of others
36% of whi tes
59% of Blacks
64% of others
34% of whites
13% of Blacks
11% of others
were officers
had E-l to E-3 ratings
advanced slowly through rate/rank system
initially acquired skills training
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Race appeared to be a significant factor in the allocation of
organizational reward to the disadvantage of minority groups, according
to the findings of this study. Two levels of discrimination were
reported:
1. Personal discrimination -- experienced in one's
work setting.
2. Collective discrimination — experienced and
perceived by minorities as a whole in the larqer
system. y
Advancement opportunities and job challenge were best
predictors of discrimination and opportunities for whites; social
relations, advancement opportunities and job challenge were predictors
for Blacks; and comfort and advancement for others. The study also
reported some significance between personal discrimination and
intention to re-enlist in the Navy (for Blacks and whites more than
for others). Relationship between opportunities provided and re-
enlistment intentions were higher for whites.
Report of the CNO Retention Study Group
When queried on climate factors, interviewees and co-workers
almost invariably referenced the report of the 1972 Black Retention
Study Group. It was their feeling that this report embraced the most
thorough and comprehensive elements of the minority experience for
that time period and probably represented years of sentiments
unexpressed. A synopsis of this report, written by Terry Johnson
(1972), as it appeared in the Crui ser-Destroyerman , a Navy publication,
is being appended.
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The group's major conclusion was that the Navy was falling t0
take responsibility or accept ownership of minority affairs and race
relations problems; that responsibility for these problems were being
delegated to minority affairs officers and other representatives.
Findings and recommendations were grouped under four themes;
1. Failure of the Navy to accept problem ownership.
2. Incompatibility of being a minority and Navy too
3. Non-representation of all minorities.
4. Classification/placement of all minorities.
Manifestations of Institutional Racism in the Navy which impacted
the Climate in the 1970' s.
This is a summary of some observations which expand upon the
information provided in this section. Basically minorities experienced
racism in the following ways.
-the continuous awareness that historically they
were not privileged to participate freely in the
major rewards provided by the organization
especially in the areas of: training, promotions
and choice of occupations.
-the continuous contradiction of Navy policies
and practices as they were poroport to be and the
persenal and (collective experiences of its
minority members.
-the degradation of persual instances of racism
encountered in the day to day experiences of
minorities in sometimes subtle and sometimes
overt manner, but almost invariably in a manner
for which the chain command offered little
rectification.
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Elements of the climate which proved problematic for minorities
with whom the investigator interacted were:
Minorities have not historically had equal
access to the major rewards provided by the
organization, especially in the areas of
promotions, training and occupation choices.
To request the day to day privileges, a sailor must submit
a "chit." The chit is a standard form that calls for certain information
about the applicant and the situation i.e., the problem should be
described comprehensively, and concisely. The Navy values crisp,
concise delivery, probably because of the mass of paper work that
gets generated with the population size and the bureaucratic procedures.
If the sailor does not form to these guidelines, the chit may be
denied. In numerous discussions regarding this procedure, which gets
to be a central means of communicating one's wishes, naval personnel
have described to the investigator instances in which cits were
destroyed repeatedly because of unsatisfactory grammar, incompletions,
lack of clarity and sometimes interpersonal conflicts between an officer
and enlisted person. First of all the process is basically padagogical
and thereby generates and perpetuates the dynamics usually engandered
in this type subordinating relationships.
Because of the strength and reinforcement of the chain of
command it became imperative to know how to use the system and some-
times how to evade it. Very often minorities did not have that know-
how. There were obviously much such procedures which theoretically
provided the mechanism for the successful management of oneself within
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the organization. These practices only became bias in the way they
were implemented, bias was in the human factor.
Another system which was reportedly exploited was psychiatric
diagnosis and care. Outspoken, assertive persons were channeled into
psychiatric programs and often discharged for medical reasons.
Aggression was treated as an illness in minorities and generally not
tolerated in the military.
The weaknesses of the testing system are discussed elsewhere.
In addition to the lack of content validity to the testing purposes
the investigator spoke with minorities who were tested under less than
favorable conditions, i.e., following strenuous activities, at an
unannounced (or not previously announced) time which would have
allowed the testee to be refreshed and rested; in an uncomfortable
environment; and sometimes the importance and use of test results were
played down or completely misrepresented.
It seemed as if this oppressive behavior was sustained for
many years, first of all because the general military milieu was not
affected; and, there were very few minorities in positions of power
to counter this type of informal system manipulation.
Chief Willie Coleman (1975), identified the following
sociological examples of discrimination:
1. Service clubs were staffed primarily by whites
and the level of service was often poor and
offensive.
2. Housing was being assigned on discriminatory
basis along racial lines.
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3. The commissary was hiring the wives of whites
only (a few Filipinos were to be found in the
storage room jobs).
4. Navy exchanges (stores) did not store literature,
foods and beauty aids for non-whites.
5. Base-employed barbers did not know how to cut
Black hair.
Admiral Zumwalt responded to the question regarding climate
factors in this way:
A combination of things happened:
bringing in minority personnel at the bottom
of the pyramid both officers and enlisted and
having them look up and get a perception of
institutional racism — almost total majority
personnel at the top (and that was racist),
created tensions. When there were only a few
(3-5) Blacks on a destroyer they tended to
disregard the slights and prejudices, when there
were 30 to 35 they began talking about conditions
and we began feeling the vibrations. And
although the Skipper (commanding officer) had the
tools to deal with it, on some ships, particularly
the bigger ones, they didn't. There was signifi-
cant performance on the part of some leaders in
dealing with it and there were significant failures
on the part of others.
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Jhe Non-Assimi 1 ated Black Sailor of the 1970's
Not all Navy personnel assimilated military ethics to the
same degree, according to Lang (1972). He associates assimilation with
background and training, especially the latter. Officer candidates
undergoing more lengthy and intense training prior to commission
demonstrate a higher degree of Navy culture assimilation than do
those whose route to commission is a shorter duration or less intense.
Lang also found strong correlation between this assimilation and
opportunities for long and successful careers. In the late 60's
and early 70' s there was an increasing number of young Black sailors
who demonstrated early in their careers a low degree of Navy culture
assimilation, very unlike their predecessors.
Petty Officer Monday (1975), related his description of a
young Black entering the Navy in the early 70' s as "coming from an
economically deprived area of the nation's cities; a much more aware
individual. Those entering in the early 70 's had been born in the
50
' s , a time period when as a society we faced great racial turmoil,
and these young men grew up with racial consciousness, unlike their
predecessors in the Navy."
A major source of the "non-assimilated young Black sailor"
was Project 100,000, a recruitment program introduced during the
McNamara administration (late 60 ' s ) designed to increase the number
of minorities, especially Blacks in the Navy (Monday, 1975). Prior to
the project, the organization acknowledged the fact that its
recruitment process screened Blacks into menial jobs; did not attract
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high calibre officer candidates and was therfore maintaining a low
minority population with very few officers emerging. In an effort to
promote Project 100,000, the test score requirement for entry and
placement was adjusted and an intensified recruitment advertising
program in minority-intensive institutions, media, and communities was
launched.
In their survey of Navy personnel the Vroom Study Group (1972),
quoted a frequent criticism of the effort by minorities: "The Navy's
recruiting advertising appears to promise more than the Navy delivers
... an enlisted man was promised X and he got Z. Not only did he
get Z but both Z and X were oversold." The resulting feelings of anger,
resentment, hostility, appressiveness and hopelessness were intensified
in a situation where these young men had made a long-term commitment.
In their study of attitudes aboard Navy ships, Brunis, James
and Jones (1975), sampled 39, 139 enlisted men from 20 ships. The
average Black sampled (among other demographic features) was more
likely to have come from an urban background (city over 250,000) and
was less likely to have received advanced training.
Monday, Lang, Brunis, James, Jones referred to the presence
of a critical and perhaps fairly new population coming into the Navy
in a compressed time period who did not fit the model asserted by
Janowitz, Glover and others; and who in fact would probably not appear
in officers training in his career.
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The Vietnam War
The racial climate was intensified by the fact of the War.
The toughest period of the entire decade of the Vietnam crises for
sailors coincided with the greatest expressions of discontent.
(Zumwalt, 1975). Massive overdeployments after the invasion across
the DMA March 30, 1972; the largest number of ships ever deployed in
the entire war, and from the smallest base of ships since the Navy had
been so badly cut back; men overworked; ships undermanned and under-
maintained; almost no domestic support for the war effort.
The impact of high commitment and over extension was confirmed
by Officer Monday(1975)
, Lieutenant Randall (1975), and others who
described the frustration of overlapping tours, tired and distressed
men and a hostile home country. This situation created more than the
usual tensions of confinement aboard a ship for long periods of time.
Navy Statistics - Population, Discharge
.
Occupations
A factor which strongly influenced the equal opportunity
climate, and which was repeatedly voiced by minority personnel, related
to non-judicial punishment, promotions and occupational choices.
Minorities complained that non-jusicial punishment impacted on them
proportionately more often than on whites, and that minority members
of the organization received a lower proportion of honorable dis-
charges and a higher proportion of general and undesirable discharges
( The Rudder The Race Relations Newsletter; July, 1974, p. 30).
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In 1975 Commander Wiley stated in an interview that:
"primarily non-whites were in the less desirable jobs; the scutbut,
least productive jobs that don't lead very far professionally."
Most of the regarding climate factor presented so far has been
in the form of soft data. This section presents hard data which seems
to substantiate organizational practices which created the need for
equal opportunity policy in the Navy during the period under study.
Glossary of Military Terms Used in Tables
Bad Conduct Discharge (BCD) - a discharge or involuntary
separation which may result from cases litigated through the court
martial system.
Undersirable Discharge (UP) - an administrative discharge
awarded for less severe infractions not meriting court martial.
BCD's and UD's on the record of an armed forces veteran
negatively impacts that person's employability and separation benefits.
General Discharge (GD) - a "regular 1 discharge, without honor,
awarded upon the completion of a tour of duty; full benefits are
awarded. Informally this type discharge has negative connotations
from within the organization.
Unknown - refers to those persons whose race was not
identified on records.
Warrant Officer (WO I - CW04 ) - a grouping which represent the
transition between enlisted personnel and officer grade. This group
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has been recognized for technical competence In their work and are
attempting to qualify for junior officer rank. In the civilian world
of work this group compares to the general foreman.
Juni or Officer - Ensigns (Ens), Lieutenant (Lt). and Lieutenant
Junior Grade (LtJG)
.
Senior Officers - Lieutenant Commander (LcDr)
, Commander (Cdr),
Captain (Caap)
,
Rear Admiral (RaDM)
,
and Admiral (Adm).
Flag Officer - Admirals and Commandants. This Is the most
senior eschelon whose presence is symbolized by the display of the
United States Flag.
Statistics on Population and Discharges
Discharge and Enlisted Population Tables - 1972 - 1973
Table A shows the racial composition, by number and percentage
of enlisted population of the Navy for 1972 and 1973. Tables B and
C list the percentage of each type of discharge awarded to each
racial group. The impact of these statistics can be determined by
comparing the percentage of total population of a racial group with
the percentage of each type discharge.
In 1972 Blacks and Indians received a disporportionate number
of less than honorable discharges than their membership v/ould indicate
when compared to percentages of the white population. Blacks received
12.9% of the bad conduct discharges when they represented only 6.4%
of the Navy population. Indians received 1.4% of the undersirable
discharges and 0.4% of the general discharges when they represented
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DISCHARGE AND ENLISTED POPULATION TABLES
TABLE A - ENLISTED POPULATION BY RACE
FISCAL YEAR 1972 FISCAL YEAR 1973
RACE PERCENTAGE POPULATION PERCENTAGE POPULATION
White
Black
American Indian
Malayan
Mongolian
89.0%
6.4%
0.2%
4.2%
0.2%
454,580
32,485
1,117
21,511
976
87.3%
7.7%
0.2%
4.6%
0.2%
427,747
37,569
1,177
22,536
979
Total 100.0% 510,669 100.0% 490,008
TABLE B - PERCENTAGE OF EACH
GROUP FOR
TYPE OF DISCHARGE
2ND HALF FY 72
AWARDED TO EACH RACIAL
TYPE WHITE BLACK A. INDIAN MALAYAN MONGOLIAN
(89%)
Population
(6.4%) (0.2%) (4.2%) (0.2%)
BCD 83.9% 12.9% 0% 3.2% 0%
UD 86.0% 11.8% 1.4% 0.9% 0%
GD 86.8% 12.1% 0.4% 0.6% 0.1%
TABLE C - PERCENTAGE OF EACH
GROUP FOR
TYPE OF DISCHARGE
FISCAL YEAR 1973
AWARDED TO EACH RACIAL
TYPE WHITE BLACK A. INDIAN MALAYAN MONGOLIAN
(87.29%)
Population
(7.67%) (0.24%) (4.60%) (0.20%)
BCD 78.9% 10.5% 0% 10.5% 0%
UD 87.4% 10.1% 1.3% 1.1% 0%
GD 84.6% 14.4% 0.6% 0.3% 0.1%
Bureau of Naval Personnel 1975
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only 0.2 of the population. The percentage of less than honorable
discharges awarded whites was consistently less than their membership
In the total population.
In 1973 the degree of disparity In these figures for the Black
population was slightly decreased. Even though the Black population
Increased slightly the percentages of less than honorable discharges
actually decreased slightly.
In the Malayan population the trend in 1973 was just the
opposite. The percentage of BCD's tripled In one year even though the
population Increased by only At.
These statistics reflect the hard facts of how less than
honorable discharges were awarded during the period critical to this
study. No generalizations can be drawn regarding more long-term
patterns of discharges; the investigator would assert however that
generally this information substantiates that minorities tended to
receive a disporportlonate percentage of the less than honorable
discharges.
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Minority Representation in thp
Officer Corp - 1973
Table D shows the distribution of racial groups in the United
States Navy officer corp for 1973. Based on these figures only 1.66* of
the officers were minorities in a year when they represented more than
12* of the total population. Fewer minorities were promoted into the
officer corp than their membership would indicate prior to 1973.
Table E is a breakdown of officer ranks by race. The larger
number of white officers cluster around the ranks of lieutenant and
lieutenant commander (the demarcation between junior officer and
senior officer). Minority officers cluster around the rank of ensign
(entry level) with very few appearing in the senior ranks and only one
minority flag officer in 1973.
These figures reflect the fact that minorities have only
recently entered the officer corp in significant numbers. Based on
the investigators information minorities who were previously promoted
often did not remain in the Navy, but found careers outside. This
tends to be consistent with Pecorella's findings of a correlation
between the experience of personal discrimination and intention to
re-enlist in the Navy.
Table F shows a distribution of enlisted personnel by race
and rank for 1973. The patterns in the promotion of minority and
whites between the ranks of E-2 and E-7 seem quite comparable to the
population patterns i.e., there is a balance in the percentage of
each racial group by rank when compared to respective populations.
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There is however, a considerable reduction in the numbers of minorities
appearing in the ranks of E-8 and E-9. The investigator does not have
substantial evidence to explain conclusively the drop off in promotion
at the more senior levels, however, the promotion procedures seem
quite relevant to this occurance.
The procedure for promotion between rates between E2 and E-7
involves the following three steps:
1. application by the enlisted person
2. written recommendation by the immediate supervisor
3. participation in Navy-wide testing competion.
Promotions are granted to a designated percentage of the higher
scoring applicants.
The procedure for promotion between E-7 and E-9 involves the
following four steps:
1. application by the enlisted person
2. written recommendation by the immediate supervisor
3. personal interview and evaluation by a panel of senior
officers (not including the supervisor)
4. Navy-wide testing competion.
Promotions are granted to a designated percentage of the higher
scoring applicants.
The human factor introduced in the later process could affect
the promotion of minorities to the more senior enlisted ratings.
OFFICERS
ON
ACTIVE
DUTY
IN
THE
UNITED
STATES
NAVY
AS
OF
31
DECEMBER
1973
137
c
i—o
o CTi cnCO in oo1^ *a- i-H
"fa- co ooin in
oo
m oz 00<y>
as
CO
cn r^
<r> o
o
cd
<c
>-
co <c
Q
CM Z
<_}
«=t
_J
CO
*3-
cn
oo
CO
00
CM
CO CM
CO in
r-»
cl
o
CM
o
<T>
4—4
CO
d
<5-$
CO
CM
in o
o
<T> CM
f-H •
00 f-H
f-H VO
CO IQ
o
CO
o
<c
0k
z
<
>-
<c
c
*—
i
Q
OO
an
LU
<_>
o
i
CO
r*.
CO\
CM
CM
Cro
i
f-H
r-
co
o
CO
in
M o O
00 CL
or 21 >- LU
LU < 1— OCo o 4—4z 4—4 4—4 oc
Ll oc o 1
»—
i
ff in 0-4 f-H Ll LU z
oo <7> m in in O ZZ 4—4
<C l-H CO in • <c OO
<_> CO CO in r«- >- 4—4
ZD in in H- M Ll 2
<C Oo cc oO c LU ooz _l CD OC
4—4 CO «£ LU
oo s: 1— Q.
cc z =3
oo LU
_j LU CO
oc o < CD
LU 4—4 h- OC
CJ Ll LU o LU
4 4 Ll CD i— CL
Ll o <£
Ll h; • •o LU LU
_l LU <_>
LU c «=c o QC
—J 21 i— oc 13
LU o LU O
Ll_ 1— CL OO
OFFICERS
ON
ACTIVE
DUTY
IN
THE
UNITED
STATES
NAVY
AS
OF
31
DECEMBER
1973
138
CO 1^ r^. CM iHo VO rH o LOCO co cn co 00
CO m. o- LO
VO
VOo
*3-
o
CO
o
o
in
CTl CT1 r—
I
vo oo r-*
CO rH
«—
• CM
cn
co
rH
CO
VO
S3oo
in
o
CM CM CO r^. CT\ VO
in ci cm h
CM r-H
CTi
cn
*3-
S3
CO
r»»
o
r O' O vf a (Ji
• co co m o
CM
S3
co
o
in cm in co o'! o CTI CM
CM
S3
COO «-H
CTi
o
co co in cm in
<S«
CM
o
o
c_>
<c
—I
CO
CO CO CM CM VO
or co o vo o
r-H iH CO
cm h oo cr>
co in CM r-t
00
S3o
CM
z
<c
1—»
in CM VO 00 CO o co cn o VO VO f-H cn S3r-Hc O CM o fH 00 in t-H CM in VOo CO CO 00 in co 00 CO •—
H
in
CD
co
CO r-^
t-H
in
»-H
o
rH
cn f-H CM VO
VO CTi
cc
I— Ct. CD CO CMC Q. o; q rs cn o o o i—
<
—Je£Oc_Jl— (— Z 3330lJ-C_>0_l_J_JLiJ00C_)3 <I—o S3 SOURCE:
BUPERS
NMIS
-
REPORT
5310-0371-0Q
N21
12/31/73-01/17/74
ENLISTED
PERSONNEL
ON
ACTIVE
DUTY
IN
THE
UNITED
STATES
NAVY
139
lo
O'!
nT
co
oo
lo
oo
rH CM rH LO CM o ooCM r>» nr nr cn
CM VO O 00 00 CM
00 vo CO nr 00
co VO c*. 00 00 oo
o
00
1^
o
00
oo
nr
oo cm oiovocncnovonr
H W N H
o
VO
cn
a*o
CM
o
CO
cn
cm
LU
CQ
LUO
LUO
l-H
co
oo
<
cn cn VO cn CM 00 CM VO
LO CM 1—
H
CM vo o cn VO r>»
CM 00
r—
H
LO
CO
o
VO
CO
nr
CO
nT
K
t
rH
CO H
CM
CM
T—
*
VO
2
NDIAN
CVJ LO f-H 00 *—H CO nr o cn CO VOM CM C\J r^. CO 00 vo CM
AM.
«"H ^4 CM CO rH CMH O
C_) «d" nr CM nT rv. rH
<c rH CM 00 VO CM 1
—
_l rH CO rH LO CO cn
CQ CM *3- CO CO
CM 00 CO LO
cn i—
H
vo LO rH
t—H cn 00 <n rH
<n cn nr 00
CO OO
o
<co
—
«
r'» CM <n cn LO o 00 cn LO nr 5^
oo rH CO r-* cn f—
H
cn r». CO o LO CM
<C CO cn o CO cn cn 00 o CO CO CO
c_> CO o o vo r>. nr CO CM r»» •
=5 CO vo vo vo CO rH VO
00
t—
2
cnccr^LOuo^j-rocM
i i i i i i i t
I . I l.l lil lil lil lil III I Ll
<C
h-o
SOURCE:
N211
MAPMIS
5414-4107
E
Q
02-02-74
12/31/73
140
Distribution of Enlisted Personnel by
Rating and Occupational Group 1973
The information in Table G has been included to reflect the
degree of equal access minorities were afforded to all occupations in
the Navy. For that purpose these statistics are not particularly
revealing.
More than half of the Malayans in the Navy in 1973 worked
within one occupational grouping. Administrative and Clerical, which
includes the steward rates. Malayan were 4.6% of the total population
and 16.54% of this particular work force. This seems to corrorborate
with numbers, the contention that historically Malayans were channeled
into the steward rates.
In two of the highly skilled areas: Electronics and Precision
Equipment, minorities made up scarecely 3% of the work force. These
are among the more professional and preferred work areas.
More critical to the study, however, are the details of how
these statistics came to be. The investigator had limited access to
this type of information, three pertinent examples have been listed
below:
1. The percentages shown in the Construction Group
reflect the tendency of civilians in that trade
to enter the Navy, more than the training patterns
of the Navy. Generally, enter the organization
with training and creditentials in the trade, the
Navy does it, actually train in this area.
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2. Just looking at the figures In the Aviation Group,
minorities seem to be proportionately represented,
however, If the nature of the different ratings were
spelled out we would find that many of the jobs In
the aviation group are less than desirable, "scutbut"
jobs and many are filled by minorities.
3. In the Medical Group minorities are highly represented.
The investigator was able to determine that these
numbers were actually Influenced by the situation
of the Viewnam War in the late 60 's and early 70' s.
There was a high percentage of casualties resulting
from the War placing high demands on the medical
forces. During crisis times such as these, it seem
that racial restrictions were relaxed and minorities
were accepted in increased numbers to handle the
deficit.
The figures therefore do not necessarily reflect what
would be the usual pattern of employment in the
Medical Group. For the period under study however,
minorities were well represented in this group.
This discussion is intended to lend credence to the value of
exploring the more Informal dynamics operating within an organization
as a means of understanding organizational behavior. It Is not
intended as a critique of the presentation of data by the Bureau.
DISTRIBUTION OF ENLISTED PERSONNEL BY RATTME ANn
OCCUPATIONAL GROUP AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1973
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0 1
CAUCASIAN BLACK
Deck Group
BM 7427 1079
EW 1124 33
MA 273 25
OS 6371 320
OT 1046 8
QM 4153 218
SM 2696 393
ST 1914 51
STG 2533 44
STS 1096 30
TOTAL 28633 2201
91.77% 7.05%
II. Ordinance Group
FT 396 4
FTB 926 23
FTG 3818 102
FTM 2648 73
GM 184 7
GMG 3490 376
GMM 855 33
GMT 1289 52
MN 491 14
MT 1269 30
TM 3884 177
TOTAL 19250 891
94.77% 4.39%
2 3 4
AM. INDIAN MALAYAN MONGOLIAN
25 128 13
2 1 2
1 18 1
10 14 13
2 1 1
11 35 5
10 41 3
3 6 2
4 4 6
5
68 253 46
0.22% 0.81% 0.15%
1 1
3 4 3
5 11 16
5 10 16
23 34 1
2 2 2
2 4 1
1 1 1
3 1 4
4 8 2
49 76 46
0.24% 0.37%
.
0.23%
TOTAL
8672
1162
318
6728
1058
4422
3143
1976
2591
1131
31201
100%
402
959
3952
2752
191
3924
894
1348
508
1307
4075
20312
100%
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(Continued)
III.
IV.
V.
DISTRIBUTION OF ENLISTED PERSONNEL BY RATING flfjn
OCCUPATIONAL GROUP AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1973
0
CAUCASIAN
1
BLACK
2
AM. INDIAN
3
MALAYAN
4
MONGOLIAN TOTAL
Electronics Group
DS
ET
ETN
ETR
1625
4794
7349
6601
31
87
192
148
3
5
5
9
17
20
26
21
7
15
24
33
1683
4921
7596
6812
TOTAL 20369
96.94%
458
2.18%
22
0.10%
84
0.40%
79
0.38%
21012
100%
Precision Equipment Group .
•
IM
OM
PI
401
319
7
12
7
1
1
4
1
418
328
7
TOTAL 727
96.55%
19
2.5%
2
0.27%
4
0.53%
1
0.13%
753
100%
Administrative and Clerical Group
CS 2658 897 11 937 19 8122
CTA 1034 26 1 2 1063
CTI 849 7 1 857
CTM 1730 14 3 1 1748
CTO 1708 37 4 1 1750
CTR 2065 31 6 1 2103
CTT 1950 40 2 2 1 1995
OK 1098 101 916 4 2119
DP 3198 141 9 105 15 3468
JO 521 26 2 11 1 561
LN 253 18 6 277
NC 426 29 15 470
PC 790 127 1 33 5 961
PM 6799 418 20 515 16 7768
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V.
VI.
VII.
distribution of enlisted personnel BY RATING ANH
OCCUPATIONAL GROUP AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1Q73
0 12 3 4
CAUCAS IAN BLACK AM. INDIAN MALAYAN MONGOL IAN
Administrative and Clerical Group (Continued)
RM 16422 1191
SO 1340 509
SH 2148 958
SK 6290 814
YN 9879 761
TOTAL 64758 6145
75.89% 7.20%
Miscellaneous Group
DM 433 23
LI 364 27
MU 1211 78
SN 62095 11451
Total 63103
82.45%
11579
14.89%
Engineering and Hull Group
BR 156 14
BT 9642 727
EM 10339 364
EN 7650 472
FN 21529 2852
HT 9334 583
IC 4649 136
ML .. 207 10
MM 20872 741
MR 2148 63
PM 157 3
TOTAL 86683
90.36%
5965
6.22%
39 109 28
5 9152 18
7 365 7
20 1651 22
28 282 21
152 14110 163
0.18% 16.54% 0.19%
2 17
3 6
60 1
314 1508 159
319 1508 160
0.41% 2.05% 0.21%
1 2
26 105 11
18 1042 39
21 402 14
124 601 37
19 155 8
10 41 9
3 1
37 348 27
6 149 1
1 21
263 2869 147
0.28% 2.99% 0.15%
TOTAL
17789
11024
3485
8797
10971
8S328
100%
475
400
1350
75527
77752
100%
173
10511
11802
8559
25143
10099
4845
221
22025
2367
182
95927
100%
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DISTRIBUTION OF ENLISTED PERSONNEL BY rating Aiun
OCCUPATIONAL GROUP AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1973
0 1 2 3 4
CAUCASIAN BLACK AM. INDIAN MALAYAN MONGOLIAN TOTAL
Construction Group
BU
CE
2347
1319
64
37
10
5
64
on
7 2492
CM
CN
CU
1393
2465
33
32
188
1
3
• 14
oU
74
28
6
1
5
1447
1503
2700
EA
EO
EQ
274
2298
31
8
73
2
7
I
66
29
3
4
35
353
2411
SW
UT
785
1145
27
66
2
3
14
34
2
3
31
830
1251
TOTAL 12090 496 46 390 31 1305392.62% 3.80% 0.35% 2.99% 0.24% 100%
Aviation Group
AB
ABE
ABF
102
1150
916
1
86
73
3
1
6
14
103
1245
1004
ABH 1823 235 5 22 4 2089
AC 2677 93 2 4 2776
AD 457 14 2 473
ADJ 9262 589 22 320 17 10210
ADR 3188 177 13 19 2 3399
AE 6759 332 12 48 7 7158
AF 631 10 1 642
AG 1676 35 5 1 1717
AK 2918 355 5 590 9 3877
AM 345 14 359
AME 2171 67 7 10 4 2259
AMH 4797 308 14 100 9 5218
AMS 6051 423 16 99 12 6601
AN 19622 5015 112 559 70 25378
AO 4571 254 10 10 2 4847
AQ 3456 87 12 8 7 3570
AS 504 31 4 1 540
ASE 430 8 13 1 452
ASH 355 14 2 8 1 380
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distribution of enlisted personnel by ratine awn
OCCUPATIONAL GROUP AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1973
-CAUCASIAN BLACK AM. INDIAN MALAYAN MONGOLIAN TOTAL
IX. Aviation Group (Continued)
ASM
AT
AW
AX
AZ
PH
PR
PT •
TD
643
9746
2259
1045
2753
2325
1736
532
1632
36
250
20
13
212
103
44
12
24
15
1
1
3
1
4
1
66
32
2
1
142
13
2
2
3
30
3
5
8
3
1
2
748
10073
2282
1063
3115
2450
1789
548
1658
TOTAL 96522
89.35%
8935
8.27%
263
0.24%
2101
1.95%
202 •
0.19%
108023
100%
X. Medical Group
HM 21041
89.46%
1803
7.67%
67
0.28%
534
2.27%
75
0.32%
23520
100%
XI. Dental Group
DT 3178 463 12 164 10 3827
83.04% 12.10% 0.31% 4.29% 0.26% 100%
OVERALL TOTAL OF ENLISTED PERSONNEL
417354 38955 1263 22176 960 480708
86.82% 8.11% 0.26% 4.61% 0.20% 100%
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Summary
Equal Opportunity Climate Factors describes the pressure
points in the Organization, sources of tension between the perceived
culture and the culture experience by minority members. This section
include both hard and soft data that illustrates institutional racism
in the areas of promotions, discharge and career development. A
disporportionately higher percentage of "less than honorable"
discharges fewer promotions, and limited career possibilities were
given to minority members of the Navy. These areas are, of course,
central elements of the Navy system of reward and sanction. The
systematic use of these sanctions over a period of years constitutes
institutional racism. This contention is supported by BUPERS statist
and the authors observations. The University of Michigan Study
reviewed in this section indicated race as a significant factor in
the allocation of organizational rewards to the disadvantage of minority
groups; that minorities experienced personal discrimination and that
there was a correlation between personal discrimination and intention
to re-enlist. All of the findings were reported by minority and non-
minority subjects.
Finally, a report from a 1972 study group summarizes the nature
and extent of racial problems in the Navy; and describes the super-
ficiality in the management of the problem.
CHAPTER V
INTEREST ARTICULATION
Baldridge identifies two major interest groups in complex
social systems:
Authorities : Those people in the organization who make
binding decisions for the group. The critical problems
for this group are the implementation of decisions and the
achievement of goals.
—
t1sans : Pe°P le in the organization who are significantly
affected by decisions. The critical issue for partisans is
social influence.
The authorities make the decisions and try to control the
partisan groups; the partisans try to influence the decisions and
perhaps even attempt to overthrow the authorities.
The interest articulation groups which are activated on the
issue of equal opportunity in the Navy were:
Commanding Officers
Admirals
U. S. Congress
Department of Defense
Minority Enlisted Personnel
Civilian Advocacy Groups
The admirals, the Congress, and the DOD were clearly in the
authority category; the minority officers and enlisted personnel were
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clearly partisan groups. The commanding officers, however, were not
an easy group to fit into Baldridge's categories. In relationship to
the admirals, the commanding officers were partisans; in relationship
to enlisted personnel they were clearly authorities because they were
making the decisions that affected the immediate behaviors. When the
context is narrowed to a command or a particular situation, these roles
are clear; when the context is the total Navy, roles overlap.
This chapter describes those activities of each group which
seemed to exert pressure on the organization in terms of race relations.
The composition of each group was influenced by the investigator's
information and access. The authority group is composed of white males
only, which reflects accurately the top decision-making structure in
the Navy.
The partisan groups are predominantly Black. It was the Blacks,
it seems, who staged the outward expression of discontent. Other
minority groups maintained low profiles and usually worked through
outside organizations. This factor influenced the subsequent programs
and policies. Most of the latter were targeted for the Black population.
Commanding Officers
Commander Bryon Wiley reflected on the power of the commander
officer:
There is a misunderstanding about the power
points in the organization. One of the things
that civilians did not understand was the title
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CNO. He isn't really chief of naval
operations; to the extent that he is a member
of the joint chiefs of staff he does figure
into what goes on, but commander in chief is
very anonymous in the operations. Frequently
civilians felt that when the CNO said something
it would automatically be done, which is not
the case. The CNO is far away and the further
away from Washington the more a program gets
diluted. You respond to what your commander
tells you to do.
In the interview session. Admiral Zumwalt consistently referred
to the commanding officers as "our leasers." Commanding officers were
often cited as the persons who made the difference.
As in other organizations the leader sets the tone and in the
Navy that leader was obviously the commanding officer who orchestrated
face to face, day to day operations.
This group articulated interest through their leadership
styles and were probably influenced by their personal stances on
racism.
Admirals
Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., has been referred to in the
media as "the man who changed the Navy." He became chief of naval
operations in 1971, a three year position. Within the first six
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months of his tenure he identified a number of people problems and
became the "innovation advocate" for a human resource development
program through which he introduced a new style of leadership into
the organization. The impact of his style was felt immediately
throughout the organization, up and down the chain of command.
Minorities saw new guidelines that enhanced their lives and careers
in the organization; middle managers felt new responsibilities and
expectations as leaders, much of which was inconsistent with their
years of experience as military managers; superiors in the Congress and
Department of Defense tested and challenged the new admiral's approach
for congruence with military tradition.
The admiral described his introduction to the race issue in
the 1975 interview with the author:
Insofar as my own transformation is concerned
what really was the energizing force for me . . .
I had for years thought that the Navy was doing
its job in providing equal opportunity. There
was only vague knowledge of discontent, but
there was always discontent in every interest
group. So even though I had never considered
myself neither prejudiced nor racist but rather
supportive of equal opportunity, it was just
one of those things that was not high on my
worry list, until we began the concept of the
retention boards designed to look into all of
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our problems; sometimes destroyer crews, officers,
at other times enlisted personnel from the
submarine force were invited to the board. Time
came when the suggestion was made that we get
together a group of Blacks and their wives — and
I was absolutely shocked to discover the emotion
with which these people really took us on about
the institutional racism which existed, and began
to recite chapter and verse ... and then to
discover through this very effective mechanism that
there were things that I had not been aware of such
as the failure to supply soul and beauty aides and
the little institutional discriminations that just
represented disregard, ignorance and lack of interest.
And when I began to feel and perceive the problems
then we began to get the thing energized and of
course created the usual resentments that a dedication
to integration creates. Two way resentments began
to build and bloomed into the disturbances in
November, 1972.
Subsequent to the first Black retention study group, follow-up
boards were assembled and the Admiral began sending out Z-Grams which
he described as "just a way of getting people's attention and focus on
an issue." He then began to build what he referred to as an
institutional approach: the Chief of Personnel was asked to put
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together a race relations program as expediciously as possible. When
that office projected a two-year time line to get such a program into
operation the Admiral re- tasked them, requesting that they use outside
resources to meet his time boundary.
Admiral Zumwalt became very outspoken and demonstrated a strong
commitment to the EO effort. His commitment was demonstrated through
his challenging of the system; his use of policy, the most powerful
tool -- the very locus of control in the organization; and the staffing
of newly created EO positions with persons who had demonstrated not
only an interest in race relations, but influence in terms of Navy
policy. His public commitment was to the total elimination of every
vestige of racism, personal and institutional, from the Navy.
Admiral Charles Rauch was assigned Project Manager to the
Human Resources Development Program by Admiral Zumwalt in 1971. Of
his initiation he reported: "We were primarily attempting to learn
all that we could about race relations, couple that with what we
learned about cross-cultural relations from Vietnam." Admiral Rauch
described his personal learnings in this way:
You see I don't think very many people realize
the degree of racism that existed in the Navy, I
certainly didn't. The complete lack of under-
standing and awareness on the part of the power
structure which is 99 and 44/100 percent of the
Navy, of the fact that there was any trouble.
We had never thought to ask and minorities had the
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attitude of why tell you, you're not going to
do anything about it. Some of us in the power
structure were out and out blatant racist, if
you will, enlist, feeling superior to other races.
I began to see things that were perhaps right
before my eyes all of the time but I never saw
them. It became clear to me that the Navy was
not going to solve its problems until we got
whites and Blacks together, sat down and dis-
cussed this as a gut issue, perhaps even
emotionally. I didn't want to get into
sensitivity training but I knew we had to get a
dialogue going if we were to accomplish anything.
The Navy was not going to solve this problem with
our standard training with age old type of class-
room training and degrees. I was convinced and I
am still convinced today, and no one will ever
convince me otherwise, until we got Blacks and
whites together sitting, talking nothing was
going to happen. I thought we were going to get
a better compliance if we got people really
understanding what the issues were.
Admiral Rauch's perception was to be reflected in the first
race relations training program, Phase I, which did structure small
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group interaction (and racial confrontation) in heterogenous groups
across cultural, rank, and occupational lines. People did begin to
deal with each other at a gut level, compliance was not affected
significantly.
Admiral Rauch continued in his position as project manager
throughout Phase II which was more of a systems change model than
Phase I. He managed program and policy development in the same
assertive manner as the NCO promulgated them.
In addition to exerting aggressive leadership in this area
both Admiral Rauch and Admiral Zumwalt were visible participants; an
example was their participation in the first race relations seminars
held for flagg officers in Washington.
Admiral Draper Kauffman was not a part of the decision-making
structure at this time, however, he was involved in field implement-
ations. Kauffman was credited with resolving some of the issues
following the racial disturbance at Great Lakes, Illinois in 1969.
Admiral Rauch described Admiral Kauffman as "probably the most aware
admiral that has ever gone through the Navy." In a personal letter to
Admiral Zumwalt, Admiral Kauffman expressed his views on race relations
in the Navy. His letter, appendicized in this study, reflects the
type of informal support system which was probably not uncommon among
Flagg officers.
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Congress
The Committee on Armed Services of the Houst of Representatives
of the Ninety-Second Congress appointed a special subcommittee to
investigate the disciplinary problems in the Navy, which had occurred
just months prior to the date of its formation.
This subcommittee, chaired by Representative Floyd B. Hicks,
convened on November 20, 1972; completed 2,565 pages of transcripts
of testimony, and assembled a large colume of reports, directives, and
military investigations. On January 2, 1973 the subcommittee submitted
its findings to F. Edward Hebert, chairman of the Armed Services
Committee.
This 'summary reflects the spirit and findings of that report.
Excerpts from the subcommittee's original report have been included in
the appendix of this study which detail events, responsibilities and
recommendations.
The context within which the subcommittee defined its task
gets captured and communicated in the introduction and rationale of
the final report by such phraseology as: "concern in the House Armed
Services Committee over relaxed discipline in the military science,"
"erosion of good order and discipline," "sabotage of Naval property,"
and "the questioning of lawful orders."
The essence of the findings was: (1) that the vast majority
of Naval personnel were performing their duties loyally and
efficiently, (2) there was no evidence of institutional racism in the
Navy, and (3) that the incidents which has transpired aboard Navy ships
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resulted from a deteriorating military ethos manifest in the Navy's
approach to equal opportunity, management, and management training
during the time in question. Relative to item three (3), the problems
or grievances which had been asserted by minorities, primarily blacks,
were represented as "misunderstandings, fostered and fammed by a small
group of skilled agitators within the rank of young Black seamen.
The seventeen (17) specific findings as they appeared in the
report were:
1. The subcommittee finds that permissiveness exists
in the Navy today. Although we have been able to
investigate only certain specific incidents in
depth, the total information made available to us
indicates the conditions could be service-wide.
2. The vast majority of Navy men and women are
performing their assigned duties loyally and
efficiently. The subcommittee is fully aware and
appreciative of their efforts. The cause for
concern, however, rests with that segment of the
naval force which is either unwilling or unable to
function within the prescribed limitations and up
to the established standards of performance or
conduct.
3. The subcommittee has been unable to determine any
preciptious cause for the rampage aboard U.S.S.
KITTY HAWK. Not only was there not one case
wherein racial discrimination could be pinpointed,
but there is no evidence which indicated that the
Blacks who participated in that incident perceived
racial discrimination, either in general or in any
specific, of such a nature as to justify belief
that violent reaction was required.
4. The subcommittee finds that the incident aboard the
U.S.S. CONSTELLATION was the result of a carefully
orchestrated demonstration of passive resistance
within a small number of Blacks, certainly no more
than 20-25, in a well -organized campaign, willfully
created among other Blacks the belief that white
racism existed in the Navy and aboard that ship.
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The subcommittee, again in this instance as
with the incident aboard KITTY HAWK, found no
specific example of racial discrimination.
In this case, however, it is obvious taht the
participants perceived that racial discrimination
existed. Several events were made to appear as
examples of racial discrimination when in fact, such
was not the case.
5. Testimony revealed that one of the triggering
devices for the dissident activity aboard
CONSTELLATION was a misunderstanding, particularly
among the young Blacks, which led them to believe
that in order to reduce the number of personnel
aboard the ship to the authorized level, general
discharges were about to be awarded to 250 Black
crew members
.
In fact, the ship was in the process of reducing its
complement by 250 personnel in order to make room
for the air wing personnel who would embark! prior to
the forthcoming combat deployment. At the same time
the captain had directed that certain records be
reviewed and that those he considered troublemakers,
if they qualified for administrative discharge,
be notified of the ship's intent to commence
processing of the required paperwork.
It is unfortunate that this latter discharge pro-
cedure was initiated against six crewmembers in one
day without adequate explanation of the justification
for such action — especially since all six were
Black and this promoted the feeling that racial
discrimination was the cause. In addition, the lack
of counseling pertaining to the poor performance
marks received by those being considered for
administrative discharge caused notification of
pending discharge to serve as traumatic incidents
to those who were to receive them. There is
strong evidence, however, that these misunderstanding
were fostered and fanned by a small group of
skilled agitators within the ranks of the young
Black seamen.
6. The subcommittee was informed that a review, con-
ducted by Naval Personnel Research Activity, San
Diego, has found no racial discrimination in the
punishments awarded by the Commanding Officer,
U. S. S. CONSTELLATION.
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The subcommittee found no evidence that
the conclusion was in error.
7. Discipline, requiring immediate response to
command, is absolutely essential to any
mi Uary force. Particularly in the forces
afloat there is no room for the "town-meeting"
concept, or the employment of negotiation or
appeasement to obtain obedience to orders
The Navy must be controlled by command, notdemand.
8. The subcommittee found that insufficient
emphasis has been given to formal leadership
training, particularly in the ranks of petty
officers and junior officers.
9
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e2?rall y smart appearance of naval personnel,both afloat and ashore, has deteriorated markedly.
While the subcommittee appreciates efforts to
allow maximum reasonableness in daily routines,
there is absolutely no excuse for slovenly
appearance of officers and men in the Navy
uniform and such appearance should not be
tolerated.
10. There was no formal training of the master-at-arms
force. There was no effective utilization of the
Marine force. Certainly there was no contingency
plan for the coordination of these two forces in
events such as these. Once the activities started
there was no plan which could have acted to halt
them. The result was to let them wear themselves
out.
11. The members of the subcommittee did not find
and are unaware of any instances of institutional
discrimination on the part of the Navy toward any
group of persons, majority or minority.
12. Black unity, the drive toward togetherness on the
part of Blacks, has resulted in a tendency on the
part of Black sailors to polarize. This results
in a grievance of one Black sailor, real or
fancied, becoming the grievance of many.
Polarization is an unfortunate trend and negates
efforts since 1948 to integrate the military
services and to stamp out separation. This
divisive trend must be reversed.
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13.
14.
Non-military gestures such as "passing the power"
or dapping are disruptive, serve to enhance
racial polarization, and should be discouraged.
After the incidents on KITTY HAWK and CONSTELLATION
a
_
me
!r^
ln9 was called by the Secretary of the Navy
of all of the admirals in the Washington, D. C., area
in which the CNO spoke to the failure of the Navy
to meet its human relations goals. Immediately
thereafter his remarks were made available to the
press and sent as a message to all hands. Because
of the wording of the text, it was perceived by
many to be a public admonishment by the CNO of
his staff for the failure to solve racial problems
within the Navy. Even though this was followed
within 96 hours by Z-Gram 117 which stressed the
need for discipline, the speech itself, the
issuance of it to the public press, and the timing
of its delivery, all served to emphasize the CNO's
perception of the Navy's problems. Again concern
over racial problems seemed paramount to the
question of good order and discipline even though
there had been incidents on two ships which might
be characterized as "mutinies." The subcommittee
regrets that the tradition of not criticizing seniors
in front of their subordinates was ignored in this
case.
15. The Navy's recruitment program for most of 1972
which resulted in the lowering of standards for
enlistment, accepting a greater percentage of
mental category IV and those in the lower half
of category III, not requiring recruits in these
categories to have completed their high school
education, and accepting these people without
sufficient analysis of their previous offense
records, has created many of the problems the
Navy is experiencing today.
16. The reduction of time in recruit training from
9 to 7 weeks, thus sending those personnel who
do not qualify for advanced training in "A"
schools from the street to the fleet in less than
two months, appears to result in inadequate
preparation for shipboard duty.
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17. The investigation disclosed an alarminq
frequency of successful acts of sabotage
and apparent sabotage on a wide variety of
ships and stations within the Navy.
Admiral Zumwalt (interview 1975) viewed the subcommittee as
one: "set up to investigate the Navy; set up to demonstrate that
there was no racism in the Navy and that the whole problem was liberal
permissiveness. It's the most fantastic thing you've ever seen. They
come out with the assertion that there is no evidence whatsoever of
racism in the Na-vy, something I don't think you could say about the
Vatican itself. There has got to be racism in every organization.
If you can get Admiral Rauch to show you the raw testimony as opposed
to the scribbed print which the committee came up with, it is
fascinating to see the extent to which they went to change the evidence."
The investigator was not allowed access to the raw data, it
was classified information, but Admiral Rauch did affirm the perception
voiced by Admiral Zumwalt, and supplied the final report referenced
here.
The subcommittee report was generally regarded as ludicrous
by military personnel with whom the investigator interacted. These
were, however, all members of the Human Goals Program staff, a group
which generally demonstrated a high level of commitment to the program
objectives. Perceptions of naval personnel not directly involved in
the program were not available for comparison.
The investigator makes the following observations relative
to the subcommittee report:
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The report seemed not to allow for the
K^ lbl !i ty of+error or ^ult on the part ofnavy. The system was projected as almostflawless in the entire course of events.
2.
There was an implicit assessment of a
contingency of young Black sailors as persons
wi th mal i cious intent; low motivation; misfits
to military standards.
3. The strong language employed, such as "sabotage"
and mutiny communicated the seriousness with
'which the committee viewed the incidents, a
message which was passed on to the Congress.
4. There was clearly a reprimand of the CNO for
his relaxation of military protocol in several
areas of operation.
Any application or results of the subcommittee report to the
Navy is not known by the investigator. It appears, however, that the
report represented high level bureaucratic maneuvering to the military
image. First and foremost, the text of the report seems unbelievable
when one considers all of the information available regarding the
social climate, structure and practices of the Navy in race relations.
For an instance this report followed closely on the heels of a
Department of Defense admonishment that the Navy was the slowest of
the armed forces in providing race relations education to its
members. Also, had the decision-makers at the House level acted
directly on the information included in this report, it would have
obviously taken another hundred years to launch an EO program and EO
policy of the scope to be seen in the Navy, within a year of the
publication of the subcommittee report.
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Minority Officers
On December 31, 1973, there were 1,131 minority officers
(1.6% of the minority population in the Navy) on active duty. Eight
hundred nineteen (319( of this group were Black; 94 were female, and
most of the minority group were junior officers.
The behavior prescribed for a naval officer was discussed in
an earlier section by Janowitz, Lang, and others. Promotions are
central to the reward system of the Navy, so we can safely assert that
this group had experienced some measure of success in the organization,
and had demonstrated some assimilation into the Navy culture.
As a group, these people were consciously absent from all
accounts of open expressions of discontent. Some of the persons who
fall into this category filled human relations type positions and
thereby worked through the system to improve the climate for themselves
and others.
Chief Coleman (interview 1975) saw the Black officer operating
pretty much within the system; he indicated that in his several years
as a counselor and minority affairs officer he had never gotten a
complaint from an officer. "I personally had as much pressure on me
as a seaman did. I don't know whether this group don't recognize
their pressures or whether they don't want to rock the boat because
of their careers. An officer in a career pattern was less likely to
complain."
Several of the minority affairs officers (a role that became
ineffective after a while) subsequently staffed equal opportunity
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training programs, where they were observed by the investigator to be
outspoken, assertive and perceptive; however, most of them lacked
the rank and authority to have far reaching influence beyond the
impact they made on the program.
Enlisted Personnel
This was the most vocal group throughout the racial crisis.
Commander Wiley observed: "the further down the chain of command you
are, the more quickly you except things to happen."
Prior to the 1972 incidents, this group had historically
channeled its grievances through the system except when outside
influence was needed; then they wrote to Congressmen, the Black Caucus,
and to the Black Omsbudsman Admiral.
Coleman (1975), described one group that organized to counter
the treatment of minorities in the judicial process. "All non-whites
organized a club, paid dues which they used to refund monies paid out
in fines (captain's masts) to members. They were highly organized
against the commander. This type of organizing was highly unusual."
This type of activity gained momentum in 1972 when the
racial climate was tense. It was primarily the enlisted personnel
who filled the visible roles of open resistance to the Navy system in
1972.
The racial disturbances of 1972 were not, however, the first
in the Navy's history. In 1943 a group of Blacks in the 10th NCB
(a construction group) staged work slow downs and hunger strikes to
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protest the conditions under which they were working. The case went
to the White House and was handled by Thurgood Marshall. The NAACP
became involved. Nineteen (19) Blacks were discharged from the Navy
as a result of this incident.
In the fall of 1972 there were three incidents aboard three
Navy ships within a 30 day period.
U. S. S. KITTY HAWK. Approximately 100
Black and white personnel were involved in an
incident on October 12. Twenty-one personnel
were charged with assault and rioting. Thirty-
three persons were injured. The carrier was
on duty and enroute to (or from) Vietnam.
U. S. S. HASSAYAMPA. In a disturbance
aboard ship on October 16, four white personnel
were injured, eleven Blacks were charged.
U. S. S. CONSTELLATION. One hundred and
twenty sailors refused to return to the ship,
which was docked at San Diego for repair of
malfunctioning equipment. This incident
occurred on November 4. The men gathered on
the dock, stated their grievances and created
a stand-off with the commanding officer. They
were declared in unauthorized leave status,
temporarily reassigned to shore stations until
hearings concerning their grievances and
violations could be held.
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Each of the ships involved carried 3,000 to 5,000 men. They
were all on active assignments with the Vietnam war. The incidents,
said to be unrelated, occurred in Subic Bay, Vietnam and San Diego.
All of those charged (primarily Blacks) were tried in military courts
except in those cases where the accused chose to exercise their right
to civilian counsel in which case that option was provided. Large
numbers of Blacks received demotions and dishonorable discharges.
The incidents attracted extensive attention from the public, the
media and the high echelon in Washington, which looked in the shock
at this unprecedented violation of Navy protocol.
Civilian Organizations
Several minority and human rights organizations monitored
consistently the progress of minorities in the Navy. Commander Wiley
(1975) reported: "There is pressure from these groups even when there
is not a particular problem. They are asking for progress reports
around specific issues such as retention, promotion, recruiting and
the percentage of non-whites in preferred work areas." This type of
inquiry was usually addressed to the D0D which would task each branch
of the military to respond. The most active groups were:
1. The National Newspaper Publishers Association
.
This group is made up of Black and Spanish
newspaper and magazine publishers.
2. The National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People (NAACP). The NAACP spent more than
$100,000 in legal fees defending people involved
in the racial incidents of 1972, a role it has
played since the early 1940's.
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3. The National Urban League
. In addition to an
ongoing monitoring function, this group became
very strong advocates for Black sailors during
the racial disturbances.
4. The American GI Forum
. This is a predominantly
Chicano group which monitored bi-lingual training
and recruitment procedures designed to attract
Spanish-Americans into the military.
5. The American Civil Liberties Union . The ACLU was
frequently involved in challenging specific cases.
6. The National Black Congressional Caucus . Individual
members of the Caucus were frequently sought out by
Black personnel to litigate cases and support causes.
A Chronology of Interest Group Activities
Described in this Section
1943 First racial disturbance in the Navy.
80th NCB at Trinidad.
1968 Growth of human relations programs, varying in
nature and support from one command to another.
1969 Racial disturbances at Great Lakes, Illinois.
1970 Admiral Rauch appointed project manager for Human
Resource Development Program.
1972 First Black Retention Study Group convened
CNO tasked Bureau of Personnel to develop first
racial relations program.
Phase I — Race Relations Program started.
Racial incidents aboard ships.
External pressure groups activated.
CNO ordered acceleration of Race Program.
Hicks Committee appointed by Congress.
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Legislative Transformation
Baldridge describes the Legislative stage as the point at
which bodies respond to pressures, transforming the conflict Into
politically feasible policy and clarifying existing policies.
There were in fact no new policies resulting from the pressures
brought to bear on the decision-makers. What the Navy did experience
however, was an acceleration in both program implementation and the
execution of existing policies. This difference in the findings of
the Baldridge study and the current study is discussed in detail in
the next section Policy Formulation and in Chapter VI.
Several policy revisions seem to have resulted from the
emphasis EO in the early 1970's.
1 • The revision of the Equal Opportunity Manual
.
The Equal Opportunity Manual was already the major
policy document, during the period of heightened
conflict and demonstrations by different interest
groups. The manual was however revised to reflect
the expanded scope of commitment to equal opportunity
in the organization. The revisions were almost
exclusively the insertion of clearer delineation
of responsibilities and "how to's" complementing
required behaviors described in the document.
The guidelines were already all-inclusive, thorough,
and actually impressive.
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2. The revision of curricula in all officer training
schools to include a component in race relations.
The curriculum revisions were intended to provide
prospective officers with a basic awareness of
race relations. This new practice was consistent
with the degree of responsibility relative to
people programs designated to officers in the
Zumwalt regime. Program was accelerated after
the 1972 conflicts created a shortage of people
to deliver the program to the field. Through the
officers' schools hundreds of officers received
advanced training they may not have otherwise received.
3. Clarification by the CNO of his position on EO.
Immediately following the racial incidents aboard
Navy ships in 1972, Admiral Zumwalt called a meeting
of all Flagg officers in Washington. The following
is an excert from that presentation. In the text
of that presentation the Admiral introduced the idea
of EO criteria as a part of the fitness criteria for
promotion of senior officers; a requirement which was
subsequently incorporated in Navy policy and which
represents a critical move toward institutionalization
of equal opportunity in the U. S. Navy.
The three factors described were interspersed in a broad
collection of concurrent activities which would be placed in other
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categories of the Baldridge model; these have been cited because they
occured in response to the pressure brought to bear on the system by
interest groups described in the section on interest articulation.
Even though the author cites only three legislative actions it is
important to note that each of these has extensive ramafi cations.
Summary
Interest Articulation Groups describes internal partisan and
authority groups; and external (civilian) groups that shared a common
interest: influencing the management (or lack of management) of
equal opportunity in the Navy. This section describes each group's
efforts to put pressure on the system either to maintain the status
quo or to bring about change. The interest groups that played an
important role in E0 were: commanding officers, admirals, the U. S.
Congress, the Department of Defense, minority officers, minority
enlisted personnel and civilian advocacy groups such as the National
Urban League and the Black Congressional Caucas as well as individual
congressmen.
Legislative Transformation describes three examples of how
interest group pressures actually influenced new legislation. The
three instances cited each involved modification or revision of
existing policy or practices. They also had far-reaching implications
for the direction and range of E0 policy and program implementation in
the immediate future.
CHAPTER VI
POLICY FORMULATION AND EXECUTION
This chapter accomplishes three things, it: ( 1 ) sets the
context for understanding EO policy formulation by discussing the
function of policy in the governance of the Navy, (2) describes the
origin and intent of EO policy historically, up to 1973, and
(3) describes the guiding, influencing and responsive behaviors
associated with EO policies (those behaviors which Baldridge classifies
as political).
Baldridge describes policy formulation as the critical element
of his political model. He also suggests examination of the
political dynamics associated with policy formulation as a new and
meaningful approach to understanding organizational behavior.
He states:
We selected policy as the central focal point,
for major policies commit the organization to
definite goals, set strategies for reaching those goals
and in general determine the long-range destiny of
the organization.
... In light of its importance, policy becomes
the center of the political analysis.
... It seems safe to argue that the vast
majority of organizational studies up to this time
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time have concentrated on the policy execution
stages and the question of the most efficient
way of carrying out policy. It seems important
that a political analysis address itself to
problems and issues that have not been well
covered before. For that reason our attention
is focused primarily on the policy formulation
side of the issue. Thus we stress the political
dynamics and processes that lead up to the
formulation of policy rather than the more bureaucratic
and routine processes by which policy is executed.
Incidentally, this is the reason that the term
"governance" is used in this research rather than
"management" with its overtones of technical efficiency.
The author therefore focuses this chapter on political reactions
that occured within the Navy and which can be associated somehow with
EO policy.
Baldridge also differentiates between major policy and routine
directives; emphasizing the former. He describes major policy as
including strategies for reaching policy goals. When we discuss EO
policy in the Navy we must also discuss programs. Much of tne
language and intent of people related policy is couched in detailed
programmatic prescriptions for compliance. For an instance, the
major EO policy statement for the organization is 0PNAVINS1 5354.1
The Equal Opportunity Manual ; a 37 page document which spells
out the
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overall policy and specific responsibilities for persons in different
roles, as well as compliance criteria in key areas where discrimination
has been experienced. This document is supported by educational/
consultancy program which is comprehensively written in a double-
volume manual. EO policy in this study fits rather precisely
Baldridge's definition of major policy.
Not unlike policy formulation in the New York University
proceedings, policy formulation in the United States Navy is a dynamic
process. Paradoxical to Baldridge's premise however, EO policy
formulation in the Navy did not impact on the climate or behaviors.
There were significant policies written for two decades before the
intent was realized. Policy formulation was very routine to the way
the organization defined and governed itself; new policy did not
automatically impact behavior. Additionally, relative to EO there
was not a direct causal relationship between the racial conflicts of
the '70's and the issuance of major policy. The Navy experience with
conflict and policy formulation is less linear than in the NYU
experience. The current study, therefore, will examine the political
dynamics, first that make this differentation so; and secondly, examine
dynamics occurring during a critical time period (1971-73) when the
organization fluctuated between varying stages of policy formulation
and execution.
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Policy Formulation in the Governance
' ot the U. S. Navy
The locus of control in the U. S. Navy is policy. Policies,
directives and instructions originating from multiple sources and
levels in, the organization prescribe and systematize behaviors i.e.,
tell people what they should be doing. In true bureaucratic form the
Navy creates rules whenever new situations arise for which some written
guidelines do not exist. Decision-making in the organization is
theoretically based on an extensive set of rules which promote the
mission of the organization.
In the Baldridge model a critical area of inquiry has to do
with decision-making authority! "who has the right to make decisions?"
Baldridge contends that the answer to this question limits, structures
and performs how the decision will get made.
In the hierarchical organization of the Navy, the focus of
authority is easily defined, the decision literature clearly identifies
the appropriate decision-makers.
The major internal decision making sources are the: Department
of Defense (DOD) ; Chief of Naval Personnel; Secretary of the Navy;
Chief of Naval Operations; and the type Commanders (commanders in
chief of Atlantic, Pacific, and Europe). Except for the latter,
policy from each of these sources has far-reaching consequences. The
first complexity surrounding policy formulation and execution is the
volume of directives put into the system. Additional elements of the
complexity of these processes might be:
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1. size of the organization and adequacy of the
communications systems.
2. authority associated with the source.
3. relevance of the issue to the command.
4. relevance of the issue to military tradition and mission.
5. scope of responsibility factor.
The organization has been described as bureaucratic; and
decentralized structurally and geographically. Getting the same word
to all concerned with a reasonable time period seems like a paramount
task. In moderate size organizations communications get lost,
distorted and misinterpreted.
Commander Wiley has been quoted earlier on the "distance from
Washington" and how this impacts decision and policy implementation.
Within the command, policy promulgated by the CNO out of Washington
may receive low priority due to the commanding officers discretion on
the issue.
Admiral Rauch (1975), indicated that the CO receives stacks
of directives telling him what he should be doing so it
becomes a
question of priorities and the priority for the CO is often
defines by
the most urgent problems. In terms of equal
opportunity policy Rauch
states: "when people are being oppressed and you
don't know anything
about it, that's not high priority; keeping
engines going may be a
higher priority. If however, you have a race
riot on your hands you
get this thing out (referring to the E. 0. Manual)
and take a look.
In 1972 the issue of equal opportunity
probably attracted
176
more attention than ever before in the history of the Navy. It is
important that we note in this study, however, the EO policy and pro-
gram development did not begin in 1972. In fact, had the then existing
guidelines had any force or influence, certainly the racial Incidents
of 1972 would not have occurred; the racial climate would have been
quite different.
The historical overview in Chapter I makes reference to a
series of temporary policies governing the treatment of minorities:
1. The United States-Filipino Agreement of the 1930's
2. Policies limiting numbers and ranking of Blacks
3. The Selective Service Act of 1940 banning
discrimination in the selection and training based
on race or color
4. The 1946 policy for general service assignments
without restriction
5. Executive Order 9981 calling for total desegregation
of the Armed forces
6. The DOD directive of 1963 abolishing the use of
off-base housing facilities which discriminate
against minorities; as well as the abilishment of
discrimination in base housing.
These policies initially focused on the question of inclusion;
once restrictions of enlistment based on race and color were abolished
issues of training, occupational assignment and patterns of promotion
and discharge became themes of military policy and remained so until
the 1970's.
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By 1971 numerous EO policy and programs had been written and
implemented in varying degrees. Table is an example of the type
of EO policies that were in effect during a given time period.
Policy development is a fairly organic process; as the needs changed
policies were developed, eliminated or incorporated into larger units.
This process became even more fluid when Admiral Zumwalt introduced
the Z-Gram; quick, direct, communication of orders, directives and
situational reports. The Z-Gram was also used to monitor the equal
opportunity activities during the admiral's four years in office 1970-
1973. He issued a total of 121 Z-Grams many of which were incorporated
into permanent, major policies before he left office.
Why is it that EO policies existed as early as 1881 with
strongly lettered policies within the Navy in the 1970's; yet minority
people experienced oppression throughout this entire time period?
So far the investigator has attempted to establish the idea
that equal opportunity was a low priority issue for the movers in the
organization prior to 1971-72.
In addition the investigator would like to note that the
problem under study is institutional racism which is both structural
and ideological. To effect structural changes is a much simpler task
than to effect change in ideology which embraces the individual's
values, beliefs and attitudes. This has not proven to be an impossible
task for the military. Militarism as we discussed it in early
sections of this chapter is certainly an ideology for the career Navy
officer. The teaching of military ideology to career officers as
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studied by Janowitz (I960) and Lang (1972) Is a teaching process that
is Inter-meshed throughout all facets of the Navy officer's life a
conditioning; a successful process. If the Navy officer is to learn
equal opportunity as a way of the military it would need to be treated
with equal thoroughness.
Another way of interpreting the "policy without action
syndrome" is in systems concepts. Systems boundaries affect the
process by which outsiders enter and become members of an organization
They may be physically with the organization for some time before
crossing the psychological boundary. Psychological separation within'
an organization is maintained by visible symbols: uniform dress,
insignia speech etc. Minorities as a group actually were experiencing
limited levels of membership in the Navy; had not been psychologically
accepted to full membership.
In discussing this issue Admiral Zumwalt stated:
"What we had before (referring to the original
E0 Manual ) was a document which I'm sure would
have withstood scrutiny as a total commitment and
yet a document which was not felt and perceived by
many people including the CNO. The problem with
the document early on was that it was lip service.
It is exactly what happens when people go to church
on Sunday and promise themselves that they are
going to be good Christians and by Monday morning
they've forgotten all about the Bible."
181
There appears to be at least three driving forces contributing
to policy formulation in the Navy decision-making milieu:
1. conditions for which policies do not exist;
policies upon which decisions can be based
2. conditions which potentially jeopardize combat
readiness; which might redirect the focus
between men and mission.
3. conditions which threaten the military image in
domestic relationships as well as overseas
diplomacy.
A trend in tO policy execution, which in fact has political
implications, is non-compliance in the Navy. This was true for
policies issued from the President of the United States; it was true
for policies issued by the CNO; it was true for policies supporting
racism as well as policy which was designed to improve conditions for
minorities.
On the other hand the formulation of policy has been routine
spontaneous and effective.
Equal opportunity and equal access are goals which extend to
all Navy personnel, not just minorities. In its broader context equal
opportunity is a right extended to all members of the organization;
because minorities have not enjoyed that right to the degree that
whites in the organization have, the Navy now has an equal opportunity
program to remedy the situation. When we take this fact into
consideration most major policies related to people in the
organization provide for equal opportunity. The United States Navy
Regulations issued by the Secretary of the Navy supports the equal
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opportunity effort in the Navy. Navy Regs are all inclusive and cover
behavior codes of every type; what to do when captured by the enemy;
design and purposes of all types of ceremonies, authority and
responsibilities of different ranking officers under every condition
or circumstance one might think of. The section of Navy Regs most
often utilized in the EO program was Chapter II which covers "Rights
and Responsibilities of Persons in the Department of the Navy." This
chapter covers such regulations as "Oppression or other Misconduct by
a Superiod," "Leave and Liberty," and "Responsibility Concerning
Marijuana, Narcotics and Other controlled Substances" and Records of
Fitness.
Another major policy supportive and closely related to equal
opportunity policy is the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ ).
The section of UCMJ most frequently referred to in the EO program is
Chapter II which covers Court-Martial, Jurisdiction; Non-Judicial
Punishment; Pre-Trial Procedure and all articles covering legal code
for Navy, Marine and Coast Guard Forces.
The first EO Manual was promulgated in 1969. In 1972 the
first educational components were established to support compliance.
The training (educational) components are most commonly referred to
as the Equal Opportunity/Race Relations Program - Phase I and Phase II.
For the time period covered in this study the most recent program was
Phase II. The history of the development of this program represents
an important element of the current study.
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In 1972 Admiral Zumwalt in response to his new sensitivity
to racial climate tasked the Bureau to develop a race relations educ-
ation program. When the Bureau projected a two-year design and
development period the Admiral proposed going outside of the Navy's
education and training procedure to get the program on the street as
soon as possible. The new educational program was under the administra-
tion of Admiral Rauch who indicated in interview with the investigator
his wish to get sufficient Black input to the program. Several small
civilian contracts were let before the major contract of approximately
$6 million dollars was let to Curber Associates of Washington, D. C.
Curber was a Black-owned consulting firm. The President of Curber,
Dr. P. Bertrand Phillips was at that time a reputable educator and
organization consultant who received his Ph.D. from Columbia University.
A group of military and civilian personnel collaborated to provide the
conceptual base for the first educational program for the Navy. Included
in that group were: Admiral Rauch, Bill Norman (the minority advisor
to the CNO) Commander Robert W. Bedingfield (a Navy chaplain very
instrumental in implementation of the Human Goals Program), Chief Pete
Fulton and Gordon Fisher of the Navy; Dr. Phillips was assisted by
Dr. Norma Jean Anderson, Assistant Dean for Student Affairs, University
of Massachusetts at Amherst who had for several years served as
Dr. Phillips' senior consultant on numerous Federal contracts; and
Ms. June Caldwell, a consultant with broad experience in Federal programs
and organizations.
This group was eventually joined by a corp of very skilled
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military and civilian consultants from around the country who staffed
the Navy Race Relations School at Key West, Florida.
The following Is a description of the Race Relations Education
Program Phase I which was implemented 1971-1973. This description Is
a reproduction of the Navy program materials.
The Race Relations Education Program is a component
of the Human Resource Development Project (Pers-6c) and
is chartered to confront and eliminate individual and
institutional racism through education in the Navy. The
program has been tasked to design, implement, and
coordinate race relations education programs throughout
the Navy.
The major organizational elements are:
1. Project Office (Pers-6cll), Washington, D.C.
This office has cognizance and responsibility
for the overall program. Its primary mission
is program design, consultancy and coordination.
The office is scheduled to be disestablished by
1 July 1974, and the billet for sponsorship of
the race relations education program will be
incorporated into Pers-62.
2. Human Resource Management Centers (HRMC's) at
Newport, Norfolk, San Diego and Pearl Harbor.
The primary mission of the race relations teams
at the centers is to provide training and
consultancy to commands within their geographic
area. On 1 January 1974, the centers will become
CINC assets and no longer be under BUPERS control.
3. Race Relations Education Specialists (RRES) . There
are 702 RRES billets throughout the Navy (officer
and enlisted). These personnel must complete an
eleven week training program comprised of seven
weeks at the Defense Race Relation Institute (DRRI),
Patrick AFB, Florida and four weeks at the Navy
Race Relations School (NRRS) , Memphis, Tenn. RRES
team numbers are full-time specialists who conduct
race relations training and provide consultant
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services to their command on race relations
matters.
Recognizing that different personnel have dissimilar needs at
various stages of their careers, the project office has modeled multi-
level education program. Race Relations Education is, or will be,
provided at all enlisted and office accession points out and at in-
service professional schools of significant duration. The format will
vary from accession points, through fleet training, to professional
schools.
In addition to that training provided in formal schools,
there are two education programs available through the local HRDC:
A. Executive Seminar - a three day intensive experience
in race relations for upper management personnel. It is designed to
provide assistance in problem identification, recognition, and accept-
ance; self examination by command of its profile in race relations and
designing a preliminary action program for the command. The group
process method is employed and group size is limited to 25 participants.
B. Upward (Understanding Personal Worth And Racial Di gni ty ) -
designed for middle management personnel (enlisted and officer) and
deals with the issue of racial attitudes, presumptions and prejudice,
both individual and institutional. UPWARD terminates with the
development of an action program.
The race relations education program is designed to be an
iterative process. It begins with the conduct of UPWARD (middle
management) seminars for approximately 5% the command personnel.
Executive seminars are then begun and completed, utilizing
information
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and materiel developed during the UPWARD sets. The necessary remaining
UPWARD seminars are then completed.
in order to Implement education programs the project office
maintains relationships with the following other commands:
A. OPNAV - coordination for curricula Inputs to officer
education programs (OCS. NROTC, Naval Academy. PG School, and Naval
War College). When liaison Is authorized by OPNAV, workshops with the
specific school staff are arranged to design curriculum.
B. CINCs - Liaison with CINCPACFLT, CINCLANTFLT, and
CINCUSNAVEUR is being established to provide for location and priority
of manning of RRES billets, discussion of program needs, progress, and
required assistance.
C. CNT - Same as A for enlisted programs (DRRI
,
RTC, SSC).
D. Other Washington offices involved In equal opportunity:
1. Special Assistance to the CNO for Minority
Affairs (OP-QOG). This office coordinates all efforts
in the area of equal opportunity for the Navy and provides
program support for the Race Relations Education Program.
2. Chief of Naval Personnel Equal Opportunity
Office (Pers-61). This office functions as an advisory
body for the CNP and the Bureau on matters of plans and
policies and their Impact on equal opportunity, conducts
visits, on a periodic basis, to various Navy commands to
evaluate the racial climate, especially after an Incident
with racial overtones, and is the action office at the
Bureau level, responsible for policy and programs In
support of the Minority Affairs Assistants throughout
the Navy. 6c and 61 are in constant contact and feed
each other valuable data on various situations around
the Navy and also work to coordinate the activity and
energy of the Minority Affairs Assistants and Race
Relations Education Specialists so as to bring a
unified effort for equal opportunity to the Navy.
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A FLAGG Seminar was eventually added to the curriculum for the
training of officers above the rank of Flagg officers.
Phase I was developed about the same time as the Defense Race
Relations Institute l DRRI ) was opened at Patrick Air Force Base,
Florida. The purpose of DRRI was to provide a core curriculum race
relations educational program to (1) develop content and methodology
for the DOD educational program, and (2) to train a corp of race
relations instructors who would both teach and train others to teach.
The overall goal of the DRRI educational program as stated in its
program description was to teach majority and minority group members
how to resolve racial and ethnic conflicts by peaceful means.
All military groups were tasked to put together teams to go to
DRRI for training. Phase I (Navy) trainers were first sent to DRRI
where they learned content and methodology for race relations
education; this training was followed by attendance at the Navy Race
Relations School (Key West Florida) where the curriculum was training
and facilitation skills in the specific content of Phase I.
Phase I design began in 1971 and took its final form and
content in 1972 successfully exposing 50-75% of the Navy Personnel to
an intensive race relations educational experience through three
seminars. While the exposure attempts of Phase I were successful they
were accompanied by some problems which hastened the Navy's move from
the educational seminar approach to Phase II, a more comprehensive
organizational change approach. The unacceptable features of Phase I
training claimed by officers were both real and imagined, and clouded
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the benefits of the experience (Glover, 1974).
There were serious differences of opinion on the ideal content
and methodology appropriate for a race relations program for Navy
personnel. It is the author's perception that the primary problem
with Phase I was that it posed rather severe conflict with the
traditional sociological forces and military ethics which we have
discussed in this study. The fears most commonly expressed related
to personal stress; the weakening of military discipline and weakening
of the chain of command.
When one takes into consideration the scope of the task;
delivery of a race relations program into a large complex and
traditional system which is experiencing turbulence - some problems
may be expected. The RRES's were highly committed students and many
of them brought both formal and natural talents to the experience;
yet, a few weeks of intensive training is still limited preparation
for the job. Some RRES's simply lacked the expertise and experience
required to deliver the program under the given conditions.
The program was infact outside of the Chain of Command in many
ways: junior officers were cast in a role that often lead to personal
confrontation of senior officers; there was extensive civilian input;
much of the material presented was written in behavioral science
jargon; and the setting which facilitated the seminar objectives,
violated military tradition for educational experiences.
The Systems Development Corporation was the contractor for the
evaluation component. The primary weaknesses of Phase I as cited in
189
that agency's report of 1974 were:
1. Phase I had varied degrees of effectiveness with
persons of different rates and ranks
2. It generated a limited number of affirmative action
plans (this was designed to be a primary outcome).
A general assessment was that the goals of egual opportunity
were not promoted to the degree desired by the sponsor's office.
The program did accomplish somewhat smaller milestones however.
The following assessment is quoted from the 8DA evaluation:
It is evident that the Race Relations Education Program was
effective in increasing awareness of:
Personal worth and racial dignity
Inequities in opportunity for minority personnel
Racial discrimination in the Navy
Differences between potential and actual effectiveness
of individuals, groups and programs in
improving race relations in the Command.
Furthermore, the program promoted:
Agreement among Blacks and whites on important
command racial issues
Personal commitment to the elimination of racism
within all Navy sectors.
More positive overall attitudes toward the Navy
demonstrated by participants than by non-
participants in programs.
The greatest benefit to the program observed by this investiga-
tor and corraborated (as a benefit) by Glover (1974) was the level of
commitment and professionalism of the military trainers. This seemed
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to have grown out of a phenomenon associated with the contracting
agency which merits attention as an influencing political dynamic.
Dr. Phillips of Curber Associates, personally impacted those
early efforts in Navy race relations training by his personal style.
Bert as he was familiarly addressed by all who worked with him, worked
an average of 15-18 hours everyday. He was untiring, hard-driving
and exuded competence and professionalism. He set forth high
performance standards for himself, his staff, military staff, military
trainees, and most importantly for top decision-makers in the program.
He was very persistent in pushing the leaders to higher levels of goal
directed activities and decisions. He scheduled long days of highly
structures tasks and outcomes; and this became the model for Phase I
training and implementation; high standards, high commitment.
Dr. Phillips' personal commitment to the elimination of racism his
competence and charismatic manner combined to provide a very influential
force in the delivery of Phase I to the U. S. Navy. He was emulated
by the RRES's; his influence was thereby felt throughout Phase I and
Phase II.
The thinkers behind the race relations program: Zumwalt, Rauch,
Bedingfield, Wiley, Bagley and numerous others at all levels of the
Navy agreed that the objective of awareness had been satisfactorily
reached within a significant population; however, they also agreed
that the Navy was not changing its behavior organizationally on the
issue of racism. It was this realization which defined the need for
Phase II.
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Ihese seeds of discontent with the accomplishments of Phase I
germinated early in the life of the Program (Winter, 1973) and Phase
II was actually born in the minds of the decision-makers long before
it was to become a reality. Commander Bedingfleld wrote in April, 19/4
Phase i was significantly successful In raising
the awareness levels of the Navy in regards to
its organizational behaviors, practices and
policies. That awareness was in a very limited
way translated into action. That lack of action,
or more specifically the non-translation of
learning into an affirmative and responsive
redirection of organizational values and goals
in Phase I, became the driving issue for Phase II.
The translation of awareness/expectations into action was
limited for two specific reasons:
1. Skills through training were not provided and,
2. The bulk of training time, in the Black format,
was spent In challenging and raising awareness
levels, which in itself was a task of gigantic
magnitude. The time frame of 18-30 hours was
of Itself educationally delimintating.
Further, Phase I had limited impact on particular elements of
the Navy population, precisely those who were in prescribed
power
positions and who have invested maximal energy and yet have
derived a
lesser amount of return on the investment (E-7 through
E-9, Warrant
Officers)
.
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Therefore the two basic principles of Phase II which are a
continuum of Phase I objectives, are to integrate learning with
organizational norms for prescribed change, and to target and tailor
the learning experience into specific power populations.
Transition from Phase I to Phase II
Commander Byron Wiley stated three factors contributing to
the discontinuation of Phase I
Absence of System Change
1) recognition that the program was not effecting change
within the organization
Insufficient Evaluation
2) the SDS Impact Survey of Phase I was very subjective
limiting feedback to the degree of receptivity
expressed by seminar participants
Congressional pressures
3) there were congressional pressures on the Navy to
justify the "man hours" and dollars used to run
what they saw as a sociological program and
"certainly not within the preview of what a
military organization should be doing." (Wiley, 1975)
Internal Resistance
4) a significant force within the Navy saw the total
effort as outside of those issues with which the
military should be concerned.
The data-gatnering and strategy-building for Phase II occurred
in four formal settings:
In the Summer of 1973 a conference including Navy personnel
from the Human Resource Management Centers, Navy Race Relations School
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Staff, Human Goals Project Office Staff, and some civilians from the
contractors' office met at NRRS which at that time had been relocated
at Memphis. This group build upon the strengths and weaknesses of
Phase I to form the conceptual groundwork for Phase II. The desired
relutant behaviors for individuals and the organization were described
through a task analysis.
October, 1973, the Bureau hosted a conference to begin to
draw together a conceptualization and definition of required resources
and skills necessary to implement the tasks/behaviors generated in the
summer conference.
December, 1973, the Bureau held a third conference in Washington
inviting Commanders in Chief (CINCS), the Chief of Navy Education and
Training (CNET), personnel from NRRS and DRRI. The product of this
group was:
1. Learning objectives for Phase II
2. Statements of common vision and direction for Phase II
3. Policy and strategy requirements.
It was this conference which structured the baseline
information substantiating all further work for Phase II.
(Bedingfield, 1974).
In April, 1974, a Policy and Strategy Conference
was convened
in Washington, D. C. This conference determined
the organizational
support systems that would be required for
Phase II as it moved into the
field. All work and planning to date was
presented to a professional
resource panel made up of numerous experts
in the fields of EO and
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organizational change; for the purposes; validation and direction.
The one-week conference brought together in a philosophical for the
direction of Phase II, while providing at the same time guidance for
the systematic approach to the accomplishments of the goals of
elimination of racism and the providing of equal opportunity for all
members of the Navy.
All four conferences fit into a three week curriculum writing
conference which ended on April 24, 1973. The curriculum represented
the last piece of a three-part strategy: policy and strategy; personnel
requirements; and curriculum supported by a development schema.
Phase II was introduced into the fleet and operating units via
the same strategy in 1975: first by an official pronouncement and
documentation; secondly by the preparation of human resources; and
thirdly through the vehicle.
In 1974 Commander Bedingfield described Phase II as having:
"a theoretical base and practical model adequate to the task. It not
only bridge the gap between awareness and action, it is the vehicle by
which equal opportunity can become a reality for the U. S. Navy,
through command oriented, implemented, monitored and evaluated action.
Description of Phase II EO/RR Program
Phase II represents a macro approach to institutionalizing
equal opportunity in the U. S. Navy; a systems intervention which is
designed to work equal opportunity into the fiber of the organization.
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By Baldrige's definition the program is a strategy for implementing
policy (the E. 0. Manual and supportive directives). The program
based on policy is modeled after the Kolb-Fromann intervention
strategy for implementation in individual commands. The cumulative
effect is that, if successful the organization will have changed
structurally to embrace equal opportunity.
The following excerpts from the Sponsor's Guidelines (pp lll-l
and 2 ) ; Phase II Equal Opportunity Race Relations Program - Volume II
provide an introduction and orientation to the program content. A
full description of Phase II is included in the Appendix P:
The most important feature of the Phase II EO/RR
Program is that all commanders, commanding officers and
Navy personnel are both responsible and accountable for
addressing policies, procedures and practices that
wittingly or unwittingly contribute to discrimination
or treatment resulting in less than full equal opportunity.
. . . Data on Phase I from both feedback and external
evaluation indicates significant success in achieving an
increased awareness in both majority and minority personnel.
It also shows a much smaller improvement in corrective
affirmative action. Additionally the data indicates that
the program did not provide for sufficient involvement
of supervisory personnel. Full involvement and support
of these personnel is required for the development and
implementation of command and individual actions to
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counter racism and to support equal opportunity.
The Phase II EO/RR Program addresses this data
in several ways. It provides for full involvement
of the chain of command in program impl rmentation. It
also builds on the awareness and affirmative action
developed as a result of the initial Race Relations
Education Program. Unlike Phase I, which required
seminars of specified length for all command personnel.
Phase II requires individual and organizational actions
to support the provisions of the Equal Opportunity
Manual
.
Political Dynamics associated with the transition
from Phase I to Phase II
The politics surrounding the transition from Phase I to Phase
II were probably less intense because Phase II was seem by many as
the lesser of two evils. The EO Program was never welcomed
with open
arms by the larger population in the Navy, however. Phase II
was more
congruent with the system, i.e., used more Navy language;
objectives
were more relevant to mission. The emphasis was a
shift to the
organization as opposed to the individual; and Navy
personnel were more
visibibly utilized. The investigator was one of
fewer than twenty (20)
civilians involved in the writing and training
of Phase II as opposed
to Phase I which used probably three times
as many civilians in various
capacities.
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This section covers those dynamics and activities which stand
out in the investigator's perception as pertinent to the political
forces affecting program development in Phase II. The political
synamic of this period are significant because it represents a pivotal
point in the EO effort in the Navy. The move from Phase I behavior to
Phase II behavior was a move from a micro approach in which policy
was almost of no value to a macro approach the very design of which
moves the organization toward institutionalizing EO as organizational
behavior.
During the development of Phase I the Navy needed assistance
of civilian behavioral science practioners to get the program
implemented. In spite of the DRRI which employed both military and
civilian faculty to provide a cognitive base for race relations train-
ing, there was not an internal capability for: writing an experiential
curriculum, and training skills in small group dynamics. In addition,
the topic itself was tension-provoking and the selected methodology
was new to Navy educational approaches; outsiders assumed a certain
amount of credibility for objectivity that Navy personnel could not
have engendered.
For the development and implementation of Phase II military
personnel were far more resourceful in that the skill requirements
of Phase II stimulated those required for management training and
organization development technology used in the Human Resource
Development Program.
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These factors contributed not only to less resistance but spoke
to the move toward institutionalization.
Choice of Language Used in Phase II
A conflict emerged between program writers (military and
civilian) and high echelon officers regarding the name of the program.
The decision-makers felt the program should be referred to as an equal
opportunity program. The rationale for this preference was that the
program should be consistent with Navy documents in language and form,
for an instance, they preferred "equal opportunity" because that was
the name attached to the major policy document.
There were two factions represented among the military program
staff at that time. The RRES's who worked in Phase I, and the HRMS's
none of whom had worked in Phase I. The HRMS's were brought aboard
because of their expertise in organization development techniques.
The former RRES's especially, expressed concern throughout the writing
and development period that the whole element of confronting racism
directly (as experienced in Phase I) was diluted if not lost by the
broader context of the Phase II design. In Phase I the Navy trainers
coined the phrase "counter racism" a concept first introduced by
Robert Terry in his book For Whites Only . Terry (1971) presented a
hierarchy of personal participation in institutional racism. The
preferred stat is called counter racism which implies affirmative
assertive behavior toward the elimination of racism.
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The RRES's wanted Phase II to be named a Counter Racism
Program to maintain the momentum of Phase I relative to personal
commitment to the elimination of racism.
Admiral Rauch reflected on the language conflict in the
1975 interview, stating: "Blacks have been taught to be distrustful
of whites; they feared whites would take the easiest way out and "equal
opportunity" would be tantamount to non-racist (a neutral term in the
Terry hierarchy).
. . . 'affirmative action' (AA) is the same as
counter racism in my opinion, however, in the private sector AA has
lost its impact.
The investigator participated in some rather emotional dis-
cussions on this issue before a compromise was reached. The program
was named the Phase II Equal Opportunity/Race Relations Program. This
decision was made by those in charge and passed on to the program
staff.
Changes in the Delivery System of the Program
Between 1971 and 1974 Curber Associates was the major contractor
for the program. In 1974-75, the Navy issued the Request for Proposals,
the Curber contract had expired. The new contract was awarded to a
new agency. Immediately the program staff experienced conflicts;
lines of allegiance were formed. The new agency was White owned; a
Black man managed the Navy contract and like Curber employed a multi-
cultural staff of consultants. A further complication of this issue
was timing. Curber had participated in the conceptualization and
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development of the new program and the new contractor came aboard just
at the point of implementation (training Navy specialists); there was
an issue of ownership around content and form.
No formal process was devised to manage the social dynamics of
this transition; the interpersonal dynamics manifest themselves in the
process which was already under a microscope by the organization.
This was one of several stressful times for the investigator.
A second set of dynamics was created by the decision to build
an interface and coliaboration between Phase II and the HRMD Program.
The goals, tools and skills for the two programs overlapped and this
step was not only rational and efficient; but represented a plus for
Phase II because the HRMD program had for some time been accepted as
a useful management support and was basically institutionalized into
the management system of the organization. The feelings of ownership
and competition distracted from the work of getting the first groups
of EOPS through the school and demonstrating the quality and
appropriateness of the program uppermost in the politics of the program
success at that time.
A third set of problems emerged relative to the retraining of
RRES's as EOPS'. Phase II was a consultancy model while Phase I had
been a group dynamics model: implicating a total new and broader set
of skills. The question of the competence of RRES' for Phase II
delivery became quite political. The Project Office faced a delicate
decision: if RRES' were not used the Office would be accused of
taking the program away from a group of highly committed people who
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impacted the organization significantly. Women in the Navy have
adopted and adjusted to a male oriented organization.
The treatment of women in the Navy was not strongly emphasized
in Phase II, it again received perfuntory treatment. A separate E0
program "Women in the Navy," an educational component supported by
policy was pronul gated in 1975-76 stimulated by a growing emphasis on
women issues both in the larger society and the Navy responded more
systematically to this subject.
Policy and Accountability
Perhaps the most powerful dynamic surrounding Phase II was
the clearly legislative foundation in which the program was grounded
and the intended integration into the chain of command.
The program was a means; policy execution was the end; so
that commanding officers were offered a program to illustrate how
policy compliance could occur; and to structure implementation
evaluation and accountability into command operations.
And finally the energy and monvention with which the leader
in the organization championed the cause and concurrently,
appressi vely
,
advanced compliance and accountability.
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Political Dynamics Which Influenced
Policy Formulation/Execution
Three factors seem to have been critical in the formulation
and execution of EO policies in the 1970's:
1) the use of support or kinship system concept
in leadership,
2) the willingness of the leadership in the Navy
to test and challenge the system,
3) the mythology of power in Washington, D.C.,
4) the rechanneling of energies from policy formulation
to policy execution,
5) change in delivery or system.
Support/Kinship System . When Admiral Zumwalt began to formal ly
create structures to support himself he sought out two types of people
to work in the power structure: people who were themselves personally
receptive to equal opportunity in the Navy and those who were prepared
to work out of an advocate posture within the organization.
There were two examples: first his selection of Admiral Rauch
to project manager for the Human Goals Program. Zumwalt and Rauch
shared common views on the need for a substantial effort to strengthen
the total human dimension of the organization.
The investigator observed what seemed to be a network of
supporters/advocates of multi -cultural backgrounds in key positions
throughout the EO program. This group felt like a kinship system; a
personal alliance.
The second example was the creation of task forces and
commissions to provide support and feedback. Once the admiral began
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his knowledge base with the Retention Board, he decided he needed a
mechanism for keeping himself informed so he created the position for
a special assistant, a billet filled by Lt. William Norman, a Black man
who had been very active and effective with the Retention Board concept.
Another support system was created in the form of the CNO
Action Committee. This was an adhoc group of Flagg officers whose
purpose was continuous examination and work on problems and issues of
concern to the Office of the CNO. To build this committee, the CNO
identified those officers who were most influential in terms of Navy
policy. This group's primary value was the interchange between
representatives of key offices high in the chain; it also created a
direct line of influence between the CNO and those respective officers
represented.
The Admiral attempted to create the same type of support for
Commanding Officers throughout the Navy by providing a special assistant
function through the minority affairs officer position. A 1971
directive created a special billet in each command for a MAO. In an
article published in the Cruiser-Destroyer 1971
,
Admiral Zumwalt is
quoted as describing the position as an "enacting job." For a while the
minority affairs officers functioned as intended. Some of the officers
with whom the investigator interacted felt quite effective both in
their relationships with minority group members and with the commanding
officer. Others felt less effective. When the general sentiment was
shared that the responsibility for minority affairs had shifted from
the commanding officer to the minority affairs officers, in too many
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situations, that position was dlscontulned and the functions
Incorporated Into the role of the Human Relations Council.
Challenging the System - Leadership
Mode of the CNO ~~
Admiral Zumwalt's style as a leader was a significant factor
In the formulation and execution of EO guidelines and programs during
his four years In office. His leadership In this area was pervasive
perhaps a prerequisite to his success.
The following is a direct quote from the Admiral's comments In
Interview with the Investigator In 197b:
I don't think that there was ever any Intention
In the Navy to go back and undo what had been done;
but there was an awful lot of thinking that this
tokenism we can go along with as long as it doesn't
get any worse, Is the kind of attitude which I think
characterized the Navy's approach to the problem; we
don't have a single Black admiral; less than token
number of captains and commanders in the Navy; and
we had less than a percent of our officer corp of
minority background; less than 4 percent of the
enlisted corp; without a major jigging of the system
it would have continued on about that level, we were
on a sort of plateau and what one had to do was
shiver the system and get It started back up the
Incline again.
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In the broad the overall thought of our
personnel changes which included equal opportunity
and included the elimination of the so called
mickey mouse and try and provide enlightened leader-
ship; the fact that re-enlistment rates improved
dramatically from 10 per cent to 30 per cent during
my four year period and the fact that we were able to
bring in high quality recruits of both minority and
majority background kind of was the bottom line
indication to the old guard that in the total what
we were about made sense, and that was the reward system.
The admiral's comments reflect his high level of competence,
which logically accounts for his indepth insights into the workings
of the organization, his orientation to strategy and political
thinking and maneuvering. Foremost in his approach to the issue of
E0 was his willingness to challenge, "jigger" the system.
The "system" in the U. S. Navy translates the chain of command.
One of the behaviors which characterized Admiral Zumwalt's leadership
as CNO was his willingness to extend or test the chain of command.
There were several ways in which this practice was used in the effort
to promote human resource utilization and the human condition in the
Navy.
When Admiral Zumwalt appointed Admiral Rauch to the position
of Program Manager for the Human Goals Program, that program was auto-
matically placed in the office of Admiral David Bagley, Chief of Naval
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Personnel. The CNO had direct authority over all Navy activities.
Personnel matters, however, such as the Human Goals Program are
delegated to the Bureau. The CNO handles directly the technical side
of Naval operations. In 1971 Admiral Rauch was given a dual reporting
relationship; he reported to both Admiral Bagley and to Admiral
Zumwalt. This gave Zumwalt direct influence and feedback to the people
program which was obviously quite important to his administration.
This, as confirmed verbally by commander Wiley, was an unusual
reporting relationship.
The Z-Gram message system discussed earlier was outside of the
system. It functioned to expedite fast and authoritative communications
which would have taken much longer to handle through the regular
policy process.
The Mythology of Washington, D.C.
For the seaman and even for some commanders Navy administration
in Washington, D. C. is as foreign as it would be for a civilian. For
field personnel the primary contact with Washington is indirect,
through directives, bulletins and publications. Interaction with
Washington is also untimely. Often by the time Washington responds to
an issue in the field, the response is irrevelent. It was the
observation of the investigator that field people felt that the
Washington staff was generally out of touch with the field. The most
respect channel of communication was the fleet commander (At I antic,
Pacific and Europe) whose office was local enough to be relevant.
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The fleet commanders would often duplicate messages coming out of
Washington under their own signature to generate interest and response.
This factor caused equal opportunity policy and programs to be diluted
as were most programs and policies coming to Washington.
While this modus operandi contributed to the success of the
E0 Programs, it was not without problems.
First and foremost, there were media reports and unverified
rumors that the Congress did make deliberate attempts to release
Admiral Zumwalt from his position as CNU; Congressional tolerance for
his maverick style wore thin.
Secondly, the career aspirations of many military personnel
associated with the program were negatively impacted. For senior
officers the system, informally, simply did not reward them. Those
who continued with the program for any length of time found themselves
outside of the career path and not in the main access stream of the
Navy professional. Many of these officers predicted this outcome
(in discussions with the author) and cnose to act on their personal
commitment to the issues addressed by the EO/RR Program.
Junior officers found themselves playing catch up; very few
received promotions they may have otherwise earned in the same time
period working within their designated rates. Admiral Zumwalt
lamented this point in the interview (1975):
Some of the people who were in the vanguard of
this program in the Navy are probably at hazard
as far as their professional careers are concerned.
I hope that in the broad they will be recognized
as people who were following the, then, policy and
that they will be rewarded.
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It worries me that those officers and
enlisted personnel who committed themselves
to the fight for E0, both Black and white,
are at hazard.
It is the author's observation that the factors (some of which
were politically motivated and some were just rational) which did the
most to validate Phase II were the following:
1. A basic thrust inherent in all activities associated
with the program was to strengthen the chain of command.
Generally this was accomplished through the strategic
positioning of responsibility into the authority
structure. The CO was given the ultimate responsibility.
The EOPS role was purely consultative. This
represented a significant recognition of the
relationship between the E0 effort and the Mission
of the Navy.
2. Conceptually and through the selective use of
language the program was made Navy-specific.
Behavioral science jargon was replaced by military
or management terminology both of which were more
acceptable in the Organization.
3. Proper protocal was observed at all times in
the administration of the program; trainers and
participants in workshop activities were instructed
to observe proper dress and military etiquette at
all
times
.
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4. A key factor in the involvement of a command
in Phase II implementation was the construction
and monitoring of an EOQI (Equal Opportunity
Quality Indicator). The EOQI illustrates
statistically the actual progress of the command
in those areas which have been identified as
critical dimensions of E0 in the Organization:
paygrade, upward and lateral movility, military
justice and retention.
5. The intervention is intended only to initiate
policy execution; the implementation of Phase II
in its entirety continues indefinitely through
a cadre of internally trained resources who
continue to assess progress and provide training.
It is the responsibility of the Commanding Officer
to monitor on-going activities with follow-up
assistance from the EOPS.
The significance of these items rest not only in accepted
theory and practice in the field of organization change; but also in
contrast to Phase I activities which set the psychological context
within the organization for Phase II.
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Execution of Phase II Program
The Phase II Program was launched in late 1974 when the first
EOPS were trained and sent out to field operations to assist commanding
Officers in compliance with the spirit and guidelines of the Equal
Opportunity Manual. The immediate goal was to provide 350 trained
EOPS who would in a 2-3 year period make individual contracts with
commands throughout the world.
An account of the execution of Phase II is beyond the scope
of this study. It seems appropriate to end this chapter however with
a prognosis for the success of the program. When the author interviewed
Admiral Zumwalt he had been in retirement for approximately one year
and studying the project from the sideline. When asked his outlook
for the execution of E0 policy he stated the following: "It's too
early for me. My only information is from officers who come up to me;
they are now in watchful waiting. My hunch is that we made a big
surge forward from 1970 to 1974 and we may be in a period of
consolidation work. I hope that we are not losing ground; my hunch is
that we are not at the top now, we have a ways to go."
Admiral Rauch was actively involved in getting Phase II
operational. His prognosis for Phase II was probably best captured in
a speech he gave at the closing activities commencing training
for
the first class of EOPS. The following are selected exerpts
from
Admiral Rauch's presentation.
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"Phase II is probably one of the biggest
efforts and most all encompassing with the
greatest amount of fleet representation in
the design of something thats being introduced
from the Washington level that has ever been
done - be it hardware or a people program."
"We cannot fail. This is very similar to the
nuclear power program. It's going to make a
significant impact on the Navy if it is
successful, or if it fails it will be
catastrophic. Now there are three benefits
the country gets as I see it from a successful
Navy Equal Opportunity Program. One is that
the country has a better weapons system in that
it has a more effective Navy. Second, we are
hopefully sending not only enlightened people
and more aware people back to society as they
return and reach the expiration of their
enlistment, but people who will have had experience
in countering racism and actively promoting equal
opportunity programs. And then thirdly, I still
think this one of the big efforts in a large
institution like this in the country, and if
its
successful, ... and I know it will be,
other
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institutions can learn.
The program was initiated with some immediate milestones for
success. Admiral Rauch in collaboration with the Undersecretary of
the Navy (Potter) set the following milestones for the first two
years (1974-1976):
Undesignated strikes would be reduced to
35% if successful, almost all minority enlisted
personnel at E-3 and above would be working
toward some specific career goals.
The population of minorities in lower
ranks would be reduced by 2% increasing the
numbers of promotions.
Sixty percent of all minorities leaving
the Navy would receive honorable discharges.
The implications were that the organization immediately
committed itself to identified targets for institutional change.
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Summary
Policy formulation and Execution covers those issues which
initially struck the author as the compatabil i ty between the Navy
project and the Political Model. This chapter describes the
significance of policy in military governance and the emphasis which
the model places on the role of policy in organizational change.
Special attention is given to the fact that significant policies
existed for sometime in the U. S. Navy with no enforcement. The
consequences of the prominence given the issue of race relations by
the CNO and a series of racial incidents prompted the acceleration of
policy execution. Educational programs in EO provided the stimulus
for policy execution. Phase I was a racial awareness training program
which provided small interaction group workshops. This program was
successful in heightening the awareness of personnel at all levels to
instances of personal and institutional racism in the organization.
An assessment of the Phase I program indicated that it was successful
in accomplishing a rather narrow spectrum of a much broader goal.
There was social awareness but no significant structural changes.
Phase II was conceived and developed to extend the accomplish-
ments of Phase I; to broaden the scope of the effort i.e., to
integrate EO into the chain of command. When the Phase II Program
was launched in 1974 the sponsoring office and the Navy leadership
expressed confidence that the management of EU was about to change.
(See speech by Admiral Rauch in Appendix).
chapter VII
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Andras Angyal (1941, stated that psychiatry is the application
of a science that does not exist. We continue to ask ourselves in
this field if social science is a science. One issue with which we
struggle is the relationship between inquiries based in qualitative
data and inquiries based in quantitative data.
The case study has several disadvantages that make it less
than an ideal method. First concentration on only one case makes it
virtually impossible to make use of contrasting situations. Had
this study compared several or many approaches to change in a generic
sense or to major changes in the approach to EO, the paralles and
differences between would most likely have provoked useful insights.
This type of contrast is missing from the case study. The second
weakness is the problem of "typificality or "generalization."
Researchers always hope to find results that can be applied i.e.,
generalized to many situations, not just to the one they're studying.
While there are numerous learnings from this study certainly the
Navy is not a typical organization, it is in fact unique.
Baldridge states that the real value of a case study is to
provoke ideas about a new way of viewing the world, to fill in an
idea and provide food for thought, and to make suggestions about
pieces of actions that might be fruit for study. The objective of
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this chapter is to identify my learnings and to present them in a
manner that other organizations might consider when faced with the
challenge of creating a climate of equal opportunity.
But first some comments about the Baldridge model, and about
the experience of participant observation. Two characteristics of
this model the author characterize as strengths. First the five
distinct elements: social context factors, interest articulation,
legislative transformation, policy and execution of policy focus the
research. Secondly, at least for the purposes of this study the
focus is on political dynamics and the use of policy adds a quality
to the case study that is often missing so the author was actually
forced to address core issues in a manner that otherwise may not have
occured. This model can be valuable to the field not only as a
framework for conducting a study but also as a strategy for intervening
and changing systems.
The experience of being a participant and observer in the Navy
experience brought life to the research. The author gathered data as
events occured rather than after they occured which allowed for
significant proding for understanding. Because the military personnel
were aware of the study and endorsed the approach, they willingly
sought out and provided resources. Then there was the experience of
personal investment in the effort which contributed to an over definition
of the research design sometimes and probably create a bias in the
author's perception of the value of the effort.
216
Conclusions and Summary
Neither Phase I nor Phase II of the Navy Race Relations
Program accomplished its goals. A significant change occured in the
Navy as a result of the program. Combined, the approach, the process
and results has been a unique example of a comprehensive change
effort in a complex, open system.
There has been observable social change in the Navy since 1971
in the areas of cultural awareness and the Navy's responsiveness to a
multicultural population. An extensive educational base has been
established, numerous EO policies have been created and enforced.
Most significantly EO and Affirmative Action have been integrated
into the reward and policy systems of the Navy, and EO is closely
identified with command readiness. In the culture of the Navy these
are measures of success.
Continuity has been a problem in this effort. Successful
system change in this instance called for continuity in perspective
and in the commitment of leadership. Leaders and persons in key
positions in the Navy change positions frequently. Meanwhile a
major foundation of the Race Relations Program was the strong
commitment of leadership. The program needed continuous assessment
and update. The Navy organization is also an organism that continues
to change - as it does the goals and strategies of the program
continue to change. The author observed that even though the
assessment occured between Phase I and Phase II it was not recognized
as a successful and natural effort, it was seen as corrective and
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compensatory and momentum and perspective were last.
Ch_a.nge Technology Related to the Infrast.n.rt,.™
Change Technology must be consistent with the infrastructure
of the organization. This has been for the investigator a key
revelation in this study.
The locus of control in the United States Navy organization
is policy - the organization is governed through policy. Policy
prescribes lifestyle, dress, behavior, careers, rewards and
punishment. When the Navy went outside its boundaries to the civilian
behavioral science looking for a method to address, EO issues the
methodology they used reflected the growth of the field. In 1970
theoreticians were describing organizations as open systems but few
practitioners had converted that set of theory to technology, so
Phase I of the Program was strictly an awareness effort. As a first
step it seemed quite appropriate as the framework for the total
effort it was somewhat naive.
What we learned in the transition from Phase I to Phase II is
that the technology or change strategy must reflect the governance
system and culture of the organization. In an organization where the
locus of control was power and governance through policy it was
necessary to build the change effort congruent with that context.
In the Navy this was legislative not humanistic.
In Phase II the charge appealed to "good management" and
productivity by illustrating the consequences of discrimination on
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command readiness, and it was command readiness that the program was
designed to enhance.
For change in EO in practices in system requires strategic
planning that takes into consideration the formal and informal
structures, administrative technical and human subsystems.
The role of strong leadership in organization change was
affirmed in this study. It is the belief of this author that there
are two dimensions to change one related to structures and strategies
and another related to motivation and personal commitment of key
characters. The author believes therefore that the impetus for social
changes that occured in the Navy between 1971 and 1982 was the chief
executive officer who in 1971 personally used the power of his office
to declare war on racism in the United States Navy.
Strong leadership is needed for system changes in EO practices.
For organizations that are attempting to change the EO climate
the author recommends the following:
(1) a systems approach to the effort, taking into
account all interrelationship within the
organization and its environment. The
identification of internal and external interest
groups is one way of including environmental
elements
(2) ongoing strategic planning that takes into account
the culture qualities of the organization especially
political dynamics
(3J plan for the long term even though the short term
nets immediate benefits.
(4) the support and commitment of key leaders
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(5) indentify the locus of control in the
organization whether it is formal or informal
written or understood and consider how EO can
be integrated or associated with that dimension
(6) study the historical patterns of change in
the organization and recognize them in
strategies for future change
(7) recognize that EO is a process that begins
with the selection and involvement of people
of color and women and continues with the
assimilation and integration of these members
into the mainstream of the system
(8) recognize that as you attempt to change the
organization deliberately, it continues to
change naturally. Reassess efforts frequently
and adjust goals and objectives that are absolete
addition to strategies. Don't look for a finite
end, change in changing
(9) the involvement of skilled people preferably as
a member of the organization who has knowledge of
organization as well as the application of
behavioral science technology
(10)
recognize that EO efforts are successful and
complete when programs and special considerations
are no longer necessary and the issue is
identified as good management.
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APPENDICES
GLOSSARY
ALNAV - All Navy (Message to Everyone in the Navy).
BUPERS - Bureau of Naval Personnel
CINCLant - Commander in Chief Atlantic
CINCPac - Commander in Chief Pacific
CINCPacFl t - Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet
CinCUSMavEur - Commander in Chief,. U. S. Naval Forces, Europe
CNO - Chief of Naval Operations
DOD - Department of Defense
DRRI - Defense Race Relations Institute
EXEC - Executive Officer
EOPS - Equal Opportunity Race Relations Specialist
EO/RR - Equal Opportunity Race Relations
EOQI - Equal Opportunity Quality Indicator
Flag Officer - Admirals and Commandants
Their presence usually recognized at Military
sites by display of U. S. Flag
JG - junior Grade
LantFlt - Atlantic Fleet
LCdr - Lieutenant Commander
MAA - Minority Affairs Assistant
NAS - Naval Air Station
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NAVOP -
OPNAV -
SitRep -
UCMJ -
Z-Gram -
Message from the Office of CNO
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Situation Report
Uniform Code of Military Justice
(Zulu NAVOPS) - Messages related to policy or
guidance emanating personally from the CNO
identified with a "Zulu" series message
designator.
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SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
NAVY RACE RELATIONS EDUCATION
IMPACT ANALYSIS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
INTRODUCTION
Thia Executive Sumary provides an overview of an evaluation study
conducted by the System Development Corporation to assess the United
States Navy Race Relations Education Program. Specifically, it
summarizes the objectives, scope, major conclusions and recomsendations
of the Impact and effectiveness of this program on Navy personnel.
OBJECTIVES
Oxe principal objectives of this evaluation were to assess:
•
the effectiveness of the Navy's Race Relations Education
Program in meeting defined program goals.
• those program areas in need of modification.
SCOPE
The assessment of the Navy Race Relations Education Program was
based on the comparison of data collected during two separate time
periods: one in the spring of 1973 and then again in the fall of 1973.
During the April-May 1973 time period, 112 commands were interviewed and
survey data collected from 5,659 personnel who had not participated
in a formal Navy Race Relations Education Seminar (Executlve/UPWARD)
.
In September-October 1973 » 108 of the original commands were revisited
and interviewed and survey data collected from 4,541 of the original
survey respondents. Of those respondents, 1,323 had directly participated
in a seminar between April and October 1973, with the remaining 3,218
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not having done so. The conclusions and recommendation, presented in
this summary are based upon comparison between those who had and had
not participated in a race relations seminar over the intervening
time period.
CONCLUSIONS
It is evident that the Race Relations Education Program was effective in
Increasing awareness of;
* Personal worth and racial dignity.
I Inequities in opportunity for minority personnel.
% Racial discrimination in the Navy.
Differences between potential and actual effectiveness,
of individuals, groups and programs in improving race relations
in the command.
Furthermore, the program promoted:
% Agreement among blacks and whites on important command racial
issues.
$ Personal commitment toward the elimination of racian within
all Navy sectors.
9 More positive overall attitudes toward the Navy (than nonprogram
participant;)).
It is also evident that the Race Relations Education Program was less
effective in fostering immediate affirmative action towards Improved
equal opportunity, specifically the program appeared to have;
P Affected white senior enlisted and officer personnel less
than other surveyed personnel.
$ Generated a limited number of command Affirmative Action Plans.
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RECOMMENDATIONS
Bawd upon the foregoing conclusions, evaluation of the impact of the
Navy'e Race RaUtiona Education Program, SDC providea the following
recommendations for program modifications by appropriate' echciona of
the Navy Chain of Comnand;
* Increased efforts should be directed toward achieving full
cooperation from senior enlisted and officer personnel in the
acceptance of the personal worth of individual uniqueness, value
potential, and in the establishment and implementation of
policies and procedures geared to guarantee equal opportunities
within and across all Navy sectors and echelons.
* To maximize the Increased awareness of racial discrimination in
the Navy, efforts should be made to Incorporate accountability
for corrective actions in operational practices, policies, and
procedures, etc. $>eclfically, clear and precise guidelines should
be provided to all commands by type comnand for developing
standardized procedures for:
- increasing emphasis on the need for, and development
and implementation of Affirmative Action Plans.
- posting equitable assignments of personnel to work
detail rosters
- providing formal striker procedures
SUMMARY
In summary, although seminars have produced desirable effects of
increasing personnel awareness of personal and Institutional racism,
the minimal indication of change in policies and practices does not
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reflect thl. new avarene... To promote each change., a. w.U a. to
Increaae racial awarene.., future training ahould provide Increaaed
emphaala on the Implementation of change within the framework of
dlaclpllned, efficient, orderly and ethical Navy operation..
Problems in tlic Navy— 234
Ships Carry
Society’s Ills
in Microcosm
"A"
INY person subject to this
cotie
. . .
who with Intent to
J.SL usurp or override lawful
military authority refuses, in concert
With any other |>crson or persons,
to obey orders or otherwise do liU
duty or creates any violence or dis-
turbance Is guilty of mutiny
. .
.•
That wide-ranging mandate, con-
tained in a 1051 congressional act
tatting up the Uniform Code of Mili-
tary Justice (UCMJ), gives the Navy
plenty of leeway in disciplining
wrongdoers.
.••'But perhaps this section of the
IJCMJ was meant to b« somewhat
Tague. Strictly speaking, mutiny in
the Navy has meant forceably tak-
ing control of a ship awav from tho
commanding officer. Mutiny la ai-
*. the ultimata nautical sin, the
most heinous offense next to treason
Itself,
Although the U.S. Navy now flnda
Itself In difficult period, recent dis-
orders aboard ship do not constitute
mutiny. They do, however, reflect
problems peculiar to naval life, and
magnifications of problems ashore.
A ship, wltcl her an aircraft carrier
with a 'I.OOO-nianrrcw.uhuttoncd-up
nuclear submarine or a patrol craft,
is a floating microcosm of society.
Cut loose from the world, perhaps
(teaming off Yankee Station in In-
dochinese watcra for months st a
time, site carries within her steel
hull all the Ills and torments of a
troubled mankind In the 1070s.
Worse, such corrosive problems
grow even rougher when the men
involved dwell in cIomc, uncomforta-
ble quarters; where routine chore*
can be grindingly monotonous;
where assembly line duty is a wav-
of-life from sunrise to sunrise;
where shorcside amenities, like
women and liquor, are totally una-
vailable.
True, the cato-nine-tail* has long
since disappeared from the arsenal
of punishments.
Nor doc* the Navy hang criminals
from the yardarm after a shipboard
rourt-manial. as was the case in
1S-I2 when Midshipman Philip Spen-
cer, son of tlus secretary of war. met
this fata with two others for con-
spiring to sciza the brig Somera,
Adm. Elmo R. Zumwolt Jr.
v 1
l %
poge
235murder her officer*. and nil to the
.Spanish Main. (Sen al«*e.)
Since the lime Concress passed a
r’rcaoltillnn establishing a Navy to
protect rnmmerre in I T9 1, that wa«
the only Incident defined as a muti-
ny In rervire hiitorv. Even it pn»-
voiced runshh-rablc comment, large-
ly unfavorable, in the presa.
In July, Hill, the naval ammuni-
tion depot at l’ort Chicago, Calif.,
blew tip when two ships collided.
Over COO persons, mostly black car-
R» handler*. were killed. Wlien the
hose commander ordered the survi-
vora Imek to work after the wrrek-
- a wan rleared, oo declined to had
more ammunition.
.
Hasty charges of ‘mutiny* wera
brought. However, the )>a«e was be-
*tc£ed by newsmen, including repre-
sentatives from the nation's leading
Negro journals, and their stories
helped in pond measure to have llte
charges reduced to "refusal to obev
lawful order*.*
The Navy is in the midst of a new
and deeply troubling jx-rto.1 of slti|»-
board dudurlmtxvs, which stem
chiefly from racial and civil right*
issues.
In October, a riot broke out among
black* and whiles on the carrier Klu
•ty Hawk, then 1mu rid for Vietnam.
Forty whites and six black sailors
were injured Icully enough to be ait*
lifted to hospitals. Twentyone crew-
men face court-martial.
A naval oiler. Hassayampe, exper-
ienced a similar fracas in Subie Bay,
the Philippines, that same month.
Early in November. 120 black
crewmen and 12 whites aboard the
carrier Constellation joined in a
•sit-down strike* during maneuvers
off San Diego, and were sent ashore.
They held a second sit-down when
ordered back to their ship after the
carrier returned to bare.
CapC J. D. Ward summoned them
before a ‘captain's man* — the
lowest form oif shipboard disciplina-
ry procedure under Xaw Regula-
tions and the UCMJ. About one-
fourth were discharged from the
N*vy, the rest given fines, demo-
tions or additional duty as punish-
ment.
None of these events, nor the in-
cidents of ship-saiiotape which have
been occurring with dangerous fre-
quency of late, can be classed as mu-
tiny. No attempts were made to tako
control of the ship. The wrongdoers
wanted—in the words of s Constella-
tion crewman—"to air our views
and tell the captain what was actual-
ly happening.*
• Ward refused to confer with the
siUiowners. This may well have
been a mistake, although he must
have had his reasons, it is unargua-
ble that work stoppages on combat
ships are not only illegal, but poten-
tially hazardous to the vessels them-
selves.
Article 1243 of N'avy Regulations
state*: *Jt anv )<crson in the naval
service considers himself oppressed
by his superior ... he shall not fail
In his respectful bearing toward
such superiur, but shall report such
oppression or misconduct to the pro
per authority.* (‘Vexatious, frivo-
lous or false* reports are Impermis-
sible, and make the mntplainant lia-
ble to disciplinary action.)
Article 121-"* pllows 'any person In
the Naval Establishment (to) ad-
dress the Secretary of Navy, via offi-
cial channels, suggestions or con-
structive criticism |N-rtnining to im-
provements ... in efficiency.*
Moreover, as the L'.S. Naval Insti-
tute’s definitive Coinm.iiul at Sea ob-
serves: Tin- men of our
-hips are
five rilhtiu of a free nation, ami the
fart that they law- coin rat ted to
wvc In isir Artm.il Forces umler
certain freely arrepted omdltlons
... In no way dimini die* ilu.no
truths.
*It Is nut often thought of, hut the
social structure of our fsmall) shi|M
closely resembles the rorlal Mruc-
tnre prevailing In our country. As in
our national society, where the pre-
dominant middle-class group fits be-
tween the much smaller upper and
lower classes, there is a predomin-
ant itrnup on board existing ho-
luxvii llte extremes of the captain
ami the (lowest) seaman
...
*
That applies al«o to capital ships.
.Vim. Lord John Jervis, Rritish
fleet commander in the late ISUt
century, declared: ’Discipline be-
pins in tlie wardroom. I dread nut
llte yeamen. It is the indbvrvct cun*
venations of the officers and the
presumptuous discussions of the or-
ders they receive that produce all
uur ills.*
Says Command si Sen: *Tlte "New
Navy* cannot sntl will not operate
successfully nit bout freedom of ex-
pression (and knowledge-able criti-
cism where warranted) within the
officer corps.
.
.*
Right there lies the key to the ail-
ment currently plaguing the once-
didst Navy.
Adm. Elmo R. Zumwait Jr., chief
of naval operations, inherited what
he termed *a lily-white racist Xaw*
two years ago, and promptly sought
to remedy tlie situation.
It was no easy task. Much of the
problem sprang from the fact that
less than 6ft of the Navy's total per-
sonnel. and less than 1% of the offi-
cers, were black. As time passe* this,
may be remedied to some degree,
since 12ft of new enlistments are
black.
But Zumwalt's zeal to bring har-
mony among the races (and increase
the proportion of blacks) waa not
4
E
'&tjj&r
l»4WtVi - illQ&vr iyL
unlverwilly shared. S.«no luni-line
admirals, dii|W captains and rhirf
l» tlv offhi-rs (who am virtually om-
nipotent I«rlow decks) resented the
kira. The ‘good old ilayg,* when
blacks wailed ialdc*. stoked boiler*.
lauiMlcrv.il and ruukud, still appealed
,
to litem.
Thu*, when Zumwait laid down
tlie law to ‘JO admiral* In Washing-
l<m aiu-r (lie ConMcllaiion affair. 1m
Until blunt laiigiuigt.-:
“Coconipn-honilintt response or
-rexiMinse which lacks nmimitmcni
from the ’In-art'—no matter how cor-
rect—ia essentially obstructionist.
Just as obstructionist U a man who
puts an order in a drawer and for-
gets 1L
’Equal meana exactly that,*
snapped Zumwait. ‘Equal:*
Command at Sea tavs: *Tha Na-
vy's policy conerrning ilia treatment
of minority grnu|is is that to allow
•llsrriminuiton in our rank* would
lie morally wrong and would in-
directly affevt uur efflcieney ami
performance ami. therefore, the wel-
fare and safety of iIkt entire nation.
This |«ilicy » 'short, sweet and to
the imint.' It should jirovkle ampin
guidance across the board to any
commander officer.*
As has always been tho case, some
ships are ineptly run. Too little at-
tention is paid by officers (starting
with the captain) to their crew's
welfare and morale. Blacks are
shorted in job assignments, promo-
tions, discipline. So a sort of cancer
sets In.
Whether Zumwalt's surgery can
catch Ibis before it goes too far is
anybody's guess.
Certain wcU-jilocsd officials ho-
lieve Zumwait, mho originated the
famed "2-grams" which repealed
many a nautical *blue law,' started
a risky era of perm Listvenejs in a
service where abrolutc obedience is
an absolute wartime necessity. But
what of non -wartime, or even
jiscudo • wartime as in « Vietnam?
That's the rub. Yet that's where
Zumwait stands on solid ground as
he seeks to make the Navy habitable
lor today's informed young men.
Zumwalt’s key Z-grams began -
with one establishing a board to find
out why officer* ami enlisted men
were quilting the Navy in droves
when their hitches ended. They aim
have directed each naval unit to
name an assistant for minority af-
fairs, and have eliminated demean-
ing and abrasive regulations on
City afloat . . . ih* < ifdtr'i
4,000 am rrprtjrn I
• micrvtmm of society.
r sr
*
**«•»>" V;
.
'
..AT —g r * Y *
*ar,Ideoq Ud.k fUrrioc U ,«Us
dress, hair styles and brerd*. (See
Page A)
•The overall rational* expressed,*
wrote Proceedings. *ls that itpiU
(ions should reflect that the vwt ma-
jority of Xavymou not be prnaUard
by policies designed to constrain
those few who would not respond to
the trust and confidence Inherent in
the less stringent rules.’
According to Command at Sex
*Thc state of discipline aboard ship
is ideal when there is a maximum of
efficiency and corneminent ami a
minimum of punishment. So ship
can lie brought to lu maximum state
of efficiency by threats of court-mar-
tial . . .*
Yet, the prejudices and practice*
of two centuries cannot be swiftly
eradicated among a service of GUO.-
000 members, even bv a determined
Zumwait. The United States has nut
succeeded in doing this ashore,
where 200-odd million Americans
cohabit in disharmony Imeans* of re-
el a 1 animosities. Too often, as
aboard tlie microcosmic shipboard
world, we manage to rerage each
other in the process.
The Kitty Hawk and Constellation
affairs cannot be condoned. (Mfetv
dors deserve punishment. But tlie
root causes must be identified and
eliminated, lest one of our tsuie mili-
tary safeguards is lu U-corae a
doubtful source of strength at some
moment of national emergency.
—JAMES BASSETT
Time* .1—«ctjM* IjJIIwi
l«n»«r Mari olllrrr
far Adm. William V. IbW;
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. Following is a text of yes.
terriay's remarks by Adm. S.
R- Zumwalt, Jr., chief of
nasal operations, to Washing.
•'
'ton area flag officers:
.
Gentlemen, I have asked
you to meet with me today
“ because I find it necessary to
dear not only my po.
sition on an important issue
,
:*.but my conviction that pro-
^
grams relevant to that issue
must be implemented. And
by implemented I mean ex-
__
actly that—down to the very
,
.lowest levels of command.
.....
When I took office 23'
..months ago I, together with }
.‘then Secretary of the Navy i
J°bo Chafee, brought to .
Washington men and women !
-,®* our officer, corps who
;
-..were members of minority. j
groups.
1 w«nt on record at that !
- time saying how surprised
-I
j#.was to find so great a misun- I
derstanding between our ra- !
cial groups. I also made |
clear the potential expio- i
•
^
siveness of such a misunder- !
standing within our Navy. !
And, how important I con-
sidered the resolution of our .
racial tensions. And let me
stress here as I will later on,
I mean resolution within the
.
framework of disciplined, ef-
.
fleient, orderly and ethical !
military operations.
Approximately two weeks
\»go, I received the fourth in
;/• »«ries of retention study
.group reports evaluadng 1
'bow effectively the more
!
than 200 minority programs *
we have devised are work- i
'..inf.
;j
Unacceptable Progress
*. It was immediately clear
to me, from this report, that
• the Navy has made unarcept-
•"able progress in the equal op-
portunity area. And that the
reason for this failure was
not the programs but the fact
• they were not being used.
At about the same time as
• I received the report, some
’*• of the very things I feared
.. 28 months ago might come i
• to pass, did, in fact, take
place.
There is no point here in
.recapitulating the incident
which took place aboard the
. earner Kitty Hawk, the
oiler Hassavampa. and most
•
.recently the earner Const*!-
latlon. For, while these ind- 1
.dents are of great import-
j
. aace, a detailed discussion •
.
Vould only obscure, with spe-
,
- cifics, the more fundamental >
issues we must face.
Let me remark, however,
‘that these incidents are not ’
the cause of racial pres- t
' sures; rather, they are the j,
manifestations of pressures
.i
• unrelieved.
_ j
Gentlemen, even before
j
;
the details of those ind- ;
dents began to come to me
• in the message traffic, it
;
dear to me the time
' had come for me to speak
very plainly. To speak with-
out the usual cushions of
jargon and without the ex-
quisite politeness we some-
.
times use to mask the im- i
pact of our thoughts. .i
What we are talking about
here is not a call for permis-
siveness. or a direction to 1
coddle. Let me say again
that discipline necessary for
good order will and must be
maintained and that each of-
ficer and man will be held
accountable for failure to •
,
• meet the standards of work
i
quality wf need and must * i
hatfe.
j
.
I am speaking to you and, >
through you, to the Navy's
entire command structure,
to emphasize again that this
jissue of discrimination must
be faced openly and fully.
Self-Deceptions Cited '
Let me begin my plain
statements by saying that, in
my opinion, the most de* •
structive influence on the
resolution of racial proiv
lems is self-deception.
|
—It is self-deception to i
j
think you can legislate attl-
tudes. You cannot !
—It is self-deception to I
feel a program is a reality.
It is not
—It is self-deception to
think that the Navy is made i
up of some separate species
j j
of man — that Navy person-
.!
nel come to us fresh from
some other place than our
world — that they come un-
tainted by the prejudices of
the society which produced
them. They do not. i
— it is self-deceotion to
j
consider all issues involving
blacks and whites solely as
racial in motivation. They
)
are not. j
JjJid, finally, ft is self-de- I
caption to consider theNavy, or any military organ- .*
Nation, as free-wheeling
— .
"to each his own way" h :
S^n°Ciet7 lllfact - even a
’
S0Ciet7 unbounded •by military law and tradi- -
non can only exist within '
the system of law and cus- i
to mtl
or a miUtary so«ty
fill its purpose ever/ man
muse icnow his own role —
*nd live within it
,
must be no swbsti-
tution of one prejudice for
another. The prejudice '
against good order and dis-
cipline is as pernicious as >
the prejudice of race.
We have tried - some-
‘
times successfully, some-
,
times not — to free our-
'
selves of those self
-decep-
tions. They lead to abstract*
tion instead of practicality. *
They lead to inefficiency ’
and failure due to an ov*^.
emphasis on theory, without • 1
consideration or to the prac-
ticality of implementation.
For instance, I believe •
many incidents are charac-
terized as, racial oniv be- •
cause that is their most visi-
• ble aspect. They have, in
fact, many causes. Men at .
sea for months on end
working extended hours’ :
seven days a week, with ‘
aging equipment, and esca- •
lating demands, face pres- •
sures almost inconceivable
to those who have not .•
known them.
It was in recognition of
the possibility that these
duty pressures might burst I
forth in biack-wbite confron-
tations that I sought,
through my racial programs,
to forestall such exolosions. i
But it was also clear-that 1
we could accomplish noth- •
ing by putting our alr-adv '
overworked commanding of-
ficers in the intolerable po-
sition pi having ever/ move •
dictated, and their every
judgment questioned.
OipT
'O JlJl b
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INTERVIEW OUTLINE
F. Kaufman
May 19, 1975
1. Overview of study objectives
2. Focus of interview
A. Pressure groups and means of expression
B. Historical perspective of policy formulation
1. Year
2. Pre Phase I, Phase I, Phase II
3. Description of policy at different stages
4. Issues surrounding policy formulation and implementation
3. Other Resources
A. Documents for study
1. Sample Z-grams
2. Copies of command policies
3. OPNAV instructions
B. Persons to interview/contact


